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Preface
All of the material in this thesis has been written out of curiosity. This curiosity has been
awakened in me when I, still as an undergraduate student, visited the Ph.D. program at the
University of California at Berkeley. It made me apply as a doctoral student, and it pushed
me to explore new ideas, which — especially during my two years in the intense and inspiring
working atmosphere at Université Toulouse 1 with its excellent courses, seminars, guest lectures,
and its numerous conferences — were constantly popping up in my mind. Many of these ideas
turned out to be not feasible, but some of them did and these are the ones that make up this
thesis.
I begin by thanking you, Konrad Stahl, for giving me the chance to start as a doctoral
student at Mannheim, for having been my advisor, and for believing enough in me to send me
first to Berkeley and later — when you realized that my research entered fields that you were
not close to yours — to Toulouse. Thank you for having prepared the way at Mannheim for
me to defend my thesis in cotutelle! Thank you also for having given me the courage and the
financial means to go and present my work in conferences and workshops! And finally thank you
for keeping me cool when my slides were stolen before my first presentation in an international
conference! I will always be prepared to give my talk without slides!
If I started understanding that writing an economic model is hard work, which needs a lot of
focus (and a lot of patience), this is certainly thanks to Giancarlo Spagnolo, who coauthored my
first paper and supervised a second idea during my time at the Universität Mannheim. Thank
you, Giancarlo, for having written the word "ugly" on several of my first attempts to write a
theoretical economic model! Thank you for having repeatedly told me to put structure on my
ideas and to write them down as clearly as possible! Thank you for insisting with me to be at
the same time as formal and as intuitive as possible! I hope I approached to some degree the
rigor you demanded from me.
If in the end I indeed managed to keep my ideas somewhat simple and — at least to some
degree — to find out which ingredient "is guilty of what" in my models, I have to thank Patrick
Rey for that. Patrick, I do not know how to thank you for your great advice and I do not know
how to express the value it had and has to me! Let me start with thanking you for having been
able to see potential in my ideas — and for having told me that there is some — a long time before
I was able to sense where these ideas were leading me! This way, you encouraged me to work
harder, to make the ideas as clear as possible, and finally to see where I was heading. Thank
you for your advice on how to tackle the ideas, even though it usually took me some time to
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follow your advice: On various occasions, I left your office thinking: "it looks right what you
are saying, but let me try to do it first the way I thought to do it". About every single time,
in the end, I found myself solving the problems the way you have suggested — because it was
the most sensible way to solve them. A huge thank you for giving me the chance to stay in the
great environment of Toulouse and for making it possible for me to defend my thesis both, at
Universität Mannheim and at Université Toulouse 1! Finally, thank you, Patrick, for teaching
me more than Economics. Being in a state of Zen was so much easier after leaving your office.
The intense working atmosphere at Université Toulouse 1 and my intention to make up for
lost time had an unfortunate drawback for my social life: Aside from few exceptions, my office
mates and colleagues at UT1 only saw me in the office. I promise to do better in the future on
that front! Thanks for knowing me, greeting me, and smiling at me anyway ;-). I am happy
that I had your company in Toulouse! Thank you also for all your answers to my questions!
The same way, I would like to thank my fellow students and colleagues at Mannheim, many of
whom left at the same time I did. Thank you for being there whenever I had a question, for
good joint teaching, and for good company! All the best to you!
A special "Thank you!" goes to Aude Schloesing and to Florence Chauvet! You have made
my life at Université Toulouse 1 so much easier by always helping me — whichever situation I
was in. Thanks also for listening to my concerns and "cooling me down" when things did not
seem to go the way I wanted them to go. You are jewels! Thank you to Marion Börresen for
giving me support in various ways at Mannheim until I "betrayed" the chair and went away!
Finally, I would like to thank my mother and my sister for always being there for me,
whatever I was doing. Thank you to my parents for teaching me both, to believe in myself and
to self-criticize! You do not know how helpful this is!
The greatest amount of debt, however, I would like to acknowledge to you, Simona. Thank
you so much for great joint work, for constant support and encouragement, and for being vigor-
ously upset whenever you felt that I have given only 115 instead of 150%! You have often made
me go the extra-mile! Knowing that I am not always easy to work with, I thank you all the
more for coauthoring two papers and for being willing to go on doing more joint work! And —
thank you for loving me and planning a life together!
In the end, money matters. Funding for my research has been provided in these five years
by Universität Mannheim, the European Commission in form of a Marie Curie Training Site
fellowship and a CEPR fellowship in the RTN "Competition Policy in International Markets",
as well as by GREMAQ in form of a post-doctoral fellowship. Thank you to Marc Ivaldi, Bruno
Jullien, Michel LeBreton, Patrick Rey, and Konrad Stahl for helping me to access these sources!
I am sad to leave Toulouse for good. One only knows what it means once one has left, but it
is possible to get a taste of it recalling the number of excellent seminars and workshops, which
are taking place each and every week, as well as all the guest lectures and conferences, which
are being held at Toulouse all over the year.
Toulouse, June 2005.
General Introduction
This thesis deals with issues of cooperation in industrial organization. It comprises two main
parts. Part I contains chapter 1, which studies the impact of network structures on the sus-
tainability of cooperation or collusion. Part II contains chapters 2 — 4, which deal with the
incentives to pursue joint R&D projects in the presence of agency problems.
Chapter 1 of this thesis is devoted to the study of networks of relational (or implicit) con-
tracts. It is based on the paper "Networks of Relations and Social Capital" by Steffen Lippert
and Giancarlo Spagnolo. In this chapter, we explore how sanctioning power and equilibrium
conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission tech-
nologies. In our model relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to
enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if agents had no access to other net-
work members’ sanctioning power and information. We identify conditions for network stability
and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable subnetworks
inhibit more valuable larger networks. In this chapter, we finally provide formal definitions for
individual and communities’ ”social capital“ in the spirit of Coleman and Putnam.
Chapter 2, based on the paper "Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Re-
search" by Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert (Fabrizi and Lippert, 2005b), analyzes the impact
of agency problems on the choice of two entrepreneurs whether to carry out a stand-alone or a
joint research project. If the research project is carried out jointly, it can be conducted either by
only one of the entrepreneurs’ research units, saving on fixed costs, or in joint work by both en-
trepreneurs’ research units, which are considered to be substitutes of a varying degree. Our main
results show that joint projects are chosen when they are of high value and/or when they exhibit
low degrees of duplication or complementarities between the research units. Agency problems
reduce the occurrence of joint projects as they have to be of higher value and/or exploit higher
synergies. We also find that joint projects that would make use of potential synergies are chosen
too seldomly from a welfare point of view.
In chapter 3, based on the paper "How much efficiency gains and price reductions to put as
ingredients into an efficiency defense? ’Quanto Basta’" by Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert,
we study the impact of agency problems on merger decisions for firms facing a process innovation
project that may be conducted in two competing stand-alone firms or in a merger. We com-
pare the decisions of agent-managed firms with those of owner-managed (or family-run firms)
and show that agent-managed firms merge less often in order to exploit synergies and more
often for pure market power reasons. Within this framework, we then characterize the errors
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a competition authority would make when it relies on an efficiency defense using expected unit
production cost reductions as a decision criterion whether or not to accept a proposed merger.
We show that, due to the systematically different organizational choices of agent-managed firms
as compared with owner-managed (family-run) firms, the occurrence of either type of errors
(type I and type II) is smaller for agent-managed than for owner-managed firms.
Chapter 4 examines a channel through which a pro-competitive policy may have an impact
on managerial incentives to develop new products, one using directly the separation of ownership
and control inside the firms. If managers who exert a non-observable effort in the development
of new products have private information about the profit maximizing organizational form to
do so, the owners would optimally distort the managers’ incentives in order to let them reveal
their private information. As a consequence, the introduction of a policy favoring competitive
stand-alone development of products will not only induce more of that organizational form, but
also increase the incentives to innovative under it.
Part I
Cooperation and Collusion in
Networks
3
Chapter 1
Networks of relations and social
capital
1.1 Introduction
Relational1 (or implicit) contracts, informal cooperative arrangements sustained by repeated
interaction, are a fundamental governance mechanism for most forms of economic and social
interaction. When several long-term cooperative relationships link different agents in a group,
these agents and their relationships form networks of relations. This paper is an attempt to
characterize some of their features.
Sociologists have forcefully argued that, by ignoring the networks of social relationships in
which economic transactions are "embedded", economists fail to understand important features
of the economic process.2 Like social relations, economic transactions themselves are seldom
isolated exchanges. Most often, they are also part of a relationship, episodes of a history of
exchanges of various type itself embedded in a network of other economic and social relation-
ships.3 This is obviously the case for transactions within organizations — from employment to
interactions between units and employees — but also for many of those between organizations,
in particular supply relations, including financial ones.4
Networks of relational arrangements are not only crucial in developing economies, where
explicit contracting is hard: in advanced economic environments, and most prominently in
the fast changing one of high-tech industries firms often cooperate to share the high risk and
return from their activities. In these industries formal arrangements represent the tip of the
iceberg ”beneath which lies a sea of informal relations” (Powell et al. 1996). On the one
1This chapter is based on the paper "Networks of Relations and Social Capital", written jointly with Giancarlo
Spagnolo and circulated as SSE/EFI Working Paper No 570, quoted in this thesis as Lippert and Spagnolo (2005).
2The work of Coleman (1988, 1990) and Granovetter (1985) is particularly relevant. For example, the latter
writes "The embeddedness argument stresses instead the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or
"networks") of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance" (1985, p. 490).
3Greif (1993) and Casella and Rauch (2002) discuss the importance of ethnic ties for trade in environments
where other enforcement mechanisms are ineffective.
4Macaulay (1963) first drew attention on the crucial role plaid by relationships in the economic process; Klein
and Leffler (1981) have stressed the importance of long term firm-customer relationships; cornerstones of the
formal theory of implicit contracts are Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989); Baker et al. (2001),
Levin (2003) and Rajo (2003) constitute important recent developments.
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hand, lacking contractibility over the main ingredients — investments into human capital and
knowledge transfers — explicit contracts can only play a limited role.5 On the other hand, the
need for flexibility linked to the fast changing and highly unpredictable environment make rigid
explicit contracts dangerous and vertical integration unattractive. High tech firms therefore often
establish informal cooperative agreements with several other firms, and these arrangements link
them in a common network of relations.6
In the Internet, the maintenance of reciprocal peering agreements between Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) requires long term cooperative relationships between them, nodes of a network.
Our theoretical inquiry also aims at shading light on the viability of peering ISPs networks, rela-
tive to the more formal unilateral transit agreements with dominant ISPs or backbone operators.
The interbank market can also be seen as a network of long term relationships, where the links
that spread contagion among interdependent financial institutions also induce liquid banks to
cooperate and privately bail out illiquid ones (see Leitner, 2004). And social networks have been
recently shown to have a pervasive and sometimes negative influence on corporate governance
practices (e.g. Kramarz and Thesmar, 2004).
In fact, cooperation is often not for the good: corruption, illegal trade (in drugs, arms and
people) and organized crime in general can only rely on relational contracts for the governance of
their illegal transactions, which therefore typically take place within networks of tight relations.
Similarly, collusive agreements to increase prices or restrain output are forms of illegal (and
common) relational contracts. Multiproduct firms at different levels of the production chain,
meeting and cooperating/colluding in different input, geographical and product markets form
networks of relations that may link many apparently distant and unrelated firms, creating pro-
collusive indirect multimarket contact where no multimarket contact seems present.
In this paper we describe equilibrium conditions for different architectures of networks of
relations under different informational regimes, paying special attention to differences between
circular and non-circular architectures. Most of the dilemmas mentioned earlier, from hold-up
situations in specific (legal or illegal) exchanges to cheating in cartel agreements or on public
good contributions have the strategic features of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, so our basic model
is a repeated game in which each agent interact in generic, asymmetric strategic situations with
the structure of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas and can form links — cooperative relationships —
with a small subset of the other agents. In our model, the links are the relationships, the network
is directed and the links’ orientation captures the presence of net gains from cooperation (slack
5The experimental work of Fehr et al. (2004) nicely documents the overwhelming importance of long term
relationships for specific economic transactions.
6Saxenian (1994) reports a highly specialized network-like organization within the computer-industry in Silicon
Valley. She argues that networks of informal cooperative information-sharing relations play a crucial role for the
success of the district in comparison with Route 128, a competing district close to Boston. In her words, ”While
they competed fiercely, Silicon Valley’s producers were embedded in, and inseparable from, these social and
technical networks.” It is noteworthy that the informal relations reported by Saxenian are not only of value on
their own, they are of special value due to their being part of a network of such relations between engineers.
Examining the biotechnology industry, Powell et al. (1996) point out that the ”development of cooperative
routines goes beyond simply learning how to maintain a large number of ties. Firms must learn how to transfer
knowledge across alliances and locate themselves in those network positions that enable them to keep pace with
the most promising scientific or technological developments.”
7of enforcing power in the bilateral relation). We consider three informational assumptions: the
benchmark case of complete information, where each agent observes the histories of play of all
agents; the opposite case where no information can be transmitted from an agent to the others
on their observed history of play; and the case where, while agents meet to transact, they can
choose to exchange and pass on received information on the respective histories of play. In
this last case we assume that time is required for information to travel from one agent to the
other, and allow for different speeds of information circulation within the network. We begin by
characterizing sustainable networks where agents can only have relations with two neighbors.
We show that when relations are asymmetric, since an agent would only cooperate if she receives
some incoming arrows, there is a kind of an "end-network effect" (resembling the "end-game
effects" of finitely repeated games), and network structures such as trees are not sustainable.
Circular networks overcome this problem, ensuring that all agents’ defections would be met with
punishment, which provide a clear and intuitive explanation to the importance attributed by
sociologists like Coleman (1988, 1990) to the ”closure“ of social networks.
We then show that the possibility of transmitting information about defections to other
agents in the network is never used in equilibrium if enforcement relies on unrelenting ”grim
trigger“ punishment strategies: when this is the case, once an agent deviates, a contagious
process eliminates all prospect of future cooperation in the network, which removes all incentives
to transmit information. With ”forgiving“ punishment strategies agents may instead choose to
transmit information to keep on cooperating in the rest of the network while punishing multilat-
erally one deviator. We also find that under imperfect information and unrelenting punishment
strategies, bilaterally enforceable relations between some agents may hinder the stability of larger
networks containing these agents because these may not be willing to sacrifice their relation to
perform their part in the punishment phase that could sustain the larger network. This problem,
though, can also be overcome with the use of relenting punishments. In contrast to results in
other literatures (e.g. Kranton, 1996; Spagnolo, 2002), in our model improved outside options,
like a more efficient spot market, may under certain conditions foster cooperation by making
the breakup of a relation in the case of a deviation a credible threat. Extending the analysis to
more complex network architectures where agents may have more than two partners/neighbors
we provide formal definitions for individual and communities’ ”social capital“ in the spirit of
Coleman and Putnam that generalize the definition introduced in Spagnolo (1999a, 2000) based
on Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990).
In an appendix we also allow agents to exclude ’cheaters’ permanently from the network and
then close the gap by creating new relations. We identify (quite restrictive) conditions for these
strategies to form a sustainable network and show that they may marginally improve over the
other strategies considered only if information about agents’ history can be transmitted over
the network. With full information these strategies do just as well as the others and with no
information transmission they cannot sustain a network because of lack of information on whom
to link to.
Related Literature. Besides being related to the already mentioned relational contracts
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literature, this paper contributes to the literature on the emergence and stability of networks.
Prominent contributions to this literature - elegantly surveyed in Jackson (2003) - include, among
others, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who model the emergence and stability of a social networks
when agents choose to set up and maintain or destroy costly links using the notion of pairwise
stability; Bala and Goyal (2000a) who consider the setup of directed and non-directed links
by one agent only; Johnson and Gilles (2000), who introduce a spatial cost structure leading
to equilibria of locally complete networks; Bala and Goyal (2000b), who explore the role of
communication reliability in networks; and Kranton and Minehart (2000, 2001) who introduce
investment and competition after in a buyer-seller network where buyers choose links in a the
first stage. Belleflamme and Bloch (2003) model the formation of networks of market-sharing
collusive relations between firms. These models focus on agents’ decision whether to build and
maintain a link or not. The common central question is: Given a value of a network, a sharing
rule and the cost of maintaining a link, which networks will emerge in equilibrium, and are
they efficient? The underlying game and enforceability problems are left out of consideration.7
Our approach is complementary. We depart from this literature by explicitly modelling the
underlying game, which allows us to study the consequences of its features for the stability of
network structures; by focussing on the equilibrium sustainability of network structures rather
than on the process of network formation; and by showing that the condition for sustainability
of each relation of which a network is composed is generally not independent of the network’s
architecture.
Related work that explicitly models enforcement problems in communities has mostly focused
on randommatching games. Kandori (1992), Ellison (1994) and others consider repeated random
matching prisoner’s dilemma games, showing how much cooperation can be sustained under no
information transmission between agents. More recently, a similar framework is used by Dixit
(2003a) to study the effects of different types of third-party enforcement, and in Dixit (2003b) to
analyze the efficiency of relational vs. explicit governance systems when distance among agents
differ, inviting in his conclusion to endogenize information transmission. Groh (2002) extends
this approach by including an endogenous decision to pass on information to other agents, hence
he is closest to our framework. In contrast to this literature, we consider situations where agents
with potentially changing opponents establish long-term relationship with fixed partners (e.g.
neighbors). This introduces an important forward induction element into strategic behavior
when defecting. We keep Groh’s endogenous choice whether to pass on information on past
actions and introduce the further possibility to pass on informations received by partners in the
underlying game.
Our work is probably closest to the simultaneous and independent work of Haag and La-
gunoff (2002) and Vega Redondo (2003).8 Haag and Lagunoff examine a planner’s optimal choice
of social linkages - or "neighborhood structure" - when each agent plays symmetric repeated
7 In a footnote of their introduction, Belleflamme and Bloch write: ”In this paper, our focus is on the stability
of market sharing agreements, and we assume that these agreements are enforceable. The issue of enforceability
of market sharing agreements is an important one, which cannot be answered in traditional models of repeated
oligopoly interaction. We leave it for further study.” Our work can be seen as a first part of this further study.
8We are grateful to Sanjeev Goyal who let us know about these important, complementary papers.
9prisoner’s dilemma games with those other agents selected to be her neighbors, the agents’ dis-
count factors differ and are stochastically determined after the planners’ choice, information is
assumed to flow along the links, and agents sustain cooperation by a kind of stationary grim
trigger strategies. Among other things, they find a trade off between suboptimal equilibrium
punishment (due to imperfect monitoring) and excessive social conflict (linked to heterogeneous
discount factors). Our approach is similar in so far that we also look at the effect of different
network structures on the maximum level of cooperation sustainable. However, our approaches
are very different in most other respects. In their model, as in Kranton and Minehart (2000,
2001), the presence of a link is a pre-condition for interaction hence for a cooperative relation. In
our model, instead, the link is the relation and there is no link without cooperation. Moreover,
we allow for general asymmetries in payoffs, so that the same agent can be very interested in
cooperating with one agent but ready to cheat with the other, and consider in detail the effect
of different strategies besides grim trigger. Finally, we endogenize information transmission and
characterize the relation with different punishment strategies.
Vega Redondo models the evolution of a social network where social relations are idiosyn-
cratic bilateral repeated prisoners’ dilemmas with symmetric payoffs, subject to random shocks.9
In his model, links are created and destroyed by agents depending on the expected net gains
from cooperation; information is assumed to flow across the network one link per period; and
enforcement power is transmitted to non sustainable relations. As in Spagnolo (1999a, 2000),
"social capital" is defined as the slack enforcement power from cooperative relations that can
be used to enforce cooperation in other relations where bilateral cooperation is not sustainable.
Vega Redondo is mainly interested in the formation and evolution of social networks. He as-
sumes circulation of information in the network and focuses on symmetric situations and grim
trigger strategies. In contrast, we do not deal with network formation and evolution but dig
more in depth in terms of sustainability of given network structures, allowing for asymmetries,
different punishment strategies and agents’ choice of whether to pass or conceal information.
Among other things, we show that a network of relations may sustain relations none of which
is sustainable if agents rely only on bilateral punishment mechanisms; and that information
transmission among agents is not consistent with the use of unforgiving strategies such as "grim
trigger" or "Nash-reversion".
Finally, our work is also closely related to the theoretical literature on multimarket contact
and collusive behavior sparkled by the seminal work of Bernheim and Whinston (1990). In
their model, collusion between two firms is fostered by tying collusive behavior in one market
to collusive behavior in the other thereby pooling asymmetries in incentive constraints in the
two markets.10 The closest paper within this strand of literature is probably Maggi (1999), who
adapts and extends the multimarket contact framework modelling multilateral self-enforcing in-
9See also Jackson and Watts (2002), who analyze the process of network formation when agents interact in
coordination games.
10Spagnolo (1999a) extends the setting to objective functions submodular in payoffs from different markets
and shows that multimarket contact may facilitate collusion even in the absence of asymmetries. Matsushima
(2001) introduces imperfect monitoring and shows that when firms meet in a sufficient number of markets efficient
collusion can be sustained under almost the same conditions as with perfect monitoring.
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ternational trade agreements. We generalize and extend the work of Bernheim and Whinston by
considering imperfect information and endogenous information transmission, and most impor-
tantly by showing that agents/firms can easily exploit indirect multimarket contact to sustain
otherwise unfeasible cartels where absolutely no multimarket contact is present. We generalize
and extend Maggi’s work by considering generic strategic situations and generic number of agents
and relations, and by characterizing the role of different information transmission mechanisms
and punishment strategies on networks stability.
We proceed with the definition of a network of relations in section 1.2. In section 1.3, we
derive results for sustainable networks with the restriction of at most two neighbors. We extend
these results to situations with more neighbors in section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes. Appendix
A.7 extends the analysis by assuming that in a punishment phase, new relations can be created.
1.2 The model
Interaction There is a set N = {1, ..., n} of infinitely lived agents i ∈ N able to interact in
pairs according to a connection structure C of two element subsets of N, where ij ∈ C, i, j ∈ N,
if they are connected. Denote Ci the set of connections of agent i. In each period t, connected
agents play according to a generic prisoners’ dilemma with idiosyncratic payoffs given by the
following matrix:
agent j
Cji Dji
agent i Cij ci,j , cj,i li,j , wj,i
Dij wi,j , lj,i di,j , dj,i
where li,j < di,j < ci,j < wi,j and li,j + wi,j < 2ci,j , ∀i, j ∈ N, i = j. The stage game is
assumed to be constant over time. Note that the assumptions on the payoffs imply the static
Nash equilibrium characterized by
(
Dij ,Dji
)
. One interpretation of agent i’s actions Cij and
Dij is that agent i is either taking a cooperative action Cij with respect to j, or not taking it,
i.e. taking no action at all, Dij .
We can think of Cij as "contributing" to any kind of local public good, "complying" with
the terms of any relational agreement, or "colluding"; and to Dij as "don’t...". The asymmetric
prisoner’s dilemma structure captures the essential strategic features of most of the examples
discussed in the introduction11.
Agents are assumed to interact repeatedly. Time is discrete, and all agents are assumed to
share a discount factor δ < 1. For simplicity, we assume additive separability of agents’ payoffs
across interactions and across time12. Agents are assumed to choose actions which maximize
their discounted utility.
11Matsushima (2001) shows this in detail for quantity setting oligopolies, where firms simultaneously choose
either a small amount of supply (”cooperation”) or a large amount of supply (”defection”).
12Removing this (standard) assumption, along the lines of Spagnolo (1999a, 1999b), would complicate the
analysis but leave all qualitative results unaffected.
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Relations and relational networks In this subsection, we define what we mean by a relation
and by a network of relations and give some definitions useful for analyzing these networks. We
start by defining a relation:
Definition 1.1 (Relation) Given a strategy profile, two agents i and j share a relation if they
repeatedly play Cij , Cji.
Let R ⊂ C denote the set of connections between agents who share a relation and Ri =
{j| ij ∈ R} the set of agents with whom i shares a relation.
For notational convenience, let gij denote player i′s net expected discounted gains from the
relation with player j, i.e. the difference between the discounted payoff from playing
(
Cij , Cji
)
forever and defecting and playing the static Nash equilibrium
(
Dij ,Dji
)
forever after
gij ≡ ci,j − δdi,j − (1− δ)wi,j .
In a standard bilateral repeated game setting both conditions, gij ≥ 0 and gji ≥ 0, are necessary
for a cooperative relation to be sustainable in equilibrium as, in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma,
Friedman’s (1971) grim trigger (or ”unrelenting Nash reversion”) strategies are optimal in the
sense of Abreu (1988). Note also that if gij > 0 player i does not have an incentive to defect
from a cooperative agreement in an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma where players use
optimal punishment strategies; but gij < 0 does not mean that there is no gain for agent i
from cooperation with agent j. It just means that agent i would like to deviate and bilateral
cooperation is, therefore, not sustainable. We call a relation of player i with player j deficient
for player i if gij < 0 and non-deficient for player i if gij ≥ 0.
Definition 1.2 (mutual, unilateral, bilaterally deficient relation) The relation ij is called mu-
tual iff gij ≥ 0 and gji ≥ 0, it is called unilateral iff either gij < 0 and gji ≥ 0 or gij ≥ 0 and
gji < 0, it is called bilaterally deficient iff gij < 0 and gji < 0.
We are now in the position to define a network of relations.
Definition 1.3 (Relational network) A relational network NS = (N,R) is a graph consisting
of the set of agents N and the set of relations R.
Definition 1.4 (Sustainable relational network) A relational network NS = (N,R) is sustain-
able iff the strategy profile prescribing the relations in R is a sequential equilibrium.
Definition 1.5 (Stable sustainable relational network) A sustainable relational network NS =
(N,R) is strategically stable if it fulfills Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986) stability criteria.
Graphical representation A simple way to represent relational networks is graphical, where
a line or an arrow is drawn from agent j to agent i if ij ∈ R. This is standard in the literature.
We would like to emphasize, however, that our graphical representation of relational networks
departs from the conventional graphical representation in the networks formation literature.
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1 2
34
Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of a network of relations
There, an arrow outgoing from a vertex i usually depicts a link sponsored or formed by vertex i.
In our graphical representation, on the other hand, the presence of arrows conveys information
on the sustainability of relations with optimal bilateral punishments, more specifically on each
agent’s net discounted gains from defecting from a bilateral relation: We depict a relation ij ∈ R
with gij > 0 by an incoming arrow to player i.
A unilateral relation, thus, is depicted by an arc originating from the agent for whom the
relation in deficient. A mutual relation is depicted by an incoming arc to both players. A
bilaterally deficient relation is just a line. If two agents i, j can take an action w.r.t. each other,
i.e. ij ∈ C, but do not share a relation, i.e. ij /∈ R, we depict this by a dotted line. Refer to
figure 1.1: Agents 1 and 2 share a mutual relation, the relation between 2 and 3 is unilateral —
it is deficient for player 2 and non-deficient for player 3 — and agents 1 and 3 share a bilaterally
deficient relation. Finally, agents 4 and 1 are connected in the sense that 14 ∈ C, however
14 /∈ R, i.e. 4 ∈ C1 but 4 /∈ R1.
Definition 1.6 (mutual, non-mutual, mixed relational network) A relational network is mutual
if it only consists of mutual relations; it is non-mutual if it does not contain mutual relations;
and it is mixed if it consists of both, mutual and other relations.
As we are going to use — to some (limited) extent — graph theoretical language, let us define
the used concepts here. In the relational network, agents i and j are called adjacent from/to
each other or directly connected if ij ∈ R. The set of agents with whom i shares relations are
the neighborhood of i, denoted by Ri, and j ∈ Ri ⇔ i ∈ Rj . Given NS = (N,R) , the number
of agents in N is called the order of NS and the number of relations in R the size of NS . The
number of arcs directed into agent i is called the indegree of agent i, denoted by id i. The degree
of vertex i is the number of edges of agent i, denoted deg i. An agent of degree 1 is called end
vertex. The network in figure 1.1 is of order 4 and size 5, there is no end vertex, and 2 is a vertex
with deg 2 = 3 and id 2 = 2. A network is called an i− j path if it consists of a finite alternating
sequence of agents and links that begins with agent i and ends with agent j, in which each link
in the sequence joins the agent that precedes it in the sequence to the agent that follows in the
sequence, in which no agent is repeated. An i− j path is called a cycle if i = j. A cycle of size
c is called a c−cycle.
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Figure 1.2: Agent 1’s possible ”observations”
Information structures We will consider the following three informational assumptions. Let
Hij be the set of histories in the relation between agents i and j with
(
aijt , a
ji
t
)
t=1,...,T
∈ Hij .
(I1) Complete Information: At time τ , each agent i ∈ NS observes
• (amnt )t=1,...,τ ∈ Hmn ∀m,n ∈ NS.
Each agent observes the history of play of all other agents.
(I2) No Information Transmission: At time τ , each agent i ∈ NS observes
•
(
aijt , a
ji
t
)
t=1,...,τ
∈ Hij ∀j ∈ Ri.
Each agent only observes the history of (his own and) his direct opponents’ play.
(I3) Network Information Transmission: At time τ , each agent i ∈ NS observes
•
(
aijt , a
ji
t
)
t=1,...,τ
∈ Hij ∀j ∈ Ri and
• (amnt , anmt )t=1,...,int[τ− lv ] ∈ H
mn, m ∈ Rn, where min [l (i,m) , l (i, n)] = l if there
exists an i−m path and if every agent on that path is willing to transmit information
on their own history as well as messages received.
Under the Network Information Transmission mechanism, (I3), besides observing the history
of his direct opponents’ play, in each period each agent i can transmit and receive truthful
messages - pieces of hard information - to/from each agent j ∈ Ri about the histories of play
and about messages they received. A message on past behavior can travel over v links per
period. We assume that agents only meet when they cooperate, hence information can only be
transmitted through existing cooperative relations/links.
For an illustration of the three informational assumptions, consider a non-circular network
with 6 agents, call them agent 1 through 6, as in figure 1.2. Suppose first agents use the Network
Information Transmission mechanism (I3) , and let v = 2. Then in t = 5, agent 1 observes the
full history of his own play starting at t = 1 through t = 5. Furthermore, he will receive messages
from agent 2 about the play between 2 and 3 and thus ”observe” actions
(
a2,3t , a
3,2
t
)
t=1,...,4
. The
messages from 2 will also contain his received messages and thus agent 1 will ”observe” actions(
a3,4t , a
4,3
t
)
t=1,...,3
,
(
a4,5t , a
5,4
t
)
t=1,...,3
, and so on. Consider now the Complete Information case
(I1). Each agent immediately knows everything that happened between every other two players,
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that is for example between agents 5 and 6 or between agents 2 and 3. This is of course also
a degenerate form of Network Information Transmission mechanism (I3) where ν → ∞. With
No Information Transmission (I2) each agent only knows the history of his own play, that is
agent 1 only knows what happened between agents 1 and 2. This is also an extreme case of the
network Information Transmission mechanism (I3) where ν = 0.
Our information transmission mechanisms relate to the literature on perfect, public, and
private monitoring in the following way. Complete Information (I1) implies perfect monitoring.
No Information Transmission (I2) implies perfect monitoring for agents i and j on their bilateral
history of play, but private monitoring for the same agents on the history of play of other agents
and of their neighbors with other neighbors13. With the Network Information Transmission
mechanism (I3), a temporal modification of (I2) is assumed. Again, refer to figure 1.2 and let
v = 2 and t = 5. There is perfect monitoring for all actions that happened more than 3 periods
ago. Actions between agents 5 and 6 from period 4 are assumed to be private w.r.t. agent 1.
They are perfectly monitored by agents 6, 5, 4, and 3. The network information transmission
regime introduces therefore a space-time neighborhood structure into relational networks, in the
sense that perfect monitoring may travel through the network with time. Note also that there
is no public monitoring in any of our information structures14.
There are many situations in which there does not exist an institution that gathers and dis-
seminates immediately information on the behavior of network members, as assumed implicitly
in the complete information case (I1). In the network information transmission regime (I3) we
thus suppose that information can only be transmitted through personal contacts of members
of the network, and that transmission takes time. We assume that in networks of relations com-
municating besides interacting is not costly. This, we think, is a reasonable assumption since
we have in mind chatting while carrying out one’s daily business. We will see that an essential
feature of this information structure is that, even though information transmission is costless in
itself, agents must be given incentives to actually transmit information. Even with high speeds
of information transmission, agents may prefer not to transmit information but rather deviate
from their relations to reap short run deviation profits, in which case the potential higher speed
of information transmission does not realize nor does it affect the sustainability of the network.
Specificity We assume fully specific relations, i.e. such that if a relation between two agents
breaks down, these agents cannot substitute it with relations with other agents (i.e., it is not
possible for an agent to substitute a partner with another one)15. Little changes (apart from
notation) if agents are assumed imperfect substitutes, in the sense that a relation with an agent
can be replaced at a finite but high cost with a relation with another agent.
13See Mailath and Morris (1999) for an example of private monitoring where the private signal about the other
players’ actions is imperfect.
14For an example of public monitoring, see Green and Porter (1984). They assume that players observe their
own actions, but only an imperfect public signal about the actions of the other players.
15The most obvious examples of such situations are networks where a geography limits the set of potential
partners of each agent, or where agents perform different functions (e.g. they supply different goods/services).
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Assumption 1.1 We restrict our attention to relational networks (equilibria) NS = (N,R),
with R = C.
We allow for costless substitution in Appendix A.7, so that punishment through exclu-
sion/replacement becomes an option, and find that the results of the present paper continue
to apply: relational networks where defecting agents are excluded and the relations shared
with them replaced by relations between the defecting agent’s former neighbors are either not
sustainable, or not strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1996).
1.3 Analysis
Most insights can be gained by examining networks with a restricted number of neighbors. For
the time being, therefore, we simplify the analysis by focussing on networks with nodes of a
maximal degree of two, i.e. where each agent can have at most two neighbors16.
Assumption 1.2 deg i ≤ 2.
In section 1.4, we will discuss how the results generalize to more complex networks.
1.3.1 Non-mutual networks
Mutual relations can be sustained by direct bilateral punishments, so if all relations are mutual,
a network cannot improve on what agents can sustain bilaterally. A relational network plays
a role when it allows to sustain unilateral or bilaterally deficient relations, i.e. relations that
would not be sustainable in the absence of a network. In this section, we explore how relational
networks can be sustainable even if they do not contain any relation sustainable in the absence
of such a network (assumption 1.3). We will show how the network’s ability to pool payoff
asymmetry and redistribute sanctioning power and information improves on what agents could
achieve through bilateral interaction.
Assumption 1.3 Relational networks do not contain mutual relations.
Let us start with a necessary condition for multilateral punishment mechanisms in a relational
network:
Lemma 1.1 id i ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ R is a necessary condition for a relational network to be sustainable.
Proof. Suppose i ∈ R and id i = 0. Then gij ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ Ri and i had an incentive to deviate
from all her relations.
This is a straightforward generalization of the sustainability condition for a bilateral rela-
tional contract: For each contracting party, the net gain from cooperating has to be non-negative.
The following proposition follows immediately:
16This assumption may represent a time constraint: It is always possible not to take an action w.r.t. someone
you are connected to, however, it takes time to indeed take a cooperative action.
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Figure 1.3: Only the empty network (b) is sustainable
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Figure 1.4: Trees
Proposition 1.1 End-network effect: The only sustainable non-mutual non-circular relational
network is the empty one (independent of the discount factor and the information structure).
As long as all relations are not mutual, they are not sustainable by a multilateral mechanism
within a non-circular network. Figure 1.3 illustrates this: Part (a) shows a network that is
not sustainable. In that situation, agent 1 always has an incentive to deviate and the only
sustainable network is empty, as shown in (b).
Proposition 1.1 highlights an end-network effect much similar to the end-game effect of
standard finite games and rather general. Relaxing assumption 1.2 but keeping assumption 1.1,
it is straightforward to see that this effect generalizes to trees (see figure 1.4 for an intuition),
stars and any other network forms where there are vertices that have only outgoing arrows.
One way to ensure that the necessary condition from lemma 1.1 is satisfied in a non-mutual
network is to "close" the network. If agents 1 and 6 from figure 1.3 shared a unilateral relation
that was non-deficient for 1, as in Figure 1.5, then each agent in the network would have an
incoming and an outgoing arrow, so that a multilateral punishment mechanism may exploit
payoff asymmetries.
To capture this effect, we define below the unrelenting strategy profiles (S1) for the complete
information case (I1), and (S2) for both, the no information transmission, (I2) and the network
information transmission case (I3). These strategy profiles can be thought of as a network
versions of Friedman’s (1971) "grim trigger" strategies.
Strategy profile (S1)
1. Each agent i ∈ NS starts playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri.
2. Each player i goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Ri as long as no deviation by any player in the
network is observed.
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Figure 1.5: Circular unilateral network
3. Every agent i reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ri for ever otherwise.
Strategy and belief profile (S2) is a straightforward adaptation of the grim trigger like
strategies (S1) to an environment without full information.
Strategy and belief profile (S2)
1. Each agent i ∈ NS starts playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri .
2. As long as player i observes every neighbor j ∈ Ri play Cji she goes on playing Cij
∀j ∈ Rj .
3. If player i observes a neighbor j play Dji in t = τ she reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ri ∀t ≥ τ + 1.
The beliefs players have after observing their neighbors — which we define formally in the
appendix — are such that (i) and (iv) they believe that everybody in the network cooperated if
they observe cooperation on both sides, (ii) and (v) they believe "anything" consistent if they
observe cheating from a neighbor whose net gain from cooperating with them is positive, and
(iii) and (vi) they assign an equal probability to the event that any of the other players was the
first to deviate in case they observe Cooperate from their neighbor with a positive net gain from
cooperation with them and Defect from the neighbor with a negative net gain from cooperating
with them. As for parts (iii) and (vi) of the belief structure, a priori a player does not know
anything else about any other player than that they are all symmetric w.r.t. their incentives
to deviate in their respective bilateral relations. Then the observation that only one neighbor
deviated does not provide any further knowledge. Following Bernoulli’s "Principle of Insufficient
Reason", we, therefore, assume that he assigns an equal probability of any of the other players
to have been the first to deviate from (S2) point 1. This assumption in part (iii) of the belief
structure is innocent as this observation is part of a dominated deviation.
We can then state the following.
Proposition 1.2 If the relational network is a c-cycle and agents use unforgiving strategies,
then:
1. under complete information (I1), a non-mutual relational network is sustainable if and
only if ∀i ∈ NS gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0;
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Figure 1.6: Circular unilateral network
2. under no information transmission (I2), a non-mutual relational network is sustainable if
and only if ∀i ∈ NS δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0; and
3. under the network information transmission regime (I3), a non-mutual relational network
is sustainable if ∀i ∈ NS δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0, regardless of the speed of information
transmission.
For the proof of proposition 1.2, refer to figure 1.6. Also note that in a non-mutual network
sustained by the above strategies and beliefs, unless there is perfect information the agents’ op-
timal deviation is defecting immediately from deficient relations; and it is to postpone defections
from non-deficient relations to the period before the punishment from that neighbor is expected
to start.
Proof. Part 1 of proposition 1.2: Sufficiency : Consider (S1). Since a deviator faces
immediate Nash-reversion from both his neighbors, it is optimal to deviate on both neighbors,
and the circular network is a Nash-Equilibrium if ∀i gi,i−1+gi,i+1 > 0. In the punishment phase,
the stage Nash equilibrium is played and therefore a best response. Necessity : Since during the
punishment phase the agents play their minimax strategy, the punishment phase is infinitely
long, and it starts immediately, this is the strongest punishment available to the agents. If
cooperation is not possible with these strategies, it will not be possible with other ones.
Part 2 of proposition 1.2: Sufficiency: Consider (S2). The optimal deviation for an agent i
is now first deviating on the deficient relation, that is from his relation with i + 1, and as late
as possible — since deviating from a bilaterally non-deficient relation is a cost — from his other
relation. The second deviation should take place after c − 2 periods. Therefore deviation will
not be profitable if
δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N S and {i− 1, i+ 1} = Ri.
Since every agent i in the network would want to deviate bilaterally from his relation with i+1,
was it not for the threat of the loss of cooperation in her other relation, after losing this other
relation for ever, "infecting" is optimal. This is true for any belief about the history of the game.
Necessity : Since during the punishment phase the agents play their minimax strategy and the
punishment phase is infinitely long, this is the strongest punishment available to the agents. As
19
there is no possibility to transmit information on past behavior, it is also not possible to enter a
punishment phase on both sides with a faster speed than one agent per period. If cooperation is
not possible with these strategies, it will not be possible with other — less strong — punishments.
Part 3 of proposition 1.2: Assume the network information transmission regime (I3) and
unforgiving strategies. Suppose agent i observes a deviation of his neighbor i− 1 in his (i− 1’s)
deficient relation. Then, since, due to the unforgiving strategies, there will never be a return
to cooperation with i − 1, the best response of i in his (i’s) remaining deficient relation would
be to deviate from that relation. Therefore agent i will not make use of her ability to transmit
information, leaving only room for the same strategies as under (I2).Q.E.D.
As we see from part 3 of proposition 1.2, an important feature of our model is that the
design of the punishment paths interacts with agents’ incentives to transmit information. One
implication of this is that, even though grim trigger strategies are optimal punishment strategies
in all the bilateral relations (i.e. if they rely on bilateral punishment mechanisms), for non-
mutual relational networks, the grim trigger-like strategies (S1) and (S2) are only optimal
punishment strategies for the complete information (I1) and the no information transmission
case (I2), respectively. They are optimal because punishment is as strong as possible on both
sides, once it arrives there, and it arrives on both sides with the smallest possible delay. Under
the network information transmission regime (I3) with high speeds of information transmission
instead, i.e. in a world where information can be transmitted via links and this information
travels more than one link per period, strategies (S2) are not optimal anymore. The potentially
high speed of information transmission is — individually optimally — not being used, and therefore,
punishment "on the other side" arrives later than necessary, reducing the enforcement power of
the network. In section 1.3.2, we will introduce a forgiving punishment mechanism that uses
information transmission and that we will show to be optimal.
A short comment on the circular form of the network is due. Even though proposition 1.2
is a statement on a particular network architecture, a c-cycle, of course this circular network
could be embedded into bigger networks. The strategy profiles (S1) or (S2) we studied would
not conflict with that. Our implicit assumption by concentrating on a c-cycle — if it is embedded
into a bigger network — is that the multilateral punishment mechanism (S1) or (S2) is taken for
that particular subnetwork only.
To give an example for circular networks (or subnetworks), one could think of firms located
on a (Salop) circle, with different capacities in the left and right market, cooperating/colluding
with their neighbors. Coleman (1990) insists on the importance of the "closure" (circularity) of
social networks. Giving a graphical representation as in figure 1.717, he suggests that if parents
(A and B), whose children (a and b) are friends, share a relation, too, as in figure 1.7 part (a),
they have more ”power” over their children — thanks to what Coleman calls ”intergenerational
closure” — than if they do not, as in figure 1.7 part (b). Lack of relations among parents makes
it more difficult for them to successfully impose/enforce norms on/upon their children. He does
not provide a game theoretical foundation for his claim, but our model fits precisely his story.
17Note that his representation differs from ours by using two arrows to describe one relation.
20 Chapter 1: Networks of relations and social capital
A B
ba
(a)
A B
ba
(b)
Figure 1.7: Representation of two communities: (a) with and (b) without intergenerational
closure (from Coleman, 1990).
1.3.2 Mixed networks
In this section, we will relax assumption 1.3 that excluded mutual relation from the relational
networks under consideration. We will explicitly allow for them (assumption 1.4), and study
their impact on the sustainability of the various types of relational networks. We proceed
examining the consequences of an increase of the stage game payoff ci· of an agent i such that
one of his relations becomes a mutual one. Increasing the cooperation payoff ci· of an agent i
increases both, the profitability of cooperating for this agent as well as the sustainability of the
relative relation with a bilateral punishment mechanism.
After demonstrating a cooperation-enhancing effect for non-circular networks under infor-
mation structure (I1), we will show that a circular network’s ability to pool payoff asymmetry
and redistribute sanctioning power under information structures (I2) and (I3) decreases if the
unforgiving punishments from section 1.3.1 are used. When the increase in ci· transforms a non-
mutual relation into a mutual one, agent i may lose the incentive to exercise the multilateral
punishment strategy, which sustained the network and thus the other bilaterally non-sustainable
relations in the network. Subsequently, we will show that forgiving strategies overcome the prob-
lem for information structure (I3).
Assumption 1.4 Relational networks contain both, mutual and other relations.
Non-circular networks with unforgiving punishments
Proposition 1.1 states that there does not exist a non-circular non-mutual network other than
the empty one. This is true because there would be an agent having only deficient relations
and, thus, an incentive to deviate. If one increases the cooperation payoff c·,· of that agent,
so that his relation becomes mutual, this incentive to deviate vanishes. Under full information
a multilateral punishment like (S1) can then sustain such a network. Part 1 of proposition
1.3 states that. Part 2 shows that the negative result of Proposition 1.1 remains for the other
information transmission mechanisms. And Part 3 shows that the equilibrium in Part 1 does not
satisfy reasonable stability criteria put forward by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). In particular,
the equilibrium (S1) does not satisfy their Iterated Dominance and Admissibility criteria and
gives thus rise to a forward induction problem.
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Figure 1.8: Sustainable networks under (a) info structure (I1), (b) info structure (I2) and (I3)
Proposition 1.3 Suppose deg i ≤ 2. Then
1. under information structure (I1), a non-circular relational network N S is sustainable if
(a) id i |deg i=1 = 1 and
(b) for all other agents in the relational network gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0, and
2. under information structures (I2) and (I3), there exists no sustainable non-circular mixed
relational network.
3. If the relational network under (I1) relies on unforgiving punishments, it is not strategically
stable.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 of proposition 1.3 are straightforward. Part 3 of proposition 1.3:
Unforgiving punishment in our framework means to play according to (S1), i.e. to play D
on both sides forever if a deviation occurred in the network. Ruling out the play of strictly
dominated strategies gives rise to a profitable deviation for each agent i of the mutual subnetwork
who is also part of a non-mutual subnetwork. Let agent 2 in figure 1.8 (a) play D2,3 and C2,1
in a period t. Then reverting to D2,3 and D2,1 for ever in t + 1 is part of a strictly dominated
strategy for 2. It is strictly dominated by D2,3 and D2,1 in a period t and reverting to D2,3
and D2,1 for ever in t+ 1. Thus, if agent 1 observes D2,3 and C2,1 in t, he can conclude that a
rational agent 2 does not want to stick to the multilateral punishment mechanism. Given that
2 played C2,1, there exists a focal equilibrium. This focal equilibrium is to switch to a bilateral
punishment mechanism, the normal grim trigger strategy. The resulting — stable — equilibrium
is the same as the one under (I2) and (I3), sketched in figure 1.8 (b). This gives rise to a
profitable deviation for agent 2. Q.E.D.
Figure 1.8 illustrates proposition 1.3. Under the full information assumption (I1), every
agent knows the history of every other player and can, thus, enter into a punishment phase. Given
this, figure 1.8 (a) is an equilibrium. Under the other information transmission mechanisms, this
is not the case, figure 1.8 (a) is not an equilibrium network, while figure 1.8 (b) is.
The sustainability of 1’s relation in the absence of a network enables cooperation in the
network. However, according to proposition 1.3, the resulting network under (I1) is not strate-
gically stable. The mutual interest in cooperation, which made cooperation of all agents in the
non-circular network an equilibrium, puts it on weak feet as it makes it unlikely to be selected
as the equilibrium played.
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Figure 1.9: Non-circular network with a (possibly) sustainable subnetwork at one end.
Relaxing assumption 1.2 (deg i ≤ 2), it is straightforward to see that Proposition 1.3 general-
izes to lines that are adjacent to subnetworks which are sustainable in autarky. Assume in figure
1.9 that the subnetwork ({1, 2, 3} , {12, 23, 31}) is sustainable in autarky, i.e. without making
use of possible relations 34, 45, 56. Then, under (I1), strategies (S1) make (a) a sustainable
network if, in addition, g31 + g32 + g34 ≥ 0, g43 + g45 ≥ 0, and g54 + g56 ≥ 0, whereas network
(b) is the only sustainable one under (I2) and (I3), irrespective of the payoffs in the relations
34, 45, and 56.
Remark. All statements made on mutual relations also apply to subnetworks that are sus-
tainable in the absence of the rest of the network.
Mixed circular networks with unforgiving punishments
We now turn to circular networks. We will proceed in the same way we did in subsection 4.3.2:
Again, we will increase the cooperation payoff ci,· of an agent i’s deficient unilateral relation
such that it becomes mutual. As in subsection 4.3.2, we will discuss the impact of this change
on the sustainability of a network.
Under full information, (I1), we will retain the results found so far. The equilibrium given
by strategies (S2) however, relied on the fact that each agent, who was cheated upon by a
neighbor, had an incentive to carry out the punishment on the deficient side. If we introduce a
mutual subnetwork, there exist agents who do not have a deficient relation. Contrary to the full
information environment (I1), and given that with (S2) it is not optimal for agents to transmit
information, under the other two information regimes it is not possible to identify the initial
deviator. Agents, who are part of a mutual subnetwork, may therefore be reluctant to enter
into an punishment phase immediately if they observe a deviation on only one side: They only
expect their neighbor to enter the punishment phase with a certain probability. This leads to
proposition 1.4.
Proposition 1.4 In a non-mutual circular relational network of size c with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and
gi,i−1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ NS, let δ ≡ {δ| gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,i−1 = 0}. For agent k increase ck,k+1 such that
gk,k+1 > 0, so that the network becomes mixed.
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1. Then, under information structure (I1),
(a) the resulting relational network is still sustainable
(b) but not strategically stable.
2. Denote with δ the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain the resulting network
under (I2) and (I3) with strategy and belief profiles (S2). Then
(a) for sufficiently low li,i+1 or sufficiently high wi,i+1, δ = δ.
(b) for too high li,i+1 and too low wi,i+1, (S2) does not result in a sustainable network.
(c) a too low wi,i+1 results in strategic instability of the network.
Proof. Part 1 (a): The optimality of the actions during a punishment phase proposed in
part 1 of the proof of proposition 1.2 only depend on the strategies played by the deviator and
his neighbors being a stage-game Nash equilibrium for the bilateral interaction. Since we have
full information, everybody knows everybody else’s history and expecting the other to stick to
the prescribed strategy (S1), would lead to playing Dij whenever a deviation is observed.
Part 1 (b): The proof parallels the one for proposition 1.3 part 3.
Part 2 (a) through (c) we relegate to the appendix. Q.E.D.
The intuition for parts 2 (a) and (b) is the following (refer to figure 1.10): With the beliefs
specified in (S2), if agent i in figure 1.10 observesDi−1,i and Ci+1,i in t = τ , he assigns probability
1
c−1 to the event that any of the other agents in the network deviated first. Then, the bigger
the network becomes, the more likely it is a priory that the agent that started the contagious
process is an agent other than i + 1 and i + 2. Since in this case, i + 1 will not play Di+1,i
until t = τ + 2, and since the net gain from cooperating with i + 1 is positive for i, for a big
size of the network, it is not a best response to play Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1. However, for agent i,
with probability 1
c−1 agent i+1 started. Because of that, if the loss from playing C
i,i+1 if i+1
plays Di,i+1, li,i+1 is high enough, the expected payoff from carrying out the punishment may
be higher than the one from going on cooperating for one more period. Furthermore, for agent
i, with probability 1
c−1 agent i+ 1 started. In that case, agent i expects D
i+1,i from t = τ + 2
on. Then, if the payoff from playing Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1, i.e. wi,i+1, is very high in comparison
to the payoff from playing Ci,i+1, agent i might also prefer to punish immediately.
The intuition for part 2 (c) is the following: Strategic stability rules out the belief that agent
i+ 1 started and then sticks to the multilateral punishment since this is strictly dominated by
having playedDi+1,i in t = τ . This only leaves a high wi,i+1 as a reason to carry out punishments
immediately.
Proposition 1.4 shows a trade-off between profitability and sustainability of cooperation in
networks: An agent, who benefits (too) strongly from relations with everybody he is connected
to, may hurt cooperation between other agents because he may be unwilling to punish deviants.
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Figure 1.10: Circular network with a mutual relation
Mixed circular networks with forgiving punishments
In this subsection, we will show that harsh, but forgiving punishments lead agents to use the
so far unused possibility to transmit information through links (under network information
transmission, (I3)). For high speed of information transmission, these strategies will give rise to
equilibrium networks not sustainable with the unrelenting grim trigger-type strategies studied
so far. We find that these forgiving punishments are optimal strategies under (I3) , while grim
trigger-type strategies are not even though they are in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
Remember that under strategy profile (S2) agents do not exploit the possibility to transmit
information offered by (I3), independent of the speed ν. Because of this, the results under (I2)
and (I3) do not differ. Transmitting information cannot be an equilibrium choice with (S2)
because the punishment phase lasts forever. A defection leads then to a complete breakdown of
the relational network during the punishment phase18, and agents prefer to "grab what they can"
before the collapse of the network by defecting/infecting rather than maintaining the relation
and transmitting information. The potential of high speed information transmission is therefore
left unused.
By rewarding agents for transmitting information instead of infecting their neighbor, it be-
comes possible to avoid the breakdown of cooperation and to make use of high speeds of informa-
tion transmission, thereby, relaxing the agents’ incentive constraint and allowing a sustainable
network for a lower δ than (S2). Proposition 1.5 shows this.
For that end, let us define the following strategy profile:
Strategy profile S3
1. All agents start by playing Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri.
2. As long as agent i observes Cji ∀j ∈ Ri, and as long as no message containing Djn for
some j ∈ Ri, agent i goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Ri.
3. If agent i observes Dji for any j ∈ Ri and she received no message about an earlier
defection of j, agent i then sends a message about the deviation to her other neighbor
18That holds also if one considers a change in (S2) such that the reversion to the stage Nash equilibrium does
not last forever but only for T periods.
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and plays Dij until j and i played Dij , Cji for Tj periods. After that i sends her other
neighbor a message about the end of the punishment phase for player j and they go back
to 2. thereafter. Each agent truthfully passes on the messages.
4. If a neighbor k of j receives a message about j’s initial deviation, she plays Dkj until both,
she receives the message that Dij , Cji has been played for Tj periods and D
kj , Cjk has
been played for Tj periods. She returns to 2. thereafter.
5. If agent j played Dji, she plays Cji for the next Tj periods, D
jk in the period when k
receives the information on her initial deviation and Cjk for the next Tj periods. She
returns to 2. thereafter.
6. If some agent deviates from the actions in 3. — 6., the punishment starts against this agent.
Proposition 1.5 In a non-mutual circular network of size c with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0
∀i ∈ NS, let δ ≡ {δ| gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,i−1 = 0}. Let ∆˜ be the set of δ for which — together with an
appropriate Tj, ∀j ∈ NS — (S3) constitutes a sustainable non-mutual network with gi,i+1 ≤ 0
and gi,i−1 ≥ 0 under (I3) and δ˜ = min
{
∆˜
}
. Then
(i) δ˜ ≤ δ with a strict inequality for high speeds of information transmission (for v > 1).
(ii) if one substitutes non-mutual subnetworks with mutual ones the network is still sustainable
and strategically stable ∀δ ∈ ∆˜ for any l.
For the proof, which we relegate to appendix , there are four incentive constraints to consider:
1. Every agent has to have an incentive to stick to Cij ∀j ∈ Ri as long as neither he observes
Dji for a j ∈ Ri nor he receives a message containing Djn for j ∈ Ri.
(
ICCI
)
2. Given one neighbor j of i played Dj,i, each agent m (including m = i herself) has to have
an incentive to send a message containing Dj,i to her other neighbor n and stick to Cm,n.(
ICCII
)
3. Every neighbor of an original cheater has to have an incentive to carry out the punishment.(
ICP
)
4. Every original cheater has to agree to be punished.
(
ICLP
)
We first show that
(
ICCII
)
and
(
ICP
)
are never binding. Using
(
ICLP
)
and
(
ICCI
)
,
we then show that, for a speed of v = 1, it is possible to choose a length Tj , ∀j ∈ NS, of
the punishment period for each agent such that the punishment payoff for her is equivalent to
minimaxing her on both sides forever19, i.e. the strength of the punishment is equivalent to
the one for (S2). Increasing the speed of information transmission reduces the delay of the
19To avoid divisibility problems, one can always assume a public randomization device giving the end of the pun-
ishment period for each agent such that in expectation the punishment payoff of the initial deviator is equivalent
to minimaxing him forever.
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punishment and, thus, relaxes
(
ICLP
)
which in turn gives room to make it more severe. This
establishes (i). Since agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they always have
an incentive to do so during a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate bilaterally,
which establishes (ii).
Corollary 1.1 Under network information transmission (I3) and assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and
1.4, for high enough ν it is possible to find a Tj ∀j ∈ NS such that (S3) is an optimal punishment
mechanism whereas (S2) is not.
Proof. Two elements determine the strength of the multilateral punishment mechanism in
the network: the payoff after punishment starts on each side, and the promptness with which
this punishment starts on each side after a deviation. It is always possible to adjust the length of
the punishment phase Tj for each player j such that he receives an punishment payoff equivalent
to minimax forever. Furthermore, according to assumption 1.1, R = C, the other neighbor of an
agent that first defects can ”get to know” about the defection and start the punishment phase
at the earliest with the information that travelled through the network. This means that (S3)
is an optimal punishment mechanism. As for high ν, information transmission is faster than
contagion, (S2) is not an optimal punishment mechanism for high ν.
Punishment with (S3) is as strong as possible and as fast as possible, therefore these are
the optimal (punishment) strategies in our network. Proposition 1.5 also shows that it is not
necessary to have a complete breakdown of cooperation in the network in case of a deviation
if information about past actions can be transmitted. The equilibrium is, thus, more robust
(against e.g. mistakes) and increases welfare during punishment phases.
Since under perfect information (I1) the agent that defects first is known, the complete
breakdown of the network in a punishment phase can be avoided through punishments as in
(S3). These strategies20 result in the same critical discount factor as for (S1), as punishment
was immediate on both sides already with (S1).
While strategy profile (S3) avoids the breakdown of the network due to mutual subnetworks
for (I3), it can not be used under (I2) since it makes use of information transmission. Without
information transmission it is impossible to know who deviated first from the equilibrium path
and a targeted punishment of only the agent that defects first becomes unattainable.
Up to now, we have not explicitly considered bilaterally deficient relations. It should however
be clear at this point that a mixed circular relational network containing bilaterally deficient
relations — as for example the network in figure 1.11 — is sustainable with the same strategies
discussed above under the same conditions given.
20All neighbors j ∈ Ni of an initial cheater i start playing D
j,i until i has played Ci,j∀j ∈ Ni for T periods and
then they go back to plaing Ci,j , Cj,i. In all other games in the network, the players go on playing the cooperative
action during the punishment phase for player i. As the initial cheater can always get his minimax payoff forever,
which is the payoff from the punishment in (S1), the biggest T , for which this strategy profile is an equilibrium,
gives him exactly this payoff.
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Figure 1.11: Mixed relational network containing only mutual relations except one bilaterally
deficient one
1.4 Higher degree networks and social capital
In this section we show that there are generalizations of the results we obtained for the simple
relational networks above, allowing for more than two neighbors21. For this end, we will use
a c-cycle as a basic structure and add a link. We will show how networks of relations that
generate “slack enforcement power” for some agents may enable these to sustain cooperation on
additional deficient relations, even in one shot prisoner’s dilemma interactions. We then offer
an interpretation of this use of networks of relations as cooperation-enforcement/governance
devices for new social dilemmas in terms of the highly debated but somewhat vague concept of
“social capital”.
In our model, establishing a link always increases the discounted payoff of the agents creating
it, as it is always profitable to cooperate. However, regarding the sustainability of the network,
though, adding a non-mutual relation has two effects: On the one hand, adding any relation that
is not sustainable in autarky uses scarce enforcement power. Thus, there is a limit to adding
them. On the other hand, if information travels with delay along the links of the network, or
where information cannot “travel” and strategies rely on contagion, new links shorten paths,
making multilateral punishments faster.
In the remainder of the section, we consider for each of the three informational regimes,
(I1) − (I3), the effects of adding to a non-mutual circular network a bilaterally deficient, a
unilateral, and a mutual relation, one at a time.
Full information (I1) It is straightforward to generalize proposition 1.2 part 1 and we state
without proof:
Proposition 1.6 Assume (I1) and the strategy profile (S1). Then a network is sustainable iff∑
j∈Ri
gij > 0 ∀i ∈ N S . (1.1)
21We have done so already in the sections before when we looked at trees, stars, or non-circular networks, one
end node of which was an autarkically sustainable subnetwork.
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Figure 1.12: Adding a relation to a circular, non-mutual network
As long as (1.1) is satisfied, also bilaterally deficient relations can be sustained in equilibrium.
Consider for example figure 1.12 (c). Agents i’s and k’s being part of the network helps them
sustain a bilaterally deficient relation if the sum of the net gains from cooperating for i and k
are big enough.
While “grim trigger” strategies (S1) are an equilibrium, the forward induction argument of
Proposition 1.3 part 3 also applies here as long as (a) there are subnetworks that are sustainable
without the rest of the network, and (b) there is a “rest” of the network that is not, i.e. as long
as the relation ik that is added to N S \ ik is not sustainable outside N S .
To see this, consider first figure 1.12, networks (b) or (c). Since ik is a deficient relation
for i, N S is only sustainable with (S1) if N S \ ik is sustainable in autarky. If this is the case,
then the same stability argument made for mutual subnetworks apply. If e.g., agent i deviates
only from her relation with agent k, but not from his other two relations, it induces speculation
on future play as under the current strategy profile the deviation is strictly dominated by a
simultaneous deviation on all relations. Furthermore there is an equilibrium — N S \ ik — which
(i) Pareto-dominates the continuation equilibrium in the punishment phase of (S1) and which is
(ii) a focal point after this deviation. This is a profitable deviation, given the agents coordinate
on N S \ ik, since gik < 0.
Consider now network (a) with strategy profile (S1). If we add a mutual relation ik to a
circular networkN S\ik that is not sustainable because gi,i−1+gi,i+1 < 0 and/or gk,k−1+gk,k+1 <
0, and if gik and gki are big enough such thatN S is sustainable with (S1), the stability argument
from proposition 1.3 part 3 applies: agents i and k had a ”profitable deviation“ from N S leaving
them with ik.
If instead we add the mutual relation ik to a sustainable network N S \ ik, both subnetworks
are sustainable in autarky and there is no need to combine them into one multilateral punishment
mechanism. Furthermore, under (I1), every member of N S \ ik immediately observes the play
of every other player so that there is no delay in punishment that can be reduced by shortening
paths through the new relation ik. However, even if players agreed on (S1) including ik, the
sustainability of both subnetworks rules out the stability argument from Proposition 1.3 part 3.
As in previous sections, with more sophisticated forgiving punishment strategies (S3), this
forward induction argument vanishes since punishments phases are followed by a return to
cooperation that, together with rewards for the punishers provide incentives to punish.
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No information transmission (I2) Let us turn to the no information transmission assump-
tion (I2) and study sustainable networks using the contagion strategies (S2).
Refer to figure 1.12, first considering network (a). Obviously, if both subnetworks ik and
N S \ik were sustainable in autarky, treating the subnetworks separately and adding ik toN S \ik
results in a sustainable network.
If, on the other hand, N S \ ik is not sustainable on its own, adding ik might help sustain the
network for two reasons. First, if N S \ ik is not sustainable because gi,i+1+δc−2gi,i−1 < 0 and if
gi,i+1 + δm−2gi,k + δc−2gi,i−1 > 0, where m is the size of the subnetwork {i, i+ 1, ..., k}, adding
ik will result in a sustainable network if both, i and k have, given their beliefs, an incentive to
contribute to a multilateral punishment using their mutual relation. Second, if N S \ ik is not
sustainable because gj,j+1+δc−2gj,j−1 < 0, adding ik may result in a sustainable network under
the same condition because the delay with which the punishment reaches j is shorter.
Proposition 1.7 Let a network N S consist of a non-mutual circular network of size c, N S \ik,
with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ NS \ ik and a mutual relation ik between two non-adjacent
agents. Let δ ≡ {δ| gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,i−1 = 0} ∀i ∈ N S \ ik. Let ∆̂ be the set of δ for which NS is
sustainable with (S2) and beliefs specified in appendix A.5 and let δ̂ = min
{
∆̂
}
. Then for li,k
and lk,i small enough or wi,k and wk,i big enough, δ̂ < δ.
Proof. Assume (S2) and the beliefs specified in appendix A.5. As in the proof of proposition
1.4, by assuming li,k and lk,i low enough or wi,k and wk,i big enough, i’s (k’s) expected profit
from playing Cik (Cki) after having observed agent i− 1 (k − 1) deviate is smaller than if they
not only play Di,i+1 (Dk,k+1), i.e. infect agent i + 1 (agent k + 1), but also Di,k (Dk,i), i.e.
infect also agent k (agent i). Therefore punishment sets in earlier and a lower discount factor is
needed to sustain N S . Q.E.D.
Again, if i’s (k’s) loss from playing Cik (Cki) if k (i) plays Dki (Dik) or the gain from playing
Dik (Dki) if k (i) plays Cki (Cik) is big, the expected payoff from not punishing is relatively low
and the agents sharing the mutual relation are willing to contribute to a collective punishment
mechanism.
Consider now networks (b) and (c). Here, adding the relation ik, which is unilateral (bilat-
erally deficient), involves a trade-off. On the one hand, punishment will be faster, which relaxes
the incentive constraint for each agent in N S \ ik and makes the network sustainable for lower
discount factors. On the other hand, one agent (two agents) will have to sustain one deficient
relation more, which tightens the incentive constraint for this agent (these agents). The set of
discount factors for which the network is sustainable may therefore expand or shrinks with the
addition the new relation, depending on parameter values.
The conditions for sustainability of the network, which we give together with the belief
structure in appendix A.5, are a straightforward generalization of the conditions we had for the
simple network with deg (i) ≤ 2.
Network information transmission (I3) Let us now turn to the network information trans-
mission assumption (I3). Consider first network (a) from figure 1.12. Given the feasibility of
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information transmission, consider strategies (S3) which make use of it. For network (a) to
be sustainable, the incentive constraints for agents other than i and k, are equivalent to the
ones given in appendix A.4 with one change: Since the ways are shorter, the delay with which
punishment sets in is shorter as well, making it easier to sustain the network. As an example
for the incentive constraints for agents i and k, we give the ones for i in appendix A.6. Again,
the sustainability conditions from appendix A.4 generalize.
Consider networks (b) and (c). Again, adding the relation ik, which is unilateral (bilaterally
deficient), involves a trade-off. On the one hand, punishment will be faster, which relaxes the
incentive constraint for each agent in the network and makes the network sustainable for lower
discount factors. On the other hand, one agent (two agents) will have to sustain one deficient
relation more, which tightens the incentive constraint for this agent (these agents). It is, thus,
not clear whether the set of discount factors for which the network is sustainable increases or
shrinks with adding the additional relation.
Social Capital Consider again figure 1.12 (c). We stated above that agents i’s and k’s being
part of the network may help them sustain a bilaterally deficient relation between them. This is
the case if the sum of the net gains from cooperating for i and k from their other relations are
large enough, i.e. if they dispose of sufficient slack enforcement power to enforce the additional
relation.
Suppose the circular network {i, i+ 1, ..., k − 1, k, k + 1, ..., i− 1, i} is a social network, i.e.
the relations in it are social relations, and suppose the bilaterally deficient relation between i and
k is a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, say an occasional business transaction where each agent can
"hold up" the other. Then the slack enforcement power from our social network, used to govern
a one-shot business interaction, is much like what Coleman (1990) defines as social capital :
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety
of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who
are within that structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive,
making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its
absence. Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely
fungible, but is fungible with respect to certain activities. A given form of social
capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful
for others. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres the structure of
relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor
in physical implements of production.
”...social capital inheres the structure of relations between persons and among persons” and
it makes ”possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence.“
This is a micro-perspective on social capital. Our model allows for a formal definition for social
capital à la Coleman:
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Definition 1.7 (Social capital à la Coleman): Take a sustainable social network NS with i, k ∈
NS. Then we define the individual social capital i and k can draw upon for a one-shot
business interaction ik as
scik =
(
max
{
wik − cik, wki − cki
}∣∣∣Cik, Cki is equilibrium in a MPM containing NS and ik) .
The social capital agent i can draw on from being part of a social network is defined as
the slack enforcement power usable to enforce cooperation-compliance in other interactions in
need of governance through an MPM (multilateral punishment mechanism)22. With complete
information (I1), this is only a player specific definition as it is equivalent to the sum of his
net gains from cooperation in all his social relations scik = min
{∑
j∈Ri
gij ,
∑
j∈Ri
gkj
}
. For
the other information regimes, the extent to which existing relations in a social network can
facilitate ”the achievement of certain ends“ for an agent depends not only on his net gains from
cooperation, i.e. how much he has to loose in his social relations. Since the delay with which
an eventual punishment sets in matters, it also depends on partners’ locations in the network.
Reviewing "(game-)theoretical questions stimulated by a reflection on social capital", Sobel
(2002) identifies two ways in which Coleman’s (1990) network closure or — put differently —
"dense social networks make enforcement of group cooperative behavior more effective": First
by creating "common knowledge of information", and second by increasing "the quality and
reliability of third-party monitoring needed to enforce cooperative dynamic equilibria." With this
paper, we offer an additional explanation of why closure might be important for the enforcement
of cooperative behavior, the pooling of payoff asymmetries.
Robert Putnam (1995) takes another perspective on social capital. For him, the concept
”refers to the collective value of all ’social networks’ and the inclinations that arise from these
networks to do things for each other.” This is a macro-perspective on social capital, which,
translated into our model, lead to the following formal definition:
Definition 1.8 (Social capital à la Putnam): Take a sustainable social network NS with i, k ∈
NS. Then we define the social capital of a society as the average individual social capital in
that society
1
n card (Ri)
∑
i∈NS
∑
k∈Ri
scik.
The conclusion to be drawn from our model for the construction of aggregate measures of
social capital is: If there is full information about the actions of economic agents, it suffices to
22This is a definition of social capital that quantifies it by its returns. A similar approach has been taken by
Fernandez et al. (2000), who measure the returns to bonusses paid to current employees who successfully refer
new employees out of their personal network. Fernandez et al. (2000) refer to the bonus paid to the employees as
the company’s "social capital investment" and to the net cost savings they obtain in their recruitment process as
"the return to social capital". In our opinion, these references are, however, misleading. What the authors call
"investment in social capital" should be termed more appropriately the employees’ return to their social capital :
The investment has been done by the employees themselves, and is not quantified by the firm’s referral bonus.
Furthermore, the net cost savings of the firm in the hiring process, which the authors label as "the returns to
social capital", is more appropriately the firm’s return to the bonus paid to its employees. It is part of, but not
the whole, return to the investment in social capital. It reflects the relative bargaining power between employees
and the firm in sharing the return to social capital.
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have a measure of the average sum of the net gains from cooperation per person from social
relations in the economy. However, if this is not the case, as in most real world situations, in
addition, a measure of the density of the network should be used.
Information transmission as social capital We would like to emphasize that the value of
the social network may also rest in the enforcement of the transmission of information on the
history of interactions with outsiders. If the outsiders interact repeatedly with changing members
of the network, transmission of information on the history of the play in these interactions
through the network may help facilitate cooperation in them. In that sense, our model is a
microfoundation of Kandori’s (1992) attaching a label to a cheater by the members of the social
network and of Sobel’s second reason of why dense networks help enforce cooperative behavior —
by increasing "the quality and reliability of third-party monitoring needed to enforce cooperative
dynamic equilibria", an insight, which — to his knowledge — no one had formalized precisely in
a game-theoretic model. The fact that such a transmission of information in a society is of
economic value has been shown in variuos studies, among others in Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1999).
1.5 Conclusion
Each of us is involved in networks of long term relationships of different kinds and with different
parties. Networks of social and economic relations include colluding firms, industrial districts,
interbank markets as well as criminal/terrorist organizations. In this paper we have tried to
clarify how the structure of such networks of relations affects the feasible equilibrium pattern of
interaction.
In our model, agents maintain long term self-enforcing relations thanks to the informa-
tion circulation and the enforcement/sanctioning power ensured by a network of such relations.
We identify equilibrium conditions for different architectures of such networks, paying special
attention to differences in these conditions for circular and non-circular architectures. The ba-
sic framework is that of repeated games between fixed partners with three basic information
structures: complete information, no information, and information transmission through the
network’s links.
We show that if agents cannot discipline themselves within a certain relation, the pooling
of asymmetries in payoffs across the network may allow them to sustain the relation under all
three informational assumptions. We find an end-network effect, i.e. that a non-circular network
or subnetwork is not sustainable. We find that the possibility to transmit information about a
defection through the links in the network is not exploited in equilibrium if enforcement relies
on unforgiving punishment phases. More complex punishment strategies induce agents to use
information transmission, and to keep on cooperating in the rest of the network while punishing
a defection (which increases efficiency and decreases the discount factor necessary to sustain the
network). If information can be transmitted via the network, grim trigger strategies, therefore,
cease to be optimal punishments as they do not use the possibility to transmit information
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to punish cheaters faster. Having self-sustaining relations in the network turns out to hurt
cooperation with imperfect information, because agents may then not be willing to perform the
prescribed punishment after a defection. When information can be transmitted, the network may
be sustained using strategies that reward the punisher and encourage information transmission.
We model relations as cooperative agreements in generic infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilem-
mas forming the links of the network of relations. The model is general enough to capture numer-
ous economic and social situations. We provide a microfoundation to Granovetter’s (1985) idea
of “embeddedness” according to which, by ignoring the social background in which economic
transactions are embedded, economists fail to understand important features of the economic
process. Our end-network effect, i.e. the finding that a non-circular network or subnetwork is
not sustainable, provides a clear explanation of why “closure” of social networks is so important
for social capital, as argued by Coleman (1988) and (1990). Finally, we drew some conclusions
about sensible measures of social capital in a network of relations, both on an individual and an
aggregate level.
Immediate applications of our model include the organization of inter-firm relations in in-
dustrial districts, the enforcement of collusive behavior in business networks, interbank relations
and the effects of “social capital” on the governance of economic and social interactions (as dis-
cussed by Coleman (1988, 1990), Putnam (1993) and Greif (1993) and formalized by Spagnolo
(1999b)). In her much acclaimed book, Saxenian (1994) attributes a large part of Silicon Valley’s
success to a special culture of cooperation in that industrial district, which stems from a common
background of the early workforce in that area. We believe our model offers a complementary
explanation how social networks may facilitate information circulation in a community.
Appendix
A.1 Strategy and belief profile (S2)
1. Each agent i ∈ NS starts playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri .
2. As long as player i observes every neighbor j ∈ Ri play Cji she goes on playing Cij
∀j ∈ Rj .
3. If player i observes a neighbor j play Dji in t = τ she reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ri ∀t ≥ τ + 1.
(i) aj,j+1t , a
j+1,j
t = C
j,j+1, Cj+1,j and aj,j−1t , a
j−1,j
t = C
j,j−1, Cj−1,j ∀t = 1, ..., τ , they believe
ak,lt , a
l,k
t = C
k,l, Cl,k, ∀kl ∈ R, ∀t = 1, ..., τ ,
(ii) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j or a
j+1,j
τ = Cj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j with gj,j+1 < 0
they can have any belief consistent with this observation,
(iii) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Cj−1,j with gj,j+1 < 0, they assign an equal probability
Pr
(
ak,lt = D
k,l ∧ ak,lt = Cm,n∀m = k
)
, t ≤ τ ,∀k = j.
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For agents j with id (j) = 2, beliefs are such that if they observe23
(iv) aj,j+1t , a
j+1,j
t = C
j,j+1, Cj+1,j and aj,j−1t , a
j−1,j
t = C
j,j−1, Cj−1,j ∀t = 1, ..., τ , they believe
ak,lt , a
l,k
t = C
k,l, Cl,k, ∀kl ∈ R, ∀t = 1, ..., τ ,
(v) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j they can have any belief consistent with this observation,
(vi) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Cj−1,j or a
j+1,j
τ = Cj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j , they assign an
equal probability Pr
(
ak,lt = D
k,l ∧ ak,lt = Cm,n∀m = k
)
, t ≤ τ ,∀k = j.
A.2 Proposition 1.1
Proof. A network has been defined non-circular if for no agent i1 ∈ NS there exists a path
{i1, i2, ..., ik} with i1 = ik. It has been defined non-mutual if gij > 0 ⇔ gji ≤ 0. In such
a network, there would have to be either an agent e at the end vertex with od e = 1 or an
agent m in the middle with odm = 2. Since we assumed deg i ≤ 2, there will not be any
punishment from other neighbors and agent e′s or agent m′s dominant strategy is to defect
from the relation.Q.E.D.
A.3 Proposition 1.4
First we proof that with an unforgiving punishment, cooperation may break down if we replace
a unilateral relation with a mutual one. We then show that for U i
(
Cij ,Dji
)
in the mutual
relation small enough, the set of equilibria will not shrink.
Proof. Part 2 (a) and (b). Consider strategies (S2) and beliefs as outlined above. Suppose,
we are in the situation of figure 1.10 with agents i and i + 1 forming a mutual subnetwork.
Consider the following defection: Agent i + 1 plays Di+1,i+2 and after c − 2 periods goes on
playing Ci+1,i. After c − 2 periods, say in period t = τ , agent i observes Di−1,i and Ci+1,i.
Playing Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1 is rational for agent i only if she expects i + 1 to play Di+1,i in
t = τ + 1. Whether she expects this to happen, depends on her beliefs on who started the
deviation. Agent i may have three possible beliefs about who defected initially.
(a) Agent i + 1 started and deviated only from his relation with i + 2. If agent i + 1 after
his initial deviation sticks to the strategies prescribed, he will play Di+1,i in t = τ + 1.
Then it is in i’s best interest to play Di,i+1 as well. In the expected discounted payoff,
this receives a bigger weight, the lower li,i+1.
(b) Agent i+2 started: Then i+2 would infect i+1 in t = τ +1, thus, no matter what agent
i plays in t = τ + 1, agent i + 1 will play Di+1,i in t = τ + 2. Therefore it is better to
have a deviation profit in t = τ + 1 and play Di,i+1. In the expected discounted payoff,
this receives a bigger weight, the higher wi,i+1.
23We will need this part of the belief structure only when we consider mixed networks. In unilateral networks,
by definition there are no agents with an indegree of two.
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(c) An agent m ∈ NS \ {i, i+ 1, i+ 2} started: The earliest period when i + 1 would be
infected by i + 2 would be τ + 2. Thus i will expect i + 1 to play Ci+1,i at least until
t = τ + 2. Since we assumed gi,i+1 > 0, for this belief it is not a best response to play
Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1.
Since agent i does not have any information, a consistent belief is that cases (a) and (b)
have occurred with probability 1
c−1 and case (c) with probability
c−3
c−1 . If c gets large, therefore,
the expected payoff for agent i from deferring the punishment phase by one period may become
positive.
This in turn delays the expected punishment date of an initial deviator, which leads to a
breakdown of the network if li,i+1 is not small and wi,i+1 is not big.
Part 2 (c). The proof parallels the one for proposition 1.3 part 3. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proposition 1.5
For notational convenience the following definition will be useful.
Definition 1.9 We define a function
θ (c, v) ≡
 max
{
c−2
v
, 1
}
max
{
int
(
c−2
v
+ 1
)
, 1
} if int
(
c−2
v
)
= c−2
v
if int
(
c−2
v
) = c−2
v
.
This function maps the order of the cycle c and the speed of information transmission v into
the strictly positive natural numbers and indicates the period in which an information about
play between agents i and i+ 1 in period 0 reaches agent i− 1.
In the proof we first consider the incentive constraints for agents in the network not to
deviate from cooperation in phase I (ICCI), from cooperation with their other neighbor in
phase II that is if one neighbor cheated (ICCII), from punishing the original cheater in phase
II (ICP ), and from letting the others punish when she deviated in the first place (ICLP ). In a
second step we show that δ˜ ≤ δ. It is shown that ICCII and ICP are never binding, so we can
concentrate on ICCI and ICLP . For a speed of v = 1, by an appropriate choice of the length
of the punishment, the conditions for cooperation can be made equivalent to the ones for (S2).
Increasing the speed then relaxes ICLP which gives room to make punishment more severe,
which establishes (i): δ˜ ≤ δ. Since agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they
always have an incentive to do so during a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate
bilaterally, which establishes (ii). If T is chosen such that punishment is as hard as playing
minimax strategies with both neighbors forever, this is the hardest punishment possible. Since
here information transmission is used, every mean to decrease the delay before punishment on
both sides sets in is used. This establishes the corollary.
Proof. The following incentive constraints are to be satisfied:
1. (ICCI) For each agent i, playing Di,i+1 in t = 0 and Di,i−1 in t = θ (c, v), which is her best
deviation, yields wi,i+1 in t = 0, li,i+1 for the following Ti periods and c
i,i+1 thereafter,
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as well as ci,i−1 until t = θ (c, v) − 1, wi,i−1 in t = θ (c, v) , li,i−1 for the following Ti
periods and ci,i−1 thereafter. Playing Ci,i+1 and Ci,i−1 forever yields 11−δ
(
ci,i+1 + ci,i−1
)
.
Summing up leads to
(
ICCI
)
, which is the condition for (S3) to be a Nash equilibrium.
ICCI ≡ (ci,i+1 − wi,i+1)+ Ti∑
t=1
δt
(
ci,i+1 − li,i+1)
+ δθ(c,ν)
(
ci,i−1 − wi,i−1)+ θ(c,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
(
ci,i−1 − li,i−1) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ NS , i+ 1, i− 1 ∈ Ri.
2. (ICCII) Suppose that in period t = 0, agent i− 1 played Di−1,i.
(a) Suppose θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1− 1. Then nothing changes in the trade-off in his interactions
with i+ 1 from ICCI . In his interactions with i− 1, i will already have returned to
the cooperative phase, which means he will give up ci,i−1 for Ti periods by infecting
i + 1. Thus, i is in the same situation as if he never had been cheated on by i − 1,
which means ICCII = ICCI .
ICCII = ICCI if θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1,
(b) Suppose now θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1. Again nothing changes in the trade-off in his
interactions with i + 1 from ICCI . Thus the first line of ICCII coincides with the
first line in ICCI . If in t = 1, agent i plays Di,i+1 instead of sticking to cooperation
and just sending a message, this results in agent i+1 sending a message that reaches
agent i−1 in t = θ (c, v)+1. This yields agent i a utility of li,i−1 until t = θ (c, v)+Ti+2.
By sticking to cooperation, she would have had a utility of wi,i−1 from t = θ (c, v)+1
until t = Ti−1 and of c
i,i−1 from t = Ti−1 + 1. This difference constitutes the second
and third line of ICCII .
ICCII ≡ (ci,i+1 − wi,i+1)+ Ti∑
t=1
δt
(
ci,i+1 − li,i+1)
+
Ti−1−1∑
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
(
wi,i−1 − li,i−1)+ θ(c,ν)+Ti∑
t=Ti−1
δt
(
ci,i−1 − li,i−1) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ NS , i+ 1, i− 1 ∈ Ri if θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1,
Since
ICCI − ICCII =

∑Ti−1−1
t=θ(c,ν) δ
t
(
ci,i−1 − wi,i−1) < 0
0
∀θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1
∀θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1
,
whenever ICCI holds, ICCII is satisfied.
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3. (ICP ) Suppose agent i receives the message that agent i+1 deviated in their relation with
one of their other neighbors. Then agent i has to have an incentive to punish him. Since
wi,j > ci,j together with
(
ICCI
)
, this is always the case.
4. (ICLP ) Suppose in period t = 0, agent i played Di,i+1. Then he has to agree to playing(
Ci,i+1,Di+1,i
)
for Ti periods instead of his minimax strategy forever. After having played
Di,i+1 in t = 0, for agent i sticking to punishment strategies means incurring li,i+1 for
Ti periods and c
i,i+1 thereafter. It furthermore means wi,i−1 in t = θ (c, v) , li,i−1 for the
following Ti periods and c
i,i−1 thereafter. Deviating from punishment strategies yields
di,i+1 forever, wi,i−1 in t = θ (c, v) and di,i−1 forever thereafter. The difference between
these utilities is represented by
(
ICLP
)
.
ICLP ≡
Ti−1∑
t=0
δt
(
li,i+1 − di,i+1)+ ∞∑
t=Ti
δt
(
ci,i+1 − di,i+1)
+
θ(c,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(c,ν)
δt
(
li,i−1 − di,i−1)+ ∞∑
t=θ(c,ν)+Ti+1
δt
(
ci,i−1 − di,i−1) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ N S , i+ 1, i− 1 ∈ Ri.
Constraint
(
ICCI
)
consists of addends that are either strictly increasing in δ or strictly
positive. Constraint
(
ICLP
)
is strictly increasing in δ for δ ∈ (0, 1). Both conditions do not
hold for a δ close to 0. They do hold strictly for a δ close enough to 1, thus there exists a δ˜ for
which both constraints hold. Therefore under the conditions stated, strategy (S3) is subgame
perfect for δ > δ˜.
Since li,j < di,j , it is possible to fix a Ti ∀i such that ICLP = 024. Given that Ti, assume v = 1,
such that θ (c, v) = c− 2. For this, ICCI is satisfied for all δ that satisfy δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 ≥ 0.
Now consider v > 1. Again, it is possible to fix a Ti ∀i such that ICLP = 0. That ensures the
same strength of the punishment. But now the punishment in the non-deficient relation sets in
earlier which reduces the value of the deviation and therefore for v > 1, δ˜ < δ.
Since agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they always have an incentive
to do so during a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate bilaterally, which establishes
(ii).
If Ti is chosen for each agent i such that the punishment is as hard as playing minimax
strategies with both neighbors forever, this is the hardest punishment possible. Since here
information transmission is used, every mean to decrease the delay before punishment on both
sides sets in is used. This establishes the corollary. Q.E.D.
24That means that the punishment is as strong as if the deviator was punished with infinite reversion to the
static Nash equilibium.
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A.5 Belief structure and sustainability conditions for section 1.4,
information regime (I2)
For networks (a), (b), and (c) from figure 1.12, we assume the following beliefs:
For agents j /∈ {i, k}, beliefs are such that
(i) if they observe cooperation on both sides, they believe that all agents in the network coop-
erated so far,
(ii) if they observe a deviation on both sides, they believe that the neighbor with whom they
share their deficient relation was the first to deviate, and
(iii) if they observe a deviation only from the agent with whom they share their non-deficient
relation, they give an equal probability to the event that any of the other players was the
first to deviate.
For agents i and k, beliefs are such that
(iv) if they observe cooperation from all neighbors, they believe that all agents in the network
cooperated so far,
(v) if they observe a deviation by all neighbors, they believe that everybody in the network
deviated,
(vi) if i (if k) observes agent i−1 (agent k−1) deviate, but the other neighbors cooperate, agent
i (agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any agent j ∈ {k, k + 1, ..., i− 1}
(any agent j ∈ {i, i+ 1, ..., k − 1}) was the first to deviate,
(vii) if i (if k) observes agents i− 1 and k (agents k − 1 and i) deviate, but the other neighbor
cooperate, he believes that agent k (agent i) was the first to deviate,
(viii) if i (if k) observes agent k, agent i+ 1, or both, agents k and i+1, (agent i, agent k+ 1,
or both, agents i and k+ 1) deviate, but the other neighbors cooperate, agent i (agent k)
gives an equal probability to the event that any agent j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, ..., k} (any agent
j ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, ..., i}) was the first to deviate, and
(ix) if i (if k) observes agents i − 1 and i + 1 (agents k − 1 and k + 1) deviate, but the other
neighbor cooperate, agent i (agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any
agent j ∈ N S \ i (any agent j ∈ N S \ k) was the first to deviate.
Let N S \ ik be of size c and the subnetwork {i, i+ 1, ..., k − 1, k, i} be of size m. Then for
the beliefs given, information structure (I2), and li,k and lk,i low N S is sustainable iff
gi,i+1 + δm−2
(
gi,k + δc−mgi,i−1
)
≥ 0
gk,k+1 + δc−m
(
gk,i + δm−2gk,k−1
)
≥ 0
gj,j+1 + δm−2gj,j−1 ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., k − 1}
gj,j+1 + δc−mgj,j−1 ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {k + 1, ..., i− 1}
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A.6 Sustainability conditions for agent i in section 1.4, informa-
tion regime (I3)
Refer to figure 1.12. We give the conditions exemplary for agent i.
1.
(
ICCIi
)
During a cooperation phase, it must be profitable for i to play Ci,i+1, Ci,k, Ci,i−1
at any time, which yields ci,i+1, ci,k, and ci,i−1 in each period, instead of choosing his best
deviation (”static“ best reply), which would be to play Di,i+1 in t = 0, Di,k in t = θ (m,ν),
and Di,i−1 in t = θ (c, ν) and then to face a Ti− period punishment during which he has
to endure payoffs of only li,i+1, li,k, and li,i−1. Such a deviation is not profitable iff
ICCIi ≡
(
ci,i+1 − wi,i+1)+ Ti∑
t=1
δt
(
ci,i+1 − li,i+1)
+ δθ(m,ν)
(
ci,k − wi,k
)
+
θ(m,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(m,ν)+1
δt
(
ci,k − li,k
)
+ δθ(c,ν)
(
ci,i−1 − wi,i−1)+ θ(c,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
(
ci,i−1 − li,i−1) ≥ 0.
2.
(
ICCIIi
)
Suppose that agent i− 1 deviated in t = −1. Agent i has to have an incentive to
pass on this information in t = 0 to both his neighbors, i + 1 and k, instead of infecting
his neighbors i + 1 in t = 0 and k in t = θ (m, ν) and then facing the punishment pre-
scribed against himself. Again, we have to distinguish two cases depending on the speed
of information transmission.
(a) If Ti−1−1 < θ (c, ν), then the information that i did not pass on the info, but cheated
instead against i+ 1, reaches i − 1 after i and i − 1 have gone back to cooperation.
Therefore,
ICCII = ICCI ∀θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1.
(b) If Ti−1−1 ≥ θ (c, v), then the information that i did not pass on the info, but cheated
instead against i+ 1, reaches i − 1 after i and i − 1 have gone back to cooperation.
That means that i looses punishment profits wi,i−1 for a number of periods equal to
the difference between T − 1 and θ (c, ν). Therefore,
ICCIIi ≡
(
ci,i+1 − wi,i+1)+ Ti∑
t=1
δt
(
ci,i+1 − li,i+1)
+ δθ(m,ν)
(
ci,k − wi,k
)
+
θ(m,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(m,ν)+1
δt
(
ci,k − li,k
)
+
Ti−1−1∑
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
(
wi,i−1 − li,i−1)+ θ(c,ν)+Ti∑
t=Ti−1
δt
(
ci,i−1 − li,i−1) ≥ 0
∀θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1.
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Again, we see that
(
ICI − ICII) =

∑Ti−1−1
t=θ(c,ν) δ
t
(
ci,i−1 − wi,i−1) < 0
0
∀θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1
∀θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1
.
Thus,
(
ICI
)
holds implies that
(
ICII
)
holds. Agent i also always has an incentive
to punish a deviator immediately, thus, the equivalent to
(
ICP
)
always holds. We
have to verify that
(
ICLP
)
holds.
3. (ICP ) Suppose agent i receives the message that agent i + 1 (agent k) deviated in their
relation with one of their other neighbors. Then agent i has to have an incentive to punish
them. Since wi,j > ci,j together with
(
ICCI
)
, this is always the case.
4.
(
ICLP
)
Lastly, agent i has to have an incentive to let his neighbors carry out the pun-
ishment on him if he deviated. He can ensure himself a payoff of di,i+1, di,k, and di,i−1
forever by playing Di,i+1, Di,k, and Di,i−1 forever. This limits the punishment available
to the community.
ICLPi ≡
Ti−1∑
t=0
δt
(
li,i+1 − di,i+1)+ ∞∑
t=Ti
δt
(
ci,i+1 − di,i+1)
+
θ(m,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(m,ν)+1
δt
(
li,k − di,k
)
+
∞∑
t=θ(m,ν)+Ti+1
δt
(
ci,k − di,k
)
+
θ(c,ν)+Ti∑
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
(
li,i−1 − di,i−1)+ ∞∑
t=θ(c,ν)+Ti+1
δt
(
ci,i−1 − di,i−1) ≥ 0
By choosing an appropriate Ti, the punishment can again be made as hard as in the
contagious equilibrium (with strategies (S2) and the respective beliefs). With ν > 1, due
to a faster punishment, the discount factor necessary to sustain the network will again be
lower than with (S2).
A.7 Sustainable networks with creation of new links
In this appendix, we consider the permanent exclusion of an agent from the relational network
together with the assumption that the remaining members close the gap in it by establishing a
new relation.
As before, we examine exclusion for the three information transmission regimes. We will
define exclusion, and then show that only for the network information transmission (I3) , exclu-
sion equilibria may sustain networks with lower discount factors than the mechanisms examined
before. This is true, however, only under quite restrictive conditions.
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Definition 1.10 (Punishment by exclusion) We define punishment by exclusion as the perma-
nent choice of a cheater’s neighbors in the relational network to play the non-cooperative action
w.r.t. the cheater and their permanent choice to play the cooperative action w.r.t. each other.
As in section 1.3, we suppose assumption 1.2 (deg (i) ≤ 2) holds. Contrary to section 1.3,
however, we assume that every two agents of the relational network are able to interact with
each other:
Assumption 1.5 ∃ij ∈ C ∀i, j ∈ NS, i = j.
We assume that it is impossible to find an agent outside the network in order to substitute
for an agent in the network. One could think of a specific group of agents exchanging a kind of
service for which it is impossible to find providors outside the community:
Assumption 1.6 If ∄ij ∈ R for some j then ∄ik ∈ C for any k ∈ NS.
As in section 1.3.1, we want to explore the possibility to sustain relations through the network
which would otherwise be non-sustainable, i.e. we presuppose assumption 1.3. In addition, we
assume that agents can have at most one relation with each other, i.e. are not able to exploit
direct multimarket contact:
Assumption 1.7 ∀i, j ∃ one and only one ij ∈ C.
The way we defined punishment by exclusion, defections are deterred by the creation of a new
relational network. The consequence is that, if this new relational network is not sustainable,
there is no deterrence. Therefore, also a deviation from it — if the same punishment is applied
— has to be deterred by the existence of yet another sustainable relational network. Strategies
will, thus, feature a recursive element. Given this recursive nature of exclusion and given as-
sumptions 1.3 and 1.7, strategies have to include at some point in time other punishments as
well. We therefore define strategies (S4) and (S5) for the (I1) and (I2) information transmis-
sion structures, respectively, such that the punishment depends on the size of the remaining
network, making the assumption that the punishment changes to defection with all neighbors if
the residual network is triangular.
Strategy profile (S4)
1. Players k ∈ N S start by playing Ckj ∀k ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Rk.
2. Each player k goes on playing Ckj ∀j ∈ Rk as long as no deviation by any player in the
network is observed.
3. If an agent i played Di,j ,
(a) her neighbors j ∈ Ri = {i+ 1, i− 1} will play Dj,i forever
(b) if size
(N S) > 3, N S−i ≡ N S − {i, i− 1; i, i+ 1} + {i− 1, i+ 1}, her neighbors j ∈
{i+ 1, i− 1} will form a link i− 1, i+ 1 and all agents k ∈ N S−i go to point 1.
(c) if size
(N S) = 3, every agent k reverts to Dkj ∀j ∈ Rk forever.
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Strategy profile (S5)
1. Every agent k ∈ NS starts with Ck,j with all neighbors k and transmits info on history as
well as received info.
2. ...goes on with Ci,j as long as he observes Ck,j and he does not observe Ci,k with i being
not a neighbor
3. If size
(
NS−j
)
≥ 3, and
(a) if k observes Dj,k without having played Dk,· before, he will
i. play Dk,j forever
ii. play Ck,i w.r.t. j’s other neighbor i
(b) if an agent i not being a neighbor of k observes Ck,i, he will
i. play Di,j with j ∈ Rk forever
ii. play Ci,k starting from the next period
(c) all agents k ∈ NS−j go to point 1
4. If size
(NS) = 3 and if k observes Dj,k, or if k played Dk,j before, he plays Dk,j ∀j ∈ Rk
forever after.
Note again that a closure of the relational network — after excluding a defector — by agents
who formerly did not share a relation requires that there are ij ∈ C with ij /∈ R. Furthermore,
there will be additional conditions to fulfill for these strategies to be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1.8 Suppose assumptions 1.2—1.3 and 1.5—1.7.
1. Assume the perfect information transmission regime (I1). Let δ̂ ≡ {δ| gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 = 0}.
Let
̂̂
δ be the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain a network with (S4)under (I1).
Then
(a) δ̂ =
̂̂
δ provided that all potential relations between network member that are not cur-
rently links in the network are mutual for δ̂.
(b) the network is not strategically stable.
2. Assume the no information transmission regime (I2). Then there is no relational network
sustained by exclusion.
3. Assume the network information transmission regime (I3). Let ∆˜ be the set of δ for which
— together with an appropriate Tj ∀j — (S3) constitutes a sustainable non-mutual network
with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0 under (I3) and δ˜ = min
{
∆˜
}
. Let
˜˜
∆ be the set of δ for
which (S5) constitutes a sustainable non-mutual network with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0
under (I3) and
˜˜
δ = min
{˜˜
∆
}
. Then
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(a) if li,i−2 is not too small, if ν is not too high, and if all potential relations between
members of the network, which are not links in the network, are mutual for
˜˜
δ,
˜˜
δ < δ˜.
(b) the network is not strategically stable.
(c) the strategy profile (S5) is the optimal cooperative strategy profile in the class of
strategy profiles with exclusion.
Proof. Part 1.: We first give the conditions for sustainability of the network assuming
optimal deviations given the punishment.
i. For any i ∈ N S we must have
gi,i+1 + gi,i−1 ≥ 0.
ii. For i− 1 and i+ 1, we need
gi−1,i+1 + gi−1,i−2 ≥ 0
gi+1,i+2 + g1+1,i−1 ≥ 0.
iii. Points i. and ii. must hold for any member of any network N S−i and any member of any
reduced network thereof except the triangular networks. In the triangular one, only i. has
to hold.
Part 1. (a): (S1) punishes a deviation immediately with the strongest possible punishment,
i.e. the one that gives the cheater his minimax payoff forever. It is, therefore, not possible to
decrease the delay until punishment takes place and the strengh of the punishment.
Condition ii. together with iii. imply that not only gi+1,i−1 > 0, but also gi+2,i−1 > 0,
gi+3,i−1 > 0, and so on. To see this, consider the following figures. The first row represents the
consequences of the deterrance of a deviation of agent 1, then 2, and then 3. We see, that the
relation of 4 with 6 has to be non-deficient for 4. The second row represents the consequences
of a deterrance of a deviation of agent 4. We see now that the relation of 4 with 6 has to be
non-deficient for 6. The consequence is that all agents inside the circle have to potentially have
mutual relations. Thus, if they are for δ̂, then δ̂ =
̂̂
δ.
1 2
3
45
6
1 2
3
45
6
1 2
3
45
6
1 2
3
45
6
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Part 1 (b).: If all ij /∈ R have to be mutual, this has consequences for the strategic stability
of the equilibrium as shown in proposition 1.4.
Part 2.: In order to be able to link to the neighbor of the neighbor who cheated on a player,
this player has to know who is the neighbor of that cheater. This requires information on the
history of his neighbor’s play, which he does not have under (I2).
Part 3.: Again, we first give the conditions for sustainability of the network. As before, we
assume optimal deviations given the punishment.
i. No agent has to have an incentive to deviate from the cooperative action:
gi,i+1 + δgi,i−1 ≥ 0.
ii. An agent i who has been cheated on by an agent i − 1 has to have an incentive to play
Ci,i+1 and Ci,i−2:
gi,i+1 + (1− δ) li,i−2 + δci,i−2 − di,i−2 ≥ 0,
iii. and to go on playing that in the next period:
gi,i+1 + δgi,i−2 ≥ 0.
iv. Any agent i−2 who observes Ci,i−2 from a member of the network who is not his neighbor
has to have an incentive to play Ci−2,i:
gi−2,i + δgi−2,i−3 ≥ 0.
v. Points i. through iv. must hold for any member of N S and of any network N S−i and any
member of any reduced network thereof except the triangular networks. In the triangular
ones, only i. has to hold.
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Part 3. (a): In this equilibrium, permanent Nash reversion of i + 1 arrives immediately.
Permanent Nash reversion of i − 1 arrives after one period. With strategy profile (S3), a
punishment of i+1 as strong as permanent Nash reversion arrives immediately. The punishment
of i + 1 as strong as permanent Nash reversion arrives after θ (c, ν) periods. Since θ (c, ν) is
decreasing in ν, for low ν condition i. is less strict than the equivalent condition for (S3).
Conditions iii. through v. imply, similarily to conditions ii. and iii. from Part 1. of this
proposition, that all potential relations between members of the network, which are not links in
the network, have to be mutual.
Condition ii. is only less stringent than condition i. if li,i−2 is not too low.
Part 3 (b).: As conditions iii. through v. imply that all potential relations between members
of the network, which are not links in the network, have to be mutual, it is possible to deviate
suboptimally in a network N S−i which makes a punishment of an agent in that mutual relation
by the other agent in that mutual relation a dominated action.
Part 3 (c).: As the creation of the links between neighbors is immediate, punishment sets
in as soon as possible. This punishment involves minimax strategies forever and is thus as hard
as possible. Q.E.D.
Let us briefly comment on these results. First, with exclusion punishments, it is only possible
to improve over the strategies defined before for the Network Information Transmission Case
(I3). For (I1), these strategies do just as well, and for (I2), there is no punishment by exclusion
for lack of information whom to link to. Second, as a deviation of any member of the network has
to be deterred by a sustainable other network, this results in certain conditions on the interaction
structure. These certain conditions are quite restrictive: all potential relations between members
of the network, which are not links in the network, have to be mutual. This causes the network
to be not strategically stable, and thus (S4) and (S5), respectively, unlikely to be chosen as
equilibrium strategies. In addition, for the Network Information Transmission Regime (I3) the
loss from playing C if your partner plays D has to be not too low, and the speed of information
transmission has to be not too high. This condition on l· would be relaxed if one allowed for the
potential relations, which would have to be mutual, to exist in the first place, i.e. if one was to
give up the ”time constraint” deg (i) ≤ 2. Third, with (S4), as with restitution punishments,
agents enjoy the advantage of avoiding the breakdown of the network during a punishment phase.
Thus, there is a utility gain compared with (S1). However, compared to restitution punishments
(similar to (S3)), the neighbors of a cheater lose utility — a payback of the damages is not done.
Furthermore, if the network fulfills any other function, such that the size of the network matters
for overall welfare, there is a loss in welfare compared to restitution punishments due to the
exclusion of the cheater.
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Part II
Agency Problems and Joint R&D
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Chapter 2
Moral hazard and the decision to do
joint research
2.1 Introduction
A number1 of research and development intensive industries, such as the software, biotechnology,
the automobile, the electronics industry and many others have seen a strong increase in joint
research and development projects. These joint projects may take the form for example of
research joint ventures (RJVs), alliances, or bilateral agreements. The value created in these
joint projects is often considerable and of high social interest. For this reason, there have been
public programs set up by several governments and supranational authorities to support them.
The EU for example does so within the "European Framework Programs". Out of the 363
million euro spent on "Promotion of Innovation and Encouragement of SME 2 Participation
in R&D" within the 5th edition of these "European Framework Programs" from 1998 until
2000, the EU devoted 200 million euro to "Joint innovation/SME activities". The relevance
of this phenomenon explains the interest in studying the formation mechanisms, to analyze the
rationale, possible failures, duration, and not least the impact on social welfare of joint projects.
Our leading example will be the pharmaceutical industry. Joint projects in this industry may
cover various stages of the innovation process, ranging from basic research, such as inventing new
chemical entities (NCE) up to the development of new final products, such as drugs, including
performing the necessary tests to get them approved by regulatory authorities (such as the Food
and Drug Administration, FDA, in the US)3. In this industry, research projects — joint and
stand-alone — are typically carried out by research units4. The choice of whether to form an
RJV, i.e. the choice of the organizational form to carry out research, on the other hand, is
usually taken by the owners of the company and not by the research units. This implies an
1This chapter is based on the paper "Moral hazard and the internal organization of joint research", written
jointly with Simona Fabrizi and circulated as UPV FAEII Working Paper 2003-10, quoted in this thesis as Fabrizi
and Lippert (2005b).
2Small and medium sized enterprises.
3See Pammolli (1996) for a discussion on R&D in the pharmaceutical industry.
4 In our paper, we will refer to these research units as managers who carry out the research for the owners (or
entrepreneurs).
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agency problem, the consequence of which for the formation of joint research agreements — to
our best knowledge — has not been studied to date. This paper is an attempt to study the
consequences from these agency problems for the formation of RJVs.
Most of the recent literature that studies the underlying incentives to enter into joint projects
as well as the conditions for their stability, concentrates on economic agents taking these decisions
as if they were also responsible for carrying out the research. There is usually no separation
between ownership and control. Therefore, possible conflicts between who takes the decision on
whether to conduct a joint research and who might affect the outcome of the research are not
accounted for5.
Our model departs from the traditional owner-manager view, by explicitly considering the
impact of principal-agent relations on formation and internal organization of RJVs by allow-
ing owners to decide whether to conduct a project alone or jointly, under both, the owner-
manager and the principal-agent assumptions. Research units will be responsible of conducting
the projects: their effort — alternatively observable or unobservable — determines in our model
the probability of success of the projects. A joint project can be conducted by only one owner’s
research unit or (in an extension) both owners’ research units (agents) together. In the latter
case, our analysis will allow for these units to be substitutes to a varying degree. The model
assesses the impact of agency problems on the owners’ decisions to carry out a stand-alone or a
joint project and whether to use possible synergies between research units.
To our best knowledge, there is one study of joint research that takes an explicit agency
approach, Pastor and Sandonís (2002). However, the authors do not consider incentives to enter
joint research projects: comparing cross-licensing agreements with research joint ventures in the
presence of agency problems, joint research is the only means entrepreneurs have to conduct
a given project. Therefore, staying alone is not an option and, contrary to our model, the
analysis of the underlying incentives to form a research alliance is ruled out by assumption. The
underlying assumption in their work is that each research unit’s success is essential, both for
the cross-licensing and for the research joint venture cases. By contrast, allowing for several
degrees of substitution between research units (managers) involved in the joint project in order
to reach a success, we are able to characterize the decisions whether to join and how to do so
as a function of these different degrees of substitution and the value possible to create in the
research projects.
By accounting for possible substitutability, duplication, or complementarity of the agents’
efforts in the functional form of the probability of success, we also depart from the team pro-
duction literature6 where the success of a task assigned to each agent is fundamental for the
success of a given project. In our model, interactions between agents allow for potential syner-
gies. However, results will show that synergies are not necessarily exploited in equilibrium. This
5For example, Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (2003) consider the endogenous formation of partnerships by firms
in a double sided moral hazard context, i.e. each firm has to decide its level of production with which to contribute
to the overall output of the partnership. Each owner has an incentive to free-ride on other owners by deciding how
much (unobservable) effort to put into the overall production of the partnership. However, an owner-managers
view on the problem is adopted, i.e. each owner is at the same time his own agent.
6See, for example, Holmström (1982) or Itoh (1991).
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is a consequence of a trade-off between the potential enhanced probability of success of the joint
project for a given effort and the increased cost of providing the optimal incentive compatible
contracts to be offered to both research units.
Another aspect of our model consists of endogenizing the cost associated with conducting a
research project. An often proposed argument to explain the forming a partnership is the ability
that share fixed costs that would have to be incurred by each party separately otherwise. These
fixed costs savings encompass research costs, savings on assets such as avoiding to replicate
laboratories, as it is argued in Harrigan (1986). The relative benefits of enjoying a success,
either alone or jointly, provides the rationale for private decisions whether to run a joint or a
stand-alone project. In our model the endogenized cost of conducting a research project can be
considered to play an equivalent role as, in standard models, the fixed costs may play.
In order to concentrate on agency problems coming from moral hazard we abstract from
several potentially interesting aspects such as from the fear of disclosing private know-how within
a joint project, from market power considerations, and from the bargaining process underlying
the determination of the sharing rule for the joint projects’ benefits and costs.
The potential trade-off between staying alone and joining when there is the fear of disclosing
each firm’s private know-how within a joint project has been considered by Pérez-Castrillo and
Sandonís (1996).
The abstraction from market power considerations (in the sense that the overall potential
value of the market that projects can target does not depend on whether they join or not) suits
situations where a success pays off a well defined value, which can be appropriated, totally or
partially, by the author of this success. Examples are R&D projects leading to the patenting
of the invention/innovation, or to the approval of a certain drug targeting a potential market.
While the overall value of the market is kept fixed, we distinguish in our analysis between in-
dependent and common market projects. This separation is meant to capture both the cases
where a stand-alone project is not facing a rival, and the one where it does. Having conducted a
successful stand-alone project will pay off a fixed value independent of whether the other entre-
preneur succeeded if this projects targeted independent markets. Taking our leading example
of the pharmaceutical industry, one could think of a market which is segmented due to regional
regulatory constraints that do not allow an innovator to use a patent in another country than
the one where the innovation was obtained because it needs to be approved in either segment
and approval in one is not a guarantee for approval in the other segment. If the projects aim
at a common market on the other hand, a success would have to be shared with the other
entrepreneur if his project succeeds as well.
Finally, concerning the bargaining, we assume an exogenous equal sharing of costs and
benefits of the joint projects. This simplification is made in order to focus on the impact
of agency problems on decision whether to join and how to join between equally important
partners in the joint project.
Results will show that the decision to pursue joint projects is always taken between firms
facing independent markets, no matter whether research units are affected by moral hazard
behavior or not. However, for both, observable and unobservable efforts, under the common
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market assumption, firms start preferring staying alone as long as the value of the overall market
to be targeted is not high enough, and/or if the degree of duplication is not too high. The more
competitive the environment, the more likely the firms pursue a stand-alone project. When
entrepreneurs face agency problems, that is, when it is more costly to implement a certain
probability of success, the value of the overall market to be targeted has to be higher than
under observable efforts for entrepreneurs to pursue a joint project. The additional agency costs
may induce the parties to stay alone even if they would otherwise have chosen to conduct the
project jointly either with one or both units. Our results show that moral hazard, and thus,
an increase of the component that inflates the cost of producing an innovation, is not a factor
that drives firms to share it necessarily, i.e. to share a "fixed" cost, as it is usually considered.
Given that the wage to be paid to the research management can be adjusted implementing the
optimal wage contract associated with each case, firms decide to stay alone in some situations
where they would have shared costs without moral hazard. In particular, the occurrence of joint
projects where both units are kept is decreased systematically as higher complementarities are
needed to sustain this configuration against either stand-alone or a joint project with one unit.
The analysis of the impacts of privately taken decisions over the social welfare, will show that
conflicts arise under the moral hazard assumption where joint projects keeping both research
units would be preferred socially, but privately firms prefer either to join keeping only one unit
or not to join at all. Too few socially desirable joint projects exploiting synergies are observed.
The work is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the setup of the model. Section
3 is devoted to the analysis of the equilibrium organization arising if only one entrepreneurs’
research unit is kept. We will compare the results for the situation without moral hazard with
the results in a principal agents framework. In section 4, we allow the entrepreneurs to keep
both research organizations, making it possible to enjoy synergies. We will perform the same
comparisons as in section 3. Section 5 concludes and discusses possible extensions of the model.
2.2 The Model
In this section, we describe the stand-alone configuration for both, projects targeting independent
markets - or market segments - (I) and those targeting a common market (C), as well as the
joint research configuration. We will describe the characteristics of the projects, the utility of
the agents’ conducting them, as well as the probability of success attached to the projects.
Entrepreneurs’ projects Let two entrepreneurs pursue a project, which potentially leads
to an innovation that targets a market, the overall value of which is ∆. The projects can be
pursued by each entrepreneur as stand-alone projects, denoted by (S), or in a joint venture
together with the other entrepreneur as a joint project, denoted by (J).
The market is assumed to be exogenously segmented into two parts, each of which is of
equal value ∆2 . In the stand-alone situation, we distinguish two cases regarding the accesibility
of the two segments by the entrepreneurs. They may be able to access only one segment of the
market, distinct from the segment accessed by the other; in this case we will refer to stand-alone
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projects targeting independent markets or market segments7, denoted by (S| I). They may on
the other hand be able to access both segments of the market; in this case we will refer to stand-
alone projects targeting a common market8, denoted by (S|C). A stand-alone project targeting
independent markets, is assumed to pay off ∆2 to each entrepreneur in the case of his success
9. A
stand-alone project targeting a common market, pays off ∆ to a successful entrepreneur if he is
the only one succeeding, or ∆2 to each of them if both are succeeding
10. Whenever entrepreneurs
decide to conduct a joint project (J), its success is assumed to lead to a success to be used in
both segments of the market11, paying off ∆. In case of failure, any project pays off zero.
Projects are assumed to be carried out by agents (research units, divisions, etc.) employed
by the entrepreneurs. The agents affect the probability of success of the project they conduct
through their chosen effort. We assume that each entrepreneur employs initially one agent
(research unit, division, etc.). If the entrepreneurs combine their assets for a joint project, we
assume that they keep one of their two research units or agents12. This assumption will be
relaxed in an extension to this model in order to analyze the exploitation of potential synergies.
Any time the project is conducted jointly, we further assume that a new entity is founded.
We refer to this entity as the joint entity. We assume that entrepreneurs share the costs and
the benefits of conducting the joint project equally.
Summarizing the assumptions made, we can write the different payoffs R(·) associated with
the stand-alone situation:
Ri (S| I) =

△
2
0
with Pr = pi (S)
with Pr = 1− pi (S) ,
Ri (S|C) =

△
∆
2
0
with Pr = pi (S) (1− p−i (S))
with Pr = pi (S) p−i (S)
with Pr = 1− pi (S) ,
7An example for projects targeting independent markets, i.e. where entrepreneurs may be initially present in
only one segment, is the case where only the "home" entrepreneur knows the regulatory framework of its country,
which is a necessary condition to get an approval for the innovation there. The "foreign" entrepreneur does not
know the regulatory framework of the for him "foreign" country and therefore, an innovation for that segment is
valueless for him.
8An example for projects targeting a common market independent markets, is the case where both entrepre-
neurs have access to - or can develop for - both segments: this is possible either because they were initially present
in both segments; or because each of them was initially present only in one segment, but they decide to conduct
a joint project — and thus share the necessary knowledge for obtaining approval in their respective segments.
9This comes from the assumption of equally sized segments.
10The assumption of sharing the value in case both entrepreneurs succeed is taken for simplification: It can
be shown that our results do not change qualitatively if we assume that a success of both entrepreneurs in the
common markets situation destroys value, i.e. if the value to be appropriated by each entrepreneur were smaller
than ∆2 .
11The underlying assumption for this is that a project success in one segment can be easily translated into a
success in the other segment: e.g. given the now common knowledge about the regulatory frameworks of each
respective separate market, joining firms can tailor the project such that its scientific success ensures it to be used
in both segments.
12We are implicitly assuming that each agent has embedded the scientific knowledge/capability to conduct the
project alone.
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where pi (S) and p−i (S) are the probabilities of success of firms i and −i, respectively. Similarly,
we can write the payoffs associated with a joint project:
R (J) =
 △0
with Pr = p(J)
with Pr = 1− p(J),
where p (J) is the probability of success of the joint project.
Agents Agents affect the probability of success of the project they conduct through their
effort. We consider both, the cases where the agents exert an observable, contractable effort ei
and where they exert a non observable, therefore not-contractable, effort. Exerting this effort
ei implies a disutility for the agent that is equal to ci (ei) =
1
2e
2
i . For conducting the project,
agents receive a transfer ti ≥ 0 from the entrepreneurs employing them. Both, entrepreneurs
and agents are risk neutral, however, agents are protected by limited liability. We assume the
agents’ utility to be additively separable between effort and money,
Ui = ui (ti)− ci (ei) = ti − 1
2
e2i .
In case of unobservable efforts, a contract, specifying a transfer to the agents cannot be made
contingent on their exerted efforts, but only on the observable and verifiable success or failure
of the project. In this case, the optimal contract requires the transfer to the agents made by
the entrepreneurs employing them to be of the following type:
ti (R) =
 bi0
if success
if failure
In the joint case (J) we will drop the index i while referring to the transfer an agent receives
from the joint entity.
Probability of success As already mentioned, agents affect the probability of success of the
project by selecting which level of effort to exert. We define this probability as13:
pi (S) = ei
p (J) = e
The underlying assumption is that an agent is as productive carrying out a joint project as
he is carrying out a stand-alone project. This assumption may be questionable for the situation
in which stand-alone projects target independent markets, as the common project has twice the
13We will derive the optimal contracts not taking into account any restrictions on the parameters ∆ and ε
such that the probability of success is well defined, e.g. smaller than 1. If the unrestricted solution specified a
probability level greater than one, entrepreneurs would not be able to increase the probability of success over the
value of one by paying a higher transfer. They would, therefore, optimally specify an implemented effort and a
transfer such that the probability is exactly equal to one. In the following analysis, we provide the unrestricted
solutions for the optimally implemented efforts and transfers, however, it is always possible to verify that the
results are unalterated by allowing for the restriction on the exogenous parameters to bind.
55
Entrepreneurs
choose
organization
(S|· ) or (J)
Entrepreneurs
offer
contract(s)
Agent(s)
choose(s)
effort
level(s)
Agent(s)
accept(s) or
reject(s)
contract(s)
Outcomes
are
realized
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2.1: Timing
scale of the stand-alone project. We keep it in order to focus on another trade-off which would
be unaffected by changing this assumption.
Timing Given that the target of stand-alone projects (independent markets or a common
market) is exogenously taken ex ante, the actions of the different players can be summarized as
follows:
1. Entrepreneurs simultaneously decide whether they want to invest in a joint or in a stand-
alone project.
2. Entrepreneurs offer contract(s) to the agent(s) involved in the project(s).
3. Agent(s) accept(s) or reject(s) the contract(s).
4. Agent(s) decide(s) on an effort level to be exerted.
5. The outcome is realized and the transfers are executed.
2.3 Equilibrium organization
2.3.1 Observable efforts
The goal of this section is to provide a benchmark analysis of the optimal organizations either
when the agents’ efforts are observable and therefore it is possible to make the transfer contingent
to the exerted effort14.
This benchmark will be compared to the parallel analysis when the efforts are not observ-
able15. Comparisons will allow us to assess the impact of the separation between ownership
and control — entrepreneurs have the power to decide whether to join, but agents affect the real
outcome of that decision — on the privately chosen configuration and on the social welfare.
14Or, seeing it differently, when we have an owner-manager, i.e. an entrepreneur who could provide that
effort alone, as if the he was also the manager. An example could be the case of a biotech firm funded by the
biotechnician that is conducting the research himself. In this case of the analysis, we will adhere to the formulation
that corresponds to the entrepreneur(s) having full control over their agent’(s) efforts. However, doing so, the
alternative interpretation of the owner-manager case just given remains valid.
15This may happen any time the entrepreneur is not able to conduct the project alone, but needs the agent(s)
and he is not able to judge whether the agent(s) behaved or not, but he can simply observe the result of his
actions, either a success or a failure.
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Stand-alone (S)
In this section we consider the case in which each entrepreneur conducts the project alone,
employing one agent each. Here only the effort of this agent determines the probability of success
of the project16, i.e. pi(S) = ei. However, as outlined in the model setup, in our analysis, a
success allows to access either one or both segments of a market depending on whether the
project targeted a independent or a common market. For this reason, in the following analysis
we distinguish between these two possible projects.
Independent Markets (I) We first assume that the projects target independent market
segments. This means that, when the entrepreneur is successful, he enjoys ∆2 , regardless of the
success or failure of the other entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur pays out a transfer that lets the
agent break even.
Therefore, each entrepreneur solves the following maximization problem:
max
ei
Πi (S| I) = max
ei
[
ei
∆
2
− ti
]
s.t. ti − 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 (IR)
ti ≥ 0. (LL)
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem gives:
eoi (S| I) = eo (S| I) = po (S| I) =
∆
2
and
toi (S| I) = to (S| I) =
1
2
(
∆
2
)2
,
where the superscript o denotes the profit-maximizing solution in the observable efforts case.
The implemented contract leads for each entrepreneur to an expected profit of:
Πo (S| I) = 1
2
(
∆
2
)2
.
Common Market (C) We now assume that entrepreneurs target a common market. Ac-
cording to our assumptions, if only one entrepreneur succeeds, he will be able to appropriate the
whole value of the market, ∆; however, if both entrepreneurs succeed, they will have to share
this value equally, appropriating each ∆2 . Again, each entrepreneur pays out a transfer that lets
the agent break even.
Each entrepreneur, thus, solves the following maximization problem:
max
ei
Πi (S|C) = max
ei
[
ei
(
(1− e−i)∆ + e−i∆
2
)
− ti
]
s.t. ti − 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 (IR)
ti ≥ 0, (LL)
16Alternatively, the entrepreneur conducts the project alone facing the same disutility of effort as the agent
would.
57
the solution to which gives the equilibrium efforts and transfers:
eoi (S|C) = eo (S|C) = po (S|C) =
2∆
∆+ 2
and
toi (S|C) = to (S|C) =
1
2
(
2∆
∆+ 2
)2
,
where, again, the superscript o denotes the profit-maximizing solution in the observable efforts
case. The expected net profit for each entrepreneur is:
Πo (S|C) = 1
2
(
2∆
∆+ 2
)2
.
Joint research (J)
In this subsection, we assume that entrepreneurs decide to pursue the research project jointly. In
this world, the project is targeting the whole (common) market. When two entrepreneurs invest
into a joint project, as assumed, they form a new entity and let one agent run the project alone.
We also assumed that the joint entity offers a transfer to their agent, and that entrepreneurs
share equally the cost of the transfer, as well as the payoff of the project.
In the (J) case, the probability of success of the joint project is p(J1) = e. As assumed, in
case of success, both segments of the market are covered, giving rise to a value of ∆.
Therefore, the joint entity’s maximization problem is
max
e
Π(J1) = max
e
[e∆− t]
s.t. t− 1
2
e2 ≥ 0 (IR)
t ≥ 0. (LL)
As in the previous subsection we can derive the following solution to this problem
eo (J1) = po (J1) = ∆,
to (J1) =
∆2
2
,
and each entrepreneur/principal expects a profit equal to
Πo (J1) =
1
2
(
∆2
2
)
.
Optimal organizational form for observable efforts
We are now able to draw some conclusions about the chosen organizations when efforts are
observable. The following table summarizes the results found above:
Configurations (S| I) (S|C) (J)
Πo (·) 12
(
∆
2
)2 1
2
(
2∆
∆+2
)2 (
∆
2
)2
po (·) ∆2 2∆∆+2 ∆
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The comparison between the different levels of profits (and social welfare) lead to the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Under the owner-manager assumption (alternatively: for observable efforts),
(i) in the independent markets case, entrepreneurs always invest jointly,
(ii) in the common markets case, entrepreneurs invest jointly and keep one agent if
∆ > 2
√
2− 2,
and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise.
When entrepreneurs are facing an independent markets world, they always choose to pursue
a joint project. The reason is that the choice of a joint as opposed to that of a stand-alone
project only affects the expected cost of implementing a given probability of success p: this cost
is shared in (J) whereas it is not shared in (S| I). It does not affect the expected payoffs of
implementing a given probability of success p an entrepreneur faces: it is always p∆2 .
In contrast, when entrepreneurs face a common market, entrepreneurs choose a joint project
only if the value of the market is high enough. To give an intuition about how firms take their
decision between staying alone or pursuing a joint project in the common markets case, we
need to distinguish between two effects, one coming from the differences in expected payoffs
and another from differences in expected costs, associated with one configuration instead of the
other.
First, the expected payoffs associated with (S|C) and (J1) for the same given probability
of success, p, are respectively p (1− p)∆ + p2∆2 = p (2− p) ∆2 and p∆2 . In other words, the
expected payoff for this probability is higher in (S|C) than in (J1) . Second, for the same given
probability of success, p, the costs in (S|C) and (J1) are respectively p22 and 12 p
2
2 . This means
that it is more costly in (S|C) than in (J1) to implement the same given probability of success,
p. The enhanced payoffs that choosing (S|C) against (J1) ensures, conflict with the higher
costs associated to this choice. Enhanced payoffs and cost savings go in opposite directions, and
which of them outweighs the other depends on the level of a given implemented probability.
When examining the optimally implemented probabilities of success and, thus, the expected
payoffs (before transfers) as a function of ∆, it is possible to note several points. First, the
optimal implemented probabilities associated with (J) and (S|C) are not the same: for any
∆, in (J1) they are systematically higher than in (S|C) . Second, the probability of success in
(J) is a linear increasing function in ∆, making the expected payoffs a quadratic function in ∆.
The probability of success in (S|C) on the other hand, is a concave increasing function in ∆.
This reflects that with an increasing probability of success of the single project the competing
project also succeeds more often and that therefore the probability that one entrepreneur enjoys
a success alone decreases. For lower ∆ values, success alone is more likely and outweighing the
cost disadvantage, makes stand-alone the preferres option. For higher ∆ values, success of both
projects is more likely and therefore the cost disadvantage becomes more important and the
joint project is chosen.
59
Note that, in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.1, we derived the optimal contracts not taking into
account any restrictions on the parameter ∆ such that the associated probabilities of success
are well defined, e.g. smaller than 1. For example, for ∆ = 2, the unrestricted solution for
the stand-alone cases specifies an effort level eoi (S| ·) = 1 and, thus, implements a probability
of success of poi (S| ·) = 1. For ∆ > 2, the unrestricted solution would specify a probability of
success greater than one. Similarly, for the (J) organization, the unrestricted solutions would
specify a probability of success greater than one for ∆ > 1. Therefore, we should not be allowed
to make comparisons for ∆ > 1. However, for ∆ > 1 and ∆ > 2, respectively, entrepreneurs
know that they cannot increase the probability of success by implementing an higher effort,
i.e. even by paying higher transfers. Therefore, they restrict themselves to pay a transfer that
implements a probability of one for all higher values of ∆. Therefore, for ∆ > 1, eo (J) = 1 and
to (J) = 12 and for ∆ > 2, e
o
i (S| ·) = 1 and toi (S| ·) = 12 . The results of our comparisons have
been obtained, taking these (restricted) contracts into consideration.
2.3.2 The principal-agent case
In this section we consider the entrepreneurs’ decisions with regard to the organizational choice
and the optimal contracts under the assumption that agents efforts are not observable. Contracts
cannot be made contingent on the level of these efforts, but only on the verifiable success or
failure of the project.
Within this context, we replicate the analysis made in the previous section in order to derive
the optimal contracts and the internal organization chosen by the entrepreneurs, as functions of
∆ in a similar way as we did for the observable efforts case. Results will allow us to discuss the
impact of agency problems on the decisions of whether to enter a joint project.
Stand-alone (S)
As before, we distinguish between the independent and common market projects when we de-
rive optimal contracts. Again, if entrepreneurs decide to invest in a stand-alone project, its
probability of success is pi(S) = ei.
Efforts are not observable, so that entrepreneurs have to provide their agents with incentives
to let them exert an effort. In this case, agent i gets a positive bonus, bi, in case of success of
the project he conducts and zero otherwise (as discussed in the setup of the model). Given this
type of contract, agent i’s maximization program is:
max
ei
Ui = max
ei
[
eibi − 1
2
e2i
]
,
the solution to which gives the incentive compatibility constraint (IC):
ei = bi. (IC)
Entrepreneurs will take this constraint into account when they decide about the contract to offer
to their agents. Notice that, no matter whether the markets are independent or common, the
incentive compatibility constraint to be taken into account by the entrepreneurs stays the same.
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Independent Markets (I) Each entrepreneur solves for the following problem:
max
bi
Πi (S| I) = max
bi
[
ei
∆
2
− eibi
]
s.t. ei = bi (IC)
eibi − 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 (IR)
As a solution, the bonus received by either agent is the same, and, given the (IC), corresponds
to the implemented probability of success:
bui (S| I) = bu (S| I) =
∆
4
= pu (S| I) .
The superscript u denotes the profit-maximizing solution in the unobservable efforts case. Note
that the induced probability of success is half the one that an owner-manager would have chosen.
Each entrepreneur’s expected profit is:
Πu (S| I) =
(
∆
4
)2
.
Common Market (C) Each entrepreneur, solves the following maximization problem:
max
bi
Πi (S|C) = max
bi
[
ei
(
(1− e−i)∆ + e−i∆
2
)
− eibi
]
s.t. ei = bi (IC)
eibi − 1
2
e2i ≥ 0. (IR)
In equilibrium, the implemented efforts and the bonuses chosen are:
eui (S|C) = eu (S|C) = pu (S|C) =
2∆
∆+ 4
and
bui (S|C) = bu (S|C) =
2∆
∆+ 4
,
where, again, the superscript u denotes the profit-maximizing solution in the unobservable efforts
case. Note that the implemented probability of success is more than half the one chosen under
observable efforts. This is due to a strategic effect between the owners. This leads to an expected
net profit for each entrepreneur of:
Πu (S|C) =
(
2∆
∆+ 4
)2
.
Joint research (J)
We know that, if entrepreneurs decide to invest in a joint-one agent project, its success probabil-
ity is p(J) = e. Again, entrepreneurs face a (IC) constraint that comes from the agent’s utility
maximization problem corresponding to the one of the stand-alone case above. The incentive
compatibility constraint is therefore the same where the index i has been dropped:
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e = b.
Thus, the joint entity solves:
max
b
Π(J) = max
b
[e∆− eb]
s.t. e = b (IC)
eb− 1
2
e2 ≥ 0, (IR)
which gives the following results:
bu (J) =
∆
2
and
eu(J) = pu(J) =
∆
2
=
po (J)
2
.
Here the induced probability of effort is half the one that an owner-manager would have
chosen. Given the equal sharing rule between entrepreneurs after joining forces, the implemented
effort and chosen bonus determines a per entrepreneur profit of:
EΠu (J) =
1
2
(
∆
2
)2
.
Optimal organizational form for unobservable efforts
We are now able to draw some conclusions about the privately chosen organizations under the
unobservable efforts assumption. Results obtained in the previous sections are summarized in
the following table:
Configurations (S| I) (S|C) (J)
Πu (·) (∆4 )2 ( 2∆∆+4)2 12 (∆2 )2
pu(·) ∆4 2∆∆+4 ∆2
A comparison of the different outcomes, leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 2.2 Under the principal-agents assumption, (alternatively: for unobservable ef-
forts),
(i) in the independent markets case, entrepreneurs always invest jointly,
(ii) in the common markets case, entrepreneurs invest jointly if
∆ > 4
(√
2− 1
)
,
and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise.
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As before, when entrepreneurs are facing a independent markets world, there are only effects
on the expected cost side. Even though the magnitude of these costs is changed, due to the
incentive compatible contracts to be offered to the agents, their relative difference makes still
entrepreneurs prefer to join over staying alone. Therefore, all comments made in the observable
efforts case apply here as well.
In a similar way, when entrepreneurs face a common market, the two effects identified in
the observable efforts case appear again. If the value of the market is high enough, i.e. ∆ >
4
(√
2− 1) , (J) is preferred to (S|C) . A similar choice was taken under the observable efforts
assumption, but for a lower level of ∆, remember that (J) prevailed over (S|C) for ∆ >
2
(√
2− 1).
Note that, as for the observable efforts case, we derived the optimal contracts not taking into
account any restrictions on the parameter ∆ such that the associated probabilities of success are
well defined, e.g. smaller than 1. As before, the results of the comparisons have been obtained
taking into account the contracts for all values of ∆.
When one compares the results obtained in this section with the ones obtained under the
observable efforts case, one finds the implications of moral hazard in our model. On the one
hand, the value of the market necessary to make the option of joining with one agent preferred
over staying alone shift upwards: it is higher under the moral hazard assumption than without
moral hazard. Staying alone is now preferred to joining with either one or two agents more
often.
Introducing moral hazard changes the cost side of the model: It makes the implementation
of the same given probability of success, p, in both, (S|C) and (J) twice as expensive: the cost
of implementing p in (S|C) is now bp = p2 and the cost of implementing p in (J) is 12bp = 12p2.
The difference in these costs is therefore also twice as big as under observable efforts. This effect
would, prima facie, speak in favor of observing more often a sharing of the costs under (J) .
However, under moral hazard the optimal implemented probabilities of success are, as under the
observable efforts case, not the same and they are reduced as compared to the observable efforts
case. In (J) the optimal implemented probability of success is one half of that in the situation
with observable efforts, while the one in (S|C) is more than one half the one under observable
efforts, even though reduced. This difference in the change of the implemented probabilities,
makes the relative cost savings associated to (J) as compared to the enhanced expected payoffs
of staying alone, not as high as before. The option (S|C) is now preferred more often over (J).
Corollary 2.1 Moral Hazard causes entrepreneurs to choose to conduct stand-alone research
(weakly) more often.
2.4 Extension: Synergies between research units
Until now, we assumed that entrepreneurs employ only one of their research units/agents in a
joint project. This way, it is impossible to use synergies or complementarities coming from a
possible interaction of these units with each other. In this section, we will lift this assumption.
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There are two consequences from this organizational form except for the possible use of
synergies. One is that entrepreneurs can now coordinate the contracts given to the agents. This
is a consequence that favors letting the agents work together and it is present in both, the cases
with observable and unobservable efforts. However, in the case of unobservable efforts, there is
also a consequence unfavorable to such a project. There is now only one statistic for the effort
of two agents, whereas in the stand-alone configuration as well as in the joint projects dealt with
so far, there was one statistic per agent. This should make it more expensive to let these agents
work together.
2.4.1 The joint research model with synergies
Entrepreneurs now have the choice to keep either one or both their reseach units if they opt for
a joint project. If they keep one unit/agent, we will refer to a joint-one agent project, denoted as
before (J). If the entrepreneurs decide to keep both agents, we will refer to a joint-both agents
project, denoted by (JB).
In the following, we will only note the changes and additions to model as presented in section
2.2, which are coming from considering this extension.
Entrepreneurs’ Projects We assume the revenues in a (JB) project to be
R (JB) =
 △0
with Pr = p (JB)
with Pr = 1− p (JB) ,
where p (JB) is the probability of success associated to the (JB) project.
Agents In a (JB) project, we impose equal transfers to both agents17. However, giving equal
wages for equal jobs would emerge in equilibrium as the result of the minimization of the cost
of implementing a given probability of success in (JB). This result is shown in appendix B.1.
Given the limited liability of the agents, the transfers are
ti (R) =
 bi0
if success
if failure
Probability of success We define the probability of success in a (JB) project as
p(JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε ≤ 1.
Note that the probabilities of success in projects conducted by one agent in a special case of
that probability where one of the efforts is set to zero.
17This may be due to legal constraints which oblige owners to pay comparable wages/transfers for comparable
jobs. It could also be in the interest of the entrepreneurs to let their agents follow the project jointly in order
not to loose part of the tacit knowledge that agents may acquire during the development of the project itself.
Furthermore, giving an incentive contract to only one of the two agents will reduce this case to the (J) case.
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The parameter ε ∈ [ε, 1[ determines the way agents’ efforts interact with each other depending
on the technology possibilities attached to a given project. We restrict the ε below in order to
fulfill second order conditions of the entrepreneurs’ optimization problems. We restrict ε to be
below one for continuity reasons. Results are not driven by this assumption. Furthermore, a
restriction above is needed to justify the assumption that agents are able to conduct the project
alone. For ε −→∞, the agents’ efforts would become perfect complements, which would conflict
with that assumption.
Allowing for positive values of this parameter we can still consider situations where for some
projects agents exhibit some complementarities. Think about a project that lets the agents
acquire information while exerting an effort together. This information needs to be shared
between the two agents and it is crucial for making the project successful.
The technology parameter can also be negative. A negative ε accounts for the degree to
which the agents’ efforts are duplicates.
Finally, if ε = 0, agents’ efforts are perfect substitutes. An example for this case is a project,
which can be divided into two parts that may each partially contribute to the overall success
of the project and which are assigned each to a different agent. Here no agent’s effort overlaps
the one of the other and the probability of success is determined by the overall amount of effort
exerted by the two agents.
Timing The timing is the same as before, except that in 1, the entrepreneurs choose between
(S| ·), (J), and (JB).
2.4.2 Observable efforts
Joint-two agents (JB)
In the (JB) case, the probability of success becomes a function of both agents’ efforts so that
p (JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε . As cost minimization requires that the joint entity proposes to each
agent exactly the same contract18, we show results here as if the constraint was imposed from
the beginning. Again it is assumed that in case of success both segments of the market are
covered, giving rise to a value of ∆.
Therefore, given that we take t1 = t2 = t, the joint entity’s maximization problem is:
max
t
Π(JB) = max
t
[(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε ∆− 2t
]
s.t. t− 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)
t ≥ 0 ∀i. (LL)
18The proof is given in appendix B.1.
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This problem leads to the following results:
eoi (JB) = e
o (JB) = 2
ε
1−ε∆,
po (JB) = 2
1+ε
1−ε∆,
to (JB) = 2
3ε−1
1−ε ∆2.
For the (JB) case, we get a per entrepreneur expected profit of:
Πo (JB) =
1
2
(
2
2ε
1−ε∆2
)
.
Optimal organizational form for observable efforts
Comparison of the expected profits reveals the following results.
Lemma 2.1 For any ∆, (JB) is privately preferred to (J) for ε ∈ ]−1, 1[.
This result in very intuitive: a higher ε means higher synergies as the agents’ efforts become
more complementary and less duplicating. Lemma 2.1 implies that for ε ∈ ]−1, 1[, the relevant
joint organization for which to make comparisons with the stand-alone organization is (JB). If
agents efforts are stronger duplicates, the relevant joint organization is (J).
Lemma 2.1 and proposition 2.1 imply the following result:
Proposition 2.3 Under the owner-manager assumption (alternatively: for observable efforts),
(i) in the independent markets case, entrepreneurs always invest jointly,
(a) for ε ∈ ]−1, 1[, they keep both agents,
(b) for ε /∈ ]−1, 1[, they keep one agent,
(ii) in the common markets case,
(a) for ε ∈ ]−1, 1[, entrepreneurs invest jointly and keep both agents if
∆ > 2−
2ε−1
1−ε − 2,
and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise,
(b) for ε /∈ ]−1, 1[, entrepreneurs invest jointly and keep one agent if
∆ > 2
√
2− 2,
and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal configurations for observable efforts.
If projects target independent markets, entrepreneurs joint for any ∆ and ε and they do so
with the (JB) organization if ε ∈ ]−1, 1[.
Results for the common market case are shown graphically in figure 2.2. The Πo(S|C),(JB)
is the indifference curve of relevant combinations of ∆ and ε above which (J2) is preferred to
(S|C); similarly, Πo(S|C),(J) is the indifference curve for the relevant combinations of the same
parameters above which profits in (J) are higher than the ones in (S|C); and, finally, for the
relevant parameters combinations the indifference curve Πo(J),(JB) separates the left(right) area
where profits in (J) are higher(lower) than in (JB) . Therefore, these three curves depict three
regions: area (S|C)o, (J)o, and (JB)o, where firms prefer (S|C) , (J), and (JB), respectively.
Again, a joint project is preferred to a stand-alone project if ∆ is high enough. However, a
higher ε may substitute for the market value of the invention: ∀ε ∈ ]−1, 1[ , the cutoff value of
∆ for (JB) is smaller than the one for (J) : 2−
2ε−1
1−ε −2 < 2√2−2 and it becomes 0 for ε ∈ [0, 1[.
2.4.3 Unobservable efforts
Joint-two agents (JB)
In the unobservable efforts world, the contracts offered by the entrepreneurs have to fulfill the
(IC) constraint, one for each of their employed agents. Furthermore, we again assume that
the entrepreneurs share equally the bonuses to be paid to them, as well as the potential value
coming from the joint project.
Each agent maximizes his own utility w.r.t. his own effort taking as given the one of the other
agent. The first order conditions of these problems determine each agent’s reaction function.
When taken together, the reaction functions lead to the (IC) constraint to be taken into account
by the joint entity when solving for the optimal implemented contract to be offered to the agents.
The agents’ maximization problems are:
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max
e1
U1 = max
e1
[(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε b− 1
2
e21
]
and
max
e2
U2 = max
e2
[(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε b− 1
2
e22
]
,
the first order conditions of which are:
e−ε1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε b− e1 = 0,
e−ε2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε b− e2 = 0.
The Nash solution to the agents’ problems gives the (IC) constraint:
e1 (JB) = e2 (JB) = e (JB) = 2
ε
1−ε b. (IC)
The probability of success for the joint-two agents case, compatible with the (IC) constraint,
can be rewritten as:
p(JB) = 2
1+ε
1−ε b,
and each agent’s (IR) constraint as:
p(JB)b− 1
2
[e (JB)]2 ≥ 0.
The joint entity solves, therefore, for:
max
b
Π(JB) = max
b
[p(JB) (∆− 2b)]
s.t. e (JB) = 2
ε
1−ε b ∀i (IC)
p(JB)b− 1
2
[e (JB)]2 ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)
The optimal bonus each agent receives is:
bu (JB) =
∆
4
and, as a consequence, the implemented efforts and probability of success are:
eu (JB) = 2
ε
1−ε
∆
4
and
pu(JB) = 2
1+ε
1−ε
∆
4
=
po (JB)
4
.
The probability induced by these contracts is equal to one fourth the one chosen by owners-
managers. This is a bigger relative reduction between the observable and the unobservable
efforts case than in the (J) configuration. It reflects the fact that there is now only one statistic
for two agents’ efforts.
Given the implemented efforts and bonuses each entrepreneur expects a profit equal to:
Πu (JB) =
1
2
(
2
2ε
1−ε
(
∆
2
)2)
.
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Optimal organizational form for unobservable efforts
Comparison of the expected profits reveals the following results.
Lemma 2.2 For any ∆, (JB) is privately preferred to (J) for ε ∈ ]0, 1[.
As before, a higher ε means higher synergies as the agents’ efforts become more complemen-
tary and less duplicating and lemma 2.2 implies that for ε ∈ ]0, 1[, the relevant joint organization
for which to make comparisons with the stand-alone organization is (JB). If agents efforts are
duplicates (ε ≤ 0), the relevant joint organization is (J).
The reduced range of ε for which a (JB) project is chosen over a (J) project as compared to
the observable efforts case reflects again the fact that in (JB) there is only one statistic for two
agents’ efforts. It is relatively more costly to use a (JB) organization than a (J) organization
in order to implement a given probability of success under moral hazard.
Lemma 2.2 and proposition 2.2 imply the following result:
Proposition 2.4 Under the principal-agents assumption, (alternatively: for unobservable ef-
forts),
(i) in the independent markets case, entrepreneurs always invest jointly,
(a) for ε ∈ ]0, 1[ they keep both agents and
(b) for ε /∈ ]0, 1[ they keep one agent;
(ii) in the common markets case,
(a) for ε ∈ ]0, 1[, entrepreneurs invest jointly and keep both agents if
∆ > 4
(
2
−ε
1−ε
√
2− 1
)
,
and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise,
(b) for ε /∈ ]0, 1[, entrepreneurs invest jointly and keep one agent if
∆ > 4
(√
2− 1
)
,
and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise.
Again, if projects target independent markets, entrepreneurs join for all ∆ and all ε and they
do so with a (JB) organization if ε ∈ ]0, 1[.
Results for the common market case are shown graphically in figure 2.3. In this figure,
Πu(S),(JB), Π
u
(S),(J) and Π
u
(J),(JB) represent the relevant indifference curves as the ones under the
observable efforts case. The superscript u refers to the unobservable case we are describing now.
As before, these three curves depict three regions: one, where firms prefer (S|C) , one, in which
firms prefer (J), and, one, where the (JB) configuration is chosen.
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Figure 2.3: Privately chosen configurations for unobservable efforts.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of equilibrium configurations with and without moral hazard
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Figure 2.4 compares results obtained in this section with the ones obtained under the ob-
servable efforts case. The solid lines depict the private indifference curves for the observable
efforts case, whereas the dashed lines depict those for the unobservable one. The graph shows
that there are two implications of moral hazard for the equilibrium organization in our model.
On the one hand, as already mentioned and motivated, joining with two agents is chosen only
for higher complementarities. On the other hand, as before, the value of the market necessary
to make the option of joining with one agent preferred over staying alone shift upwards: it is
higher under the moral hazard assumption than without moral hazard. Staying alone is now
preferred to joining with either one or two agents more often.
Welfare
In this section, we would like to highlight some welfare implications. Let us first define the
measure of social welfare W (·) we will use for each of the different environments we consider.
Social welfare is assumed to consist of both the entrepreneurs’ expected net profits and the
agents’ expected utility, equivalent therefore to the sum of the expected gross profits and the
disutility of agents’ efforts, i.e.:
W (S| ·) =

W (S| I) = (e1 + e2) ∆2 − 12e21 − 12e22
W (S|C) = (e1 + e2 − e1e2)∆− 12e21 − 12e22,
W (J) = e∆− 1
2
e2, and
W (JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε ∆− 1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22,
respectively for the stand-alone independent markets and common markets, and for the
joint-one agent or two-agents cases.
Proposition 2.5 summarizes the analysis of the induced welfare in the three organizations for
both, the independent markets and common market assumption.
Proposition 2.5 Under the principal-agents assumption, (alternatively: for unobservable ef-
forts),
(i) in the independent markets case,
(a) the private decision to invest jointly is welfare improving as compared to staying alone;
(b) for ε ∈ ]−0.125, 0[, (J) is privately chosen whereas (JB) would have been socially
preferable;
(ii) in the common markets case,
(a) if the joint configuration is chosen, this is always welfare improving as compared to
staying alone;
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(b) however
b1 for ε ∈ ]−0.125, 0[ and ∆ > 4 (√2− 1) , (J) is privately chosen whereas (JB)
would have been socially preferable;
b2 for ∆ ∈ ]0, 4 (√2− 1)[ and 4(2 1−2ε1−ε √37 − 1) < ∆ < 4(2 −ε1−ε√2− 1), (S|C) is
privately chosen whereas (JB) would have been socially preferable.
The main message of the welfare analysis is: under moral hazard, there are too few joint
projects in which synergies between the entrepreneurs’ research units are exploited as compared
to the social preferences. If projects target independent markets, entrepreneurs choose instead
of the socially preferred (JB) the (J) organization. If projects target a common market, for
high values of the market, entrepreneurs choose instead the (J) organization, for lower values of
the market, they choose instead the (S) configuration.
Figure 2.5 describe the possible conflicts between the privately and the socially preferred
configurations. The curves Wu(S|C),(JB), W
u
(S|C),(J) and W
u
(J),(JB) added to the graph from figure
2.3, divide the regions where respectively (S|C) is socially preferred to (JB), or (J), or (J) is
socially preferred to (JB).
In the figure, we have highlighted the two areas of conflict described above. In area A
entrepreneurs choose to join with one agent, while joining with two would have been socially
preferred. This happens for high enough values of the market, i.e. ∆ > 4
(√
2− 1) , and low
levels of agents’ efforts duplication, i.e. ε ∈ ]−0.125, 0[ . This conflict is of the same nature as the
one observed under the independent market assumption. It derives from the fact that joining
with two agents is more costly privately than socially as entrepreneurs face higher costs coming
from the informational rent to be paid to agents. In area B entrepreneurs pursue a stand-alone
project, while, again, a joint project where both agents were kept would have been socially
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preferred instead. This happens for values of the markets smaller than for area A, combined
with efforts that are slight duplicates up to slight complements.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced agency problems into the RJV formation literature, departing
from the traditional owner-managers view. This way, we have given an alternative rationale
for joint research projects through optimal implemented contracts. The model proposed has
explained the difference in the internal organizations of joint projects between the situations in
which there are owner-managers as compared to when there is a principal-agent relation between
the owner(s) and the agents carrying out the research.
Our results have shown that in the owner-manager case, research is always conducted jointly
for projects targeting independent markets (or market segments), but only for sufficiently high
values of the market or high enough synergies between agents for projects targeting a common
market (or common market segments). When owners face agency problems instead, the decision
of going jointly is taken only for higher values of the market and/or higher synergies. We have
shown that owners choose less often to let both their units work together if they face moral
hazard than otherwise. It has also been shown that for agents’ efforts that range from slight
duplicates to slight complements there exist a conflict: privately entrepreneurs either decide to
stay alone or to join with only one agent, but socially a joint project with both agents would have
been preferred. Entrepreneurs choose too seldomly to make use of possible synergies between
agents as compared to what would be socially desirable.
Our results suggest that support should be offered to joint projects, provided that they
combine research units and, thereby, exploit synergies.
Results have been obtained taking an exogenously fixed overall value of the market, either
independent or common. We have argued that making this assumption was not allowing us
to look at any market power effects within our analysis. A clarification on the role of this
assumption is now possible. When considering the common markets assumption we have let
the projects become rivals. This way, an intermediate case between the no competition at all
(the one of the independent markets) and the full competition one, which would correspond to
a subsequent stage where firms might have had to compete on the market for selling a produced
good had they not chosen to join, has been allowed for. In Fabrizi and Lippert (2005a), pure
market power considerations are instead considered in model where a project has to be adopted
that would lead to an production cost reducing innovation. In that context, firms that originally
compete on the market have to decide whether to join and the role of a competition authority is
explicitly taken into account to characterize the types of errors that may be made when having
to accept or refuse a proposed merger.
In our model the efforts that agents provide have not been bounded ex-ante. This is because
the optimal contracts always implement effort levels such that the probabilities of success are
well defined. However, the model could be used as well in order to assess the impact of part time
versus full time job on the privately offered wage contracts, and on the social welfare. This would
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be possible by reinterpreting our level of effort as the number of hours worked. Our joint-two
agents case would then represent an equivalent to part-time jobs, while the joint-one agent case
would play the role of a full time job. This could give an explanation, other than demand side
arguments such as fears of job instability or the rigidities introduced by legal constraints into
the labor market, on why part-time jobs are rarely observed as compared to full-time jobs. Even
when these fears or rigidities were not present, this result might be observed as a consequence
of an optimal internal organization decision.
One possible extension of this paper would be to analyze patent litigation issues. This would
allow for an additional rationale for the occurrence of joint projects. Firms may desire to join
to insure themselves against the risk of facing a litigation, and this effect may contrast with the
one we have characterized in our model: the tendency under moral hazard to observe too few
joint projects where both agents were kept.
Another interesting extension could be to allow the number of entrepreneurs and agents to
vary. Examples of such cases are partnerships such as law firms, where a number of seniors and
juniors cooperate within the same organization in a proportion which may be variable. Our
model could help understand which would be the optimal organization of such a partnership in
terms of the relative number of senior partners versus junior associates.
Appendix
B.1 Proof of t1 = t2 for (JB)
In this appendix, we show that paying equal transfers in the (JB) case is cost minimizing. To
show this, we minimize the transfer implementing a certain probability level, first under the
assumptions that efforts are observable and then unobservable.
B.1.1 Observable efforts
Entrepreneurs employ two agents to whom a contract, that specifies an effort level and trans-
fer(s), is proposed. Each agent then has the choice to accept or reject this contract. Thus,
entrepreneurs minimize their transfers paid subject only to their respective (IR) constraints. In
this case, the cost of implementing a certain probability level is exactly equal to the disutility
of the efforts exerted to achieve this probability level.
The probability of success depending on two agents’ efforts, is p(JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε .
Owner-managers solve the following minimization problem:
min
t1,t2
Co (JB) = min
t1,t2
[t1 + t2]
s.t. ti − 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 ∀i (IRi)
p(JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
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The first order conditions to this minimization problem,
∂Co (JB)
∂e1
= e1 − λ 1
1− ε
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε (1− ε) e−ε1 = 0
∂Co (JB)
∂e2
= e2 − λ 1
1− ε
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε (1− ε) e−ε2 = 0,
give us:
e1 = e2 = e.
This implies that symmetric transfers are optimal.
B.1.2 Unobservable efforts
Replicating the same analysis for the world with moral hazard, requires to consider that now
entrepreneurs have to offer contracts specifying the transfer to be paid to their agent(s) de-
pending on each state of nature: a positive bonus in case of success and zero in case of failure,
thus, satisfying the (LL) constraints. Since efforts are not observable here, entrepreneurs have
to give incentives, take (IC) constraints into account, through transfers, in addition to the (IR)
constraints.
The joint entity solves now the following minimization problem:
min
b1,b2
C (JB) = min
b1,b2
[p (JB) (b1 + b2)]
s.t. p(JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
e−εi
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε bi = ei ∀i (ICi)
p(JB)bi − 1
2
ei ≥ 0 (IRi)
Given the (LL), the (IR) are never binding. Thus, we can rewrite the program expressed in ei
min
e1,e2
C (JB) = min
e1,e2
[p (JB) (b1 + b2)]
s.t. p(JB) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
bi = e
1+ε
i
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε ∀i (ICi)
we derive the first order conditions
∂Cu (JB)
∂e1
=
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε e−ε1
(
e1+ε1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε + e1+ε2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε
)
+
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
(
(1 + ε) eε1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε − εe1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
)−1−ε
1−ε
)
+
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
(
−εe1+ε2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
)−1−ε
1−ε e−ε1
)
= 0
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∂Cu (JB)
∂e1
=
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε e−ε2
(
e1+ε1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε + e1+ε2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε
)
+
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
(
(1 + ε) eε2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) −ε
1−ε − εe2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
)−1−ε
1−ε
)
+
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε
(
−εe1+ε1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
)−1−ε
1−ε e−ε2
)
= 0
Solving for this problem, leads again to the following result:
e1 = e2 = e ⇒ b1 = b2 = b.
An intuition for this result is that, even though the technology is not convex for ε < 0, the
non-linear iso-cost lines give rise to an interior solution for ε not too negative.
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Chapter 3
On the design of an efficiency defense
3.1 Introduction
In recent years1, a wave of horizontal mergers has occurred giving rise to more concentrated
market structures in many industries. Historically, such a higher concentration has been viewed
as detrimental to welfare as it often leads to a reduction of competitiveness in the respective
market. However, mergers usually do not only have an impact on the output market side but
also on the production processes, the organizational structures, the relations to suppliers of
intermediate inputs or even on the financial resources of the firms through a relaxation of credit
constraints. The effects of mergers can be better understood when one looks at what drives the
decisions of firms about whether to merge or not. On the one side, we may think that potential
synergies, efficiency gains, reduction of internal organizational costs or the increase of market
power are considered positively by merging parties. On the other side, concerns about the future
division of control rights, the loss in control over the actions of the management, conflicts about
the sharing of potential profits may be responsible for potential merger not to come to existence.
In our paper, with their merger decision, the merging parties trade off between on the one
hand potential synergies, the coordination of implemented efforts through the incentives within
the merged firm, as well as the increase of market power and, on the other hand, the loss in
control over the actions of the management. Potential synergies and the coordination of the
implemented efforts within the firm(s) are responsible for lower expected unit production costs
and, thus, are also beneficial for social welfare.
Thus, as for both, profits and social welfare, there may be positive and negative effects
from a merger, it is far from clear whether a merger is beneficial, not only from a private, but
also from a social point of view. There may exist, thus, a need for competition authorities
to discriminate between mergers that are harmful to the society’s objective functions either the
consumers’ surplus or the social welfare, from the ones that instead may enhance either of them.
In their decisions on horizontal merger cases, competition authorities may accept a so called
efficiency defense, according to which they can allow mergers on the basis of "merger specific,
1This chapter is based on the paper "How much efficiency gains and price reductions to put as ingredients
into an efficiency defense? ’Quanto Basta’", written jointly with Simona Fabrizi and circulated as UPV FAEII
Working Paper 2004-04, quoted in this thesis as Fabrizi and Lippert (2005a).
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substantial efficiency gains that are likely to be passed on to consumers via price reductions2"
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 and 2001, provide an excellent assessment of this efficiency defense
analyzing efficiency gains in horizontal mergers). The US Antitrust Law allows explicitly for
this defense, and, even though the European Competition Law does not explicitly account for it,
it is not incompatible with the use of it. The rationale behind allowing for an efficiency defense
is that mergers usually do not only have an impact on the competitiveness of the market for
the products sold by the parties but also on their production processes and their organizational
structures. This paper takes this rationale literally and models the effects of an efficiency
defense if the efficiency gains are endogenously determined through incentives to innovate with
and without the merger.
Merging parties have the burden of proving whether efficiencies can be reached according to
the US Antitrust law, while in Europe the competition authorities are responsible for collecting
and processing the relevant information to justify their decision upon a merger. This is a
difficult task for both, the merging parties and the competition authorities. The merging parties
very often are not able to produce the hard evidence for potential efficiency gains, and, on the
other side, the competition authority cannot judge perfectly upon other possible configurations
as the information that it possesses comes often from the merging parties themselves. There
exist attempts to measure the efficiency gains that a merger would lead to. However, the
efficiency gains considered in these studies are especially the ones associated with decreases in
the production costs, transaction costs, or with the internalization of costs that cancel out within
the merged entity eventually.
To our best knowledge, no attempt exists to qualify the costs parties may have to incur
for compensating managerial effort for reducing production costs before and after a merger and
thereby to endogenize the efficiency gains from a merger through implemented optimal contracts.
This paper is an attempt to do so. We allow for efficiency gains that come from the imple-
mentation of optimal effort levels of the management, which, in a merger, can exploit synergies
on the managers’ efforts. This is done by considering firms willing to pursue a production cost
reducing project to be conducted by managers, either in a stand-alone situation or in a merger.
Agents are able to affect the success of the project, therefore, to affect the realized costs in the
industry and their efforts are either observable or unobservable.
We determine the private decision to merge as a function of the interaction between these
agents’ efforts when they work together in a merger, as compared to the stand-alone situation,
as well as the parameters of the industry, such as the initial costs firms face, and the potential
for cost reduction. We show that mergers are privately chosen either when the potential for cost
reduction is low, i.e. due to pure market power considerations, or when managerial efforts are
close substitutes, or slight duplicates, i.e. when synergies induced by implemented contracts are
present.
Once the private decision has been obtained, we match it with its impact on both standards,
the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare. Even though it is often argued that using either
2See e.g. the FTC 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, section 4.
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measure does not make a difference in practice3, we study both, as competition authorities often
seem to care about consumers’ surplus, whereas economists often consider the overall social
welfare impact instead. We will discuss more in detail the motivation behind this choice as well
as the impact of privately taken decisions over either standards in the section devoted to the
policy analysis.
Results will show that an efficiency defense based on potential efficiency gains due to a
merger is generally too lax a requirement − some bad mergers would be accepted − for the
observable efforts case, and, for both informational assumptions, when the initial costs are not
too high. Requiring substantial efficiency gains may reduce this distortion for these mentioned
cases. However, requiring substantial efficiency gains for either the unobservable case when
initial costs are high, or for a larger range of costs when the standard used is the social welfare,
may be too strict: some good mergers would be refused. As a general result, efficiency gains
and decreased expected prices guarantee an enhancement in both consumers’ surplus and social
welfare more often when efforts are not observable. The reason is that under moral hazard, the
firms choose to merge more often for market power reasons and less often in order to exploit
synergies than if they do not face moral hazard. As a result, it will be necessary to use the two
requirements ’quanto basta’. One of the contributions of this paper is to define what is ’quanto
basta’.
Our work is mainly related to three different strands of literature. First, it is connected to the
literature on research joint ventures and R&D cooperation in the spirit of Kamien, Muller, and
Zang (1992) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). As in Kamien et al., we also characterize
a project as a reduction in the associated production costs of a good, even though in our model
this project does not necessarily come in the form of joint R&D: when firms decide to stay
alone, they can conduct this project separately as well. Second, our work is in line with a recent
literature on the endogenous formation of partnerships for specific projects, as e.g. the work
of Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (2003). However, our function for the probability of success of
the project includes a parameter that captures how the managers/agents work together, i.e. the
degree of substitutability of their efforts in the ”production” of the success of the project. With
this approach we depart from the standard literature on joint projects allowing for efforts to
be substitutes, duplicates or complements. This allows us to consider more than one specific
degree of complementarity between agents’ efforts as it has been extensively studied for example
in the team production literature; and also does it not limit us to functional forms where agents’
efforts have to duplicate necessarily in a very specific way as it is the case in the literature that
looks at the incentives for external monitoring of projects to be financed which could be given
either to one or more banks4.
We furthermore differ from the existing literature on endogenous partnership formation in
our way of using a principal-agent-framework as opposed to a double-sided moral hazard one. A
3Motta (2004) argues that "[...] Article 2.1 of the Merger Regulation accepts in principle an efficiency defense
"provided that it is to consumers’ advantage". These provisions might indicate that consumer welfare is among
the ultimate objectives of competition law. However, I am not aware of any statement of the ECJ on this point,
nor of any (Commission or Court’s) decision where reliance on either standard has made a difference in practice."
4See Holmström and Tirole (1997)
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third related strand of literature is the principal-agent literature. We use Rogerson’s (1985) first
order approach to the ”standard” agency models with hidden action. Given a configuration,
agents take a non-observable action from a continuous interval which influences the expected
payoff of the project. Principals write contracts on the realization of the payoff and reward
agents accordingly. In the case of joint projects with multiple agents, we use the multi-agent
single principal framework common to the moral hazard in teams literature. Important work on
incentives and team production includes Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982). A
closely related work from that literature is Itoh’s (1991) paper on endogenous team production.
He shows that giving incentives to help, i.e. inducing team production, is optimal if own effort
and helping effort are complementary. Contrary to his approach, we do not model comple-
mentarity/substitutability coming from the form of the agents’ disutility of providing effort. In
our model instead, efforts are substitutes to a varying degree in the probability of success they
induce.
In the way we allow for different degrees of substitutability between agents’ efforts we adopt
the modelling used in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005b). In that paper we compare the organizational
choice of entrepreneurs pursuing a product innovation project, either alone or jointly, in the
absence of moral hazard behavior on their agents’ side with that in the presence of moral
hazard. Contrary to the product innovation approach considered there, in the present paper,
we instead allow for a process innovation and market power considerations are made possible as
a consequence so that, in addition, we are able to provide insights on the policy implications of
mergers.
In this paper, even though we allow for the management to be responsible of the possible
synergies that may arise though a merger, the management is not able to decide directly whether
a merger is going to take place or not. When the management is allowed to enter actively this
type of decisions, additional constraints to the ones we will explore in this analysis will have to be
considered. This is done by Lippert (2005) where the management proposes the mergers at the
first place and possesses superior information on the synergies and, therefore, the profitability
that a merger can bring about.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model, section
3 is devoted to the private decision of firms about the merger, without and with moral hazard,
section 4 considers the policy analysis, and section 5 concludes.
3.2 The model
We consider a situation where a good with demand Q = 1−P is exchanged in an economy. This
good is initially produced by two firms i = 1, 2 at a unit production cost equal to c ≤ 15. Each
firm employs one agent. We assume that there exists a project that in the case of success leads
to a lower unit production cost βc, with β ∈ [0, 1[. The probability of success of the project thus
5We normalize the level of the initial cost such that it varies between zero and one. It is positive, but it cannot
exceed the willingness to pay for the good to be exchanged in the economy in order to allow for non-negative
gross profits.
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measures the capacity of a given firm to reduce its unit production costs.
The project can be conducted by each firm alone − we will refer to this case as a stand-alone
situation, (S) − or together with the other firm by merging. If each firm conducts the project
alone, then each project will be conducted by one agent. However, if firms decide to merge, the
agents previously employed by each firm will work jointly in the project − we will refer to this
case as a merger, (M).
In our model, the agent(s) affect the probability of success or failure of the project they
conduct through their chosen effort. Depending on the assumptions on the observability of
efforts, this may result in a moral hazard problem. We assume both: The agents exert either an
observable or a non observable, therefore not-contractible, effort ei which is a continuous choice
from the interval [0, 1]. Exerting this effort ei implies a disutility for the agent that is equal to
ci (ei) =
1
2e
2
i . Agents receive a transfer ti from their respective firm (stand-alone case) or from
the merged entity (joint project). They are risk neutral and their utility is additively separable
between effort and money, Ui = ui (ti)− ci (ei) = ti− 12e2i . However, we assume that agents have
limited liability so that for any state of nature they have to receive a non-negative transfer.
In the next subsections we will describe the possible configurations that these decisions may
lead to.
3.2.1 Pre-merger or stand-alone
In this case, two separate firms i = 1, 2, competing à la Bertrand, decide to undertake each
the production cost reducing project on their own. Each firm employs one agent. The success
probability of each project undertaken is defined as pi (S) = ei, i.e. is equal to the effort exerted
by agent i. We assume the probabilities of success in the two firms to be independent.
Given the Bertrand competition assumption, a firm receives a non-zero gross profit only if
its own project succeeds while the one of the other firm does not. Given this assumption, the
efficiency on the production side of the economy will be given by:
E(S) = p1 (S) + p2 (S)− p1 (S) p2 (S)
The success of one firm may lead to either a drastic or a non-drastic innovation.
It is drastic when the monopoly price associated to it is lower than the initial unit production
costs, i.e.:
1 + βc
2
≤ c ⇔ β ≤ 2c− 1
c
If it is, the succeeding firm can charge the monopoly price while the other one exits because
at that price it cannot recover its costs.
If it is non-drastic, the succeeding firm can charge a price at most equal to the cost of the
rival firm. In this case, we assume the unsuccessful firm not to make any sales6.
6This assumption is the limit case for the successful firm pricing slightly below the rival’s high cost which
would induce it to exit the market.
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Firms may face a drastic or non-drastic innovation, depending on the combinations of the
parameters β and c. As these parameters can take values between zero and one, it is straight-
forward to show that any innovation is non-drastic for c ∈ [0, 13[ , it might be either drastic or
not depending on the combination of β and c for c ∈ [13 , 12[ , it is certainly drastic for c ∈ [12 , 1] .
If both firms have either a high production cost, i.e. both projects fail, or a low production
cost, i.e. both projects succeed, they both charge a price equal to their marginal costs and make
zero gross profits.
As discussed before, the probabilities of success of each firm are independent of each other,
so that for each of the four different states of nature (failure of one firm while the other does
not, and, vice versa, failure of both, success of both of them) we can associate the following
probabilities: Pr (βc, c) = e1 (1− e2), Pr (c, βc) = (1− e1) e2, Pr (c, c) = (1− e1) (1− e2) , and
Pr (βc, βc) = e1e2.
Given these assumptions, w.l.o.g. we can write the profit of firm 1, gross of the transfer to
be paid to its agent, as follows:
π1 (·, ·) =

π1 (βc, c) =

(1−βc)2
4
c (1− c) (1− β)
if β ≤ 2c−1
c
otherwise
π1 (βc, βc) = 0
π1 (c, c) = 0
π1 (c, βc) = 0.
In the same way, we can summarize the prices for the different realizations of the unit
production costs as:
P (·, ·) =

P (βc, c) = P (c, βc) =

1+βc
2
c
if β ≤ 2c−1
c
otherwise
P (βc, βc) = βc
P (c, c) = c.
Let us characterize now also the corresponding levels of consumers’ surplus, CS (., .) , asso-
ciated with each possible state of nature:
CS (·, ·) =

CS (βc, c) = CS (c, βc) =

(1−βc)2
8
(1−c)2
2
if β ≤ 2c−1
c
otherwise
CS (βc, βc) = (1−βc)
2
2
CS (c, c) = (1−c)
2
2 .
Note that in the stand-alone situation, a process innovation never makes consumers worse
off: it always leads to a (at least weak) consumers’ surplus increase as compared to the situation
without the innovation.
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As already introduced, the consumers’ surplus will be used in our analysis as one possible
objective function the competition authority cares about. The alternative objective function
that we will consider will be the social welfare. The social welfare will be defined as the sum of
consumers’ surplus, profits, and the agents’ utility. We will describe both objective functions in
detail later on when introducing the policy analysis.
We will consider two cases regarding the ability to write contracts contingent on agents’
actions. In one case, contracts can be written contingent on the agents’ exerted efforts and the
firms just pay transfers which compensate the agents for their disutility of exerting the effort:
ti =
1
2
e2i .
In the other case, contracts cannot be made contingent on the agents’ efforts but only on the
realized costs, either c or βc. From standard principal-agent theory, we know that it is optimal
for the bonus paid to an agent not to be a function of the cost realizations of the other firm.
Therefore, contracts will only be such that agent i will receive a positive bonus, bi, in case firm
i succeeds in reducing its costs, or a transfer equal to zero, in case firm i fails in reducing them
instead, no matter whether the other firm succeeded or not. The limited liability of the agents
we have assumed, means that firms cannot offer any contract that might pay a negative wage to
their agent for a given realization. Thus, the transfers to be paid to the agent in the stand-alone
situation are:
t1 =
 b10
if (βc, c) or (βc, βc)
otherwise.
3.2.2 Merger
When firms merge we consider that the previously employed agents undertake the project jointly,
so that its success probability becomes a function of both agents’ efforts7, i.e.:
p(M) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε with ε ∈ [ε, ε] .
The parameter ε captures the degree of substitutability between agents’ efforts. As discussed
in the introduction, different degrees of substitutability will be considered: agents’ efforts can
be either perfect substitutes, or slight complements, or duplicates. This is done, in order to
account for possible synergies between agents’ efforts, as agents work together in the merged
entity. We characterize the probability of success using values of the parameter ε that are
bounded below and above. The upper bound is necessary to rule out cases where agents’ efforts
would be too complementary, because otherwise the assumption that the project could have
been undertaken separately by each firm would not be consistent anymore. The lower bound
is imposed to guarantee that the second order conditions of the maximization problems we will
consider are satisfied. In addition, we will always check for the conditions such that this measure
of probability is well defined, i.e. never exceeds the value of one.
7We use the same definition of the probability of success here as in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005b), where agents
work together in a joint research project.
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Pure synergies, which are merger specific, are the ones that are able to generate, for the same
level of inputs, a higher output. In our case, we will have merger specific synergies whenever
the induced efficiency by a merger, E(M), is higher as compared to the expected one induced
by a stand-alone situation, E(S), i.e. if:
E(M) ≃ p(M) = (e1−ε1 + e1−ε2 ) 11−ε ≥ e1 + e2 − e1e2 = E(S).
A sufficient condition for having synergies through a merger is that the parameter ε takes
values between zero and one. This is a sufficient but not necessary condition as lower values
than zero might produce some merger specific synergies for special combinations of high levels
of both agents’ efforts. In addition, it can be shown that higher values than one never produce
any synergy.
However, given that in our model we will solve for the optimal contracts that induce a certain
level of agents’ efforts, ex-post the inputs (optimal efforts) in a stand-alone situation may take
different values from the ones in a merger situation. Because of this, we will need to distinguish
between ex-ante synergies and ex-post ones: the first ones refer to the definition just given and
the second ones refer to the same condition where the optimal levels of efforts have been replaced
instead.
Once we have defined the probability of success induced by a merger, we can concentrate as
before on the profits, prices, consumers’ surplus, social welfare and the transfers agents receive
which are associated with it.
When merging, firms enjoy monopoly profits on the product market, no matter whether
the merged entity succeeds in reducing its production costs or not. Only the magnitude of the
profits will be affected by the success or failure of this project. Thus the profit enjoyed by the
merged entity, before making the transfers to their agent(s) is:
π (.) =
 π (βc) =
(1−βc)2
4
π (c) = (1−c)
2
4 ,
i.e. either high or low, depending on whether the merger respectively succeeds or not in
reducing its unit production costs. Here we differ from the assumption made in Fabrizi and
Lippert (2005b) and Lippert (2005). In those papers, a product innovation project is considered,
the failure of which brings a zero profit in any configuration.
As we consider mergers among equals, we assume that, once merged, merging parties share
equally the overall monopolistic profit. Thus, assuming an equal sharing of the realized profits
of a merger, we implicitly disregard the way merging parties come to such a sharing.
The prices prevailing in the economy once the merger is formed (in the cases of success and
failure) are:
P (·) =
 P (βc) =
1+βc
2
P (c) = 1+c2 .
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The realizations of the consumers’ surplus, CS (., .), associated with these states of nature
are then the following:
CS (·) =
 CS (βc) =
(1−βc)2
8
CS (c) = (1−c)
2
8 .
As before, the consumers’ surplus, as well as the social welfare that we will discuss in detail
when looking at the policy analysis, will be alternatively used in our analysis as the objective
functions the competition authority cares about.
Let us finally characterize the transfers the agents get within a merger. As before, we will
need to distinguish whether the efforts are observable or unobservable in order to let the transfer
to the agents be contingent or not on their respective exerted effort. If contracts can be written
contingent on the agents’ exerted efforts, agents receive transfers equal to:
ti =
1
2
e2i .
Otherwise, contracts will give the same bonus to each agent such that8:
ti =
 b0 if success,otherwise.
As before, limited liability on the agents’ side is assumed so that the minimum transfer
agents can get even when there is no success is non-negative.
3.3 Private decision
3.3.1 No Moral Hazard
The goal of this section is to isolate the market power effects from the ones that would be driven
by pure moral hazard behavior merging parties have to face when deciding about merging or
not and which type of contract to propose to the agent(s). In this section we characterize the
maximization problems firms face in a world without moral hazard.
Stand-alone, (S)
This is the case where two firms decide each to let their respective agent conduct the project
alone. The success probability of this project is therefore pi (S) = ei, with i = 1, 2.
For notational simplicity, we will refer to the gross profits π (·, ·) as defined above when
describing the pre-merger case: they are a function of each state of nature and also depend
on the combination of the parameters that lead to a drastic or a non-drastic success, β and c.
The advantage of using this notation is that it encompasses both the drastic and non-drastic
situation we need to account for.
8Giving the same bonus to both agents can be shown to result from cost minimization. We assume it for
expositional purposes.
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Given this, we can, w.l.o.g., write the maximization problem firm 1 faces:
max
t1
Π1 (S) ≡ max
t1
[e1 (1− e2)π (βc, c)− t1]
s.t. t1 − 1
2
e21 ≥ 0, (IR)
where Π1 (S) is the expected net profit of firm 1.
Given the observability of the effort, each firm can extract any potential rent from the agent,
so that the individual rationality constraint, (IR) , is binding. Therefore, the maximization
problem becomes simply:
max
e1
Π1 (S) ≡ max
e1
[
e1 (1− e2)π (βc, c)− 1
2
e21
]
.
The Nash equilibrium of this problem each firm faces is:
eo1 (S) = e
o
2 (S) = e
o (S) = po(S) =
π (βc, c)
π (βc, c) + 1
=

(1−βc)2
(1−βc)2+4
c(1−c)(1−β)
c(1−c)(1−β)+1
if β ≤ 2c−1
c
otherwise
where the superscript o stands for "observability of effort". The level of the optimal effort
coincides here with the measure of the probability of success.
The optimal expected profit for each firm is therefore:
Πoi (S) = Π
o (S) =
1
2
(
π (βc, c)
π (βc, c) + 1
)2
.
Merger, (M)
In this case, the merged entity solves for the following problem:
max
t1,t2
Π(M) ≡ max
t1,t2
[p (M)π (βc) + (1− p (M))π (c)− t1 − t2]
s.t. ti − 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)
ei ≤ 1
p (M) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε ≤ 1,
At this stage we solve for the unconstrained problem, i.e. taking the constraint on the
probability of success as not binding. This way we get the potential unconstrained solution
of the maximization problem. If this solution does not exceed the value of one, given the
combination of the parameters of the model, then it will be used for the following analyses;
otherwise, the maximum value of one will be considered instead9.
9This is possible as we have restricted the values of the parameter ε such that the problem to be solved is a
well behaved one.
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For this reason, we can rewrite the previous problem as follows:
max
e1,e2
Π(M) ≡ max
e1,e2
[(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε π (βc) +
(
1− (e1−ε1 + e1−ε2 ) 11−ε)π (c)− 12 (e21 + e22)
]
.
The first order conditions associated with this problem are:
∂Π(M)
∂e1
= e−ε1
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε (π (βc)− π (c))− e1 = 0,
∂Π(M)
∂e2
= e−ε2
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) ε
1−ε (π (βc)− π (c))− e2 = 0.
They tell us that the solution to the problem should be such that:
eo1 = e
o
2 = e
o (M) .
We should remember that the constraint over the probability of success not to exceed the
value of one is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that each agent’s effort will not exceed the
value of one as long as eo (M) ≤ 2− 11−ε . Implementing a higher eo (M) would not lead to a higher
probability of success (and, therefore, to higher expected revenues), but to increased costs as
the agents would eventually have to be compensated for these extra efforts. Using this property,
and the one just found above, we can solve for the system and derive the following result:
eo (M) = min
{
2
ε
1−ε (π (βc)− π (c)) , 2− 11−ε
}
.
We now proceed in characterizing the measure of the probability of success associated with
this case. Remember that, when two agents are kept in the merger, the success probability is a
function of both agents’ efforts so that:
po(M) = min
{
2
1+ε
1−ε (π (βc)− π (c)) , 1
}
.
The expected profit each merging party can enjoy in a merger is then:
Πo (M)
2
=
1
2
(
po(M)π (βc) + (1− po(M))π (c)− (eo (M))2
)
.
Merger decision under no MH
Firms are willing to merge any time the share of the expected merged entity’s profit they may
enjoy is higher than the one they expect in a stand-alone situation. Therefore, to character-
ize under which conditions firms would propose a merger, we need to solve for the following
inequality:
Πo (M)
2
> Πo (S)

1
2
(
po(M)π (βc) + (1− po(M))π (c)− (eo (M))2
)
>
1
2
(
π (βc, c)
π (βc, c) + 1
)2
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Figure 3.1: Private merger decision for c = 0.99 under no moral hazard.
The expression of the merged entity’s profit is a function of three different parameters, β, c,
and ε. Given the complexity of the expression it is difficult to solve analytically for the values of
these parameters for which the inequality might hold. We therefore use graphical representations
in order to show for which combination of the relevant parameters firms are willing to merge.
To this purpose, we will fix different values of the initial cost economy faces and we let the
other parameters vary freely. This will allow us to characterize qualitatively the decision to
merge which will be shown to be taken more often, the lower the initial level of costs. This
result can be seen in figures 1 and 2.
In the vertical axis different values of β ∈ [0, 1] are considered: low values of β imply high
relative cost savings, while high levels of it imply the opposite. In the horizontal axis the
parameter ε is represented only for a restricted range such that ε ∈ [−5, 5] . We restrict the
attention to this interval for pure descriptive reasons. Extending the range would not add any
information on the firms’ merger decision as the lines of indifference will continue asymptotically.
In addition, in the analysis that will follow the interesting results will come in the interval where
ε ∈ [−1, 1[, so that we will even concentrate on this range to show under which circumstances
a competition authority’s decision may induce a type I or type II error when relying on an
efficiency defense.
Firms are always willing to merge, no matter which is the value of β, as long as ε ∈ [0, 1[ .
This result was partially expected as we know that pure synergies occur in that range. However
a decision to merge may also arise in ranges where pure synergies are not present. This is the
case, for values of ε above one where mergers are still privately preferred as long as potential cost
savings are not too high. On the other hand, when ε is negative we might still expect firms to
merge for high β. The intuition behind this result is that for high β, due to the low implemented
efforts, the probability that no firm succeeds in inventing the product both, in stand-alone and
in the merger situation, is high. Contrary to the stand-alone situation, in a merger, the firms
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Figure 3.2: Private merger decision for c = 0.79 under no moral hazard.
make a positive profit also in the case of a failure of the project. The decision to merge for a low
cost reduction potential is driven by market power considerations. This result contrasts with the
product innovation case considered in Fabrizi and Lippert (2005b), where both, in stand-alone
and joint development, a failure means zero profits.
3.3.2 Moral Hazard
In this section, we will repeat the analysis made for the observable efforts case considering the
efforts as unobservable instead. This is done in order to be able to compare results obtained in
the absence of moral hazard with the ones obtained introducing it into the model and to discuss
them.
Stand-alone, (S)
As before, we can write the maximization problem each firm solves when choosing to conduct
the project alone. In this case, however, we need to remember that, given the moral hazard
assumption, the contract firms propose to their respective agent has to be incentive compatible.
Agents will receive a transfer higher than the one they would have enjoyed if their efforts were
observable.
Thus, w.l.o.g. we can now write the profit maximization of firm 1 as follows:
max
b1
Π1 (S) ≡ max
b1
[e1 (1− e2)π (βc, c)− e1b1]
s.t. e1b1 − 1
2
e21 ≥ 0 (IR)
e1 = argmax
e1
[
e1b1 − 1
2
e21
]
. (IC)
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Solving for the Nash equilibrium, we get:
b1 = b2 = b (S) = e
u (S) = pu(S) =
π (βc, c)
π (βc, c) + 2
=

(1−βc)2
(1−βc)2+8
c(1−c)(1−β)
c(1−c)(1−β)+2
if β ≤ 2c−1
c
otherwise
,
where the superscript u stands for "unobservability of effort". As a consequence, the expected
profit of each firm corresponds to:
Π1 (S) = Π2 (S) = Π
u (S) =
1
2
(
π (βc, c)
π (βc, c) + 2
)2
.
Merger, (M)
In this case, remember that the probability of success in reducing production costs is given by:
p(M) ≡ (e1−ε1 + e1−ε2 ) 11−ε .
The merged entity pays the same bonus b in case of success to both agents10. The non-
observability of agents’ efforts, makes it impossible to separate the contribution one agent has
given to the project from the contribution of the other agent. The merged entity faces again
the (IC) constraint due to the non-observability of agents’ efforts. The (IC) constraint here
will result from the Nash equilibrium of each agent’s utility maximization problem. The (IC)
- that will be a function of the bonus - can be obtained this way as each agent maximizes his
utility considering that his chosen level of effort will not lead to a probability exceeding one.
The merged entity will have already internalized the feasibility constraint over the probability of
success when it chooses the level of the bonuses. This means that the merged entity will never
propose a level of the bonus that may induce each agent to choose an effort that may lead to a
probability exceeding the level of one11.
Therefore, the merged entity solves for the following problem:
max
b
Π(M) = max
b
[p(M)π (βc) + (1− p(M))π (c)− 2p(M)b]
s.t. p(M)b− 1
2
e2i ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)
ei = argmax
ei
[
p(M)b− 1
2
e2i
]
∀i (IC)
p(M) =
(
e1−ε1 + e
1−ε
2
) 1
1−ε ≤ 1.
The solution to this maximization problem gives:
b(M) = min
{
1
4
(π (βc)− π (c)) , 2− 1+ε1−ε
}
eu (M) = 2
ε
1−ε b(M)
pu(M) = min
{
2
1+ε
1−ε
1
4
(π (βc)− π (c)) , 1
}
.
10Remember that equal bonuses for both agents would result from cost minimization in equilibrium.
11This would not be feasible anyway, but costly.
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Figure 3.3: Private decision for c = 0.99 under moral hazard.
The merged entity’s expected profit associated to this optimal bonus and probability of
success is:
Πu (M)
2
=
1
2
[pu(M) (π (βc)− 2b) + (1− pu(M))π (c)] .
Merger decision under MH
As before, we know that a merger will be proposed as long as:
Πu (M)
2
> Πu (S)

1
2
(
pu(M)π (βc) + (1− pu(M))π (c)− (eu (M))2
)
>
1
2
(
π (βc, c)
π (βc, c) + 2
)2
.
We have again the same type of complexity as before, so to solve for this inequality we will
proceed with graphical representations in order to describe the combination of the parameters
of the model that will drive the merger decisions of firms. Different values of the initial cost will
be fixed here as well, while the other parameters will be let free to vary.
Figures 3 and 4 show results of the merger decision under moral hazard, for a comparable
range of the parameter ε as in the case of observable efforts.
As before, in the vertical axis different values of β ∈ [0, 1] are considered. Again, low values
of β imply high relative cost savings, and high levels of it imply the opposite. The horizontal
axis accounts again for different values of the parameter ε in the range [−5, 5].
The first fact to be noticed is that for a high costs savings potential, firms are less often
willing to merge. Specifically, for high initial costs, they do not anymore always merge in the
range where ε ∈ [0, 1[ . However, as soon as the initial cost is lower a similar behavior can be
expected by firms: the lower the initial cost the more often they are willing to merge. It can be
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Figure 3.4: Private decision for c = 0.79 under moral hazard.
shown that for c < 0.69, firms are always willing to merge no matter which values β and ε may
take. The rest of the comments from the observable efforts case apply here as well.
3.3.3 Comparing private decisions on mergers
Now that we have characterized the private decision on mergers under the assumption of observ-
able and unobservable agents’ efforts, we can compare these decisions with each other. To do
so, we combine the graphs referred respectively to c = 0.99 and c = 0.79 for both the observable
and unobservable case, obtaining figures 5 and 6. In these figures some profits appear with
the superscript j = o, u. This is done as, when combining figures 3 and 4, there exist regions
in which the decisions about merging stay the same for both assumptions on observability of
efforts. Instead, we highlight the differences in the behavior of the merging parties as results of
this comparison show that there exist areas where the decision taken under observable efforts
does not coincide with the one taken in the presence of moral hazard. We have two different
types of these areas. Areas (a) are the ones where under observable efforts firms are not willing
to merge, but they are instead under moral hazard. In area (b), arising for values of ε ∈ [−1, 1[,
the opposite occurs: firms are willing to merge for observable efforts, but not for unobservable
ones.
The intuitions for the existence of areas (a) and (b) are as follows. In a merger, it is not
anymore possible to observe the success of each manager separately. This makes it - absent any
synergies - more expensive to implement the same probability of success, and - again absent syn-
ergies - a lower probability of success will be implemented. For the same cost savings potential,
therefore, a lower probability of success is implemented, and it is more often preferred to use
the increase in market power through a merger. This explains (a). At the same time, a higher
degree of synergies is required to compensate for the loss in control over the management, which
explains (b). The effect of (b) was also present in the product innovation case of Fabrizi and
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Figure 3.5: Comparison between private decisions for c = 0.99.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison between private decisions for c = 0.79.
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Lippert (2005b), whereas the effect of (a) was not.
Proposition 3.1 If low synergies are present (ε small or bigger than one, i.e. efforts are not
close substitutes), the firms choose more often to merge under moral hazard than with observable
efforts. For higher synergies (ε around zero, i.e. efforts are close substitutes), the firms choose
less often to merge under moral hazard than with observable efforts.
3.4 Policy analysis
Now that we have determined under which conditions firms are willing to merge, we need to verify
the impact of their decisions on both the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare depending
on which of them is taken as the objective function by a competition authority. We study the
impacts on both, because competition authorities often seem to care about consumers’ surplus,
even though economists often consider the overall social welfare impact to judge a merger instead.
Several justifications why a merger authority should care about consumers’ surplus and not
about overall social welfare have been given.
One reason is that, in the decisions a national competition authority has to make on mergers,
only consumers’ surplus should matter given that the profits accruing from a merger might be
enjoyed elsewhere than in the domestic market. This is certainly the case for mergers occurring
between firms, the respective ownership of which is based abroad. However, this is not a general
case as many mergers may occur between firms selling their products in a given domestic market
while one of them at least can be held domestically. In these alternative cases, it is not obvious
anymore why the profits of the merging firms should be disregarded.
Another reason that has been put forward to privilege the consumers’ surplus as an objective
by the competition authorities is that consumers are less likely to coordinate in order to voice
their concerns. The argument implies that they are in a weaker position than merging parties
might be. However, it is not clear why, even if this was the case, this should represent a justi-
fication for considering only consumers’ surplus. What we mean with this, is that if consumers
cannot protect themselves from the potentially adverse effects of a merger it does not have to
be that the competition authority has to take a biased point of view favoring them.
One last argument in favor of adopting consumers’ surplus that is often advocated is that it
does not matter whether a competition authority adopts a consumers’ surplus standard instead
of a social welfare one, as the first represents anyhow a good approximation for the second.
However, as results will show, it is not clear whether this is always true. Apart from overstating
the role of consumers as opposed to firms, consumers’ surplus also neglects another component
which might be crucial in a merger situation: namely the cost of efforts associated with the
undertaken project. The integration efforts that enable the firms to create synergies come at a
cost. It is therefore important as well to compare it with the cost separate firms will have to
encounter when developing projects alone. In our model, the cost of effort can be interpreted as
the cost of development of a given technology that comes to existence. Such a development cost
is not a fixed one though, as it is often modeled in R&D literature, as we have made it become
endogenous through the optimal contracts implemented before and after the merger.
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On the other hand, a tendency of considering a broader objective than the consumers’ surplus
has been observed as well. As Motta (2004) points out:
In the EU, Article 81(3) allows any agreement, decision or concerted practice
"which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit". Furthermore, Article 2.1 of the Merger Regulation accepts in
principle an efficiency defense "provided that it is to consumers’ advantage". These
provisions might indicate that consumer welfare is among the ultimate objectives
of competition law. However, I am not aware of any statement of the ECJ on this
point, nor of any (Commission or Court’s) decision where reliance on either standard
has made a difference in practice.
In other jurisdictions, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, competition au-
thorities seem instead to lean towards a total welfare standard (Lyons, 2003:3).
In the following subsections, we will define two measures as proxies of either the enhanced
consumers’ surplus or the social welfare, namely the expected efficiency gains, and the reduction
in expected prices.
The way proxies are determined is always disputable. For example, any time prices are
weighted using a different weight than the exchanged quantities associated to each of them, the
measure of the expected price reductions is not indicative for an enhanced consumers’ surplus.
Therefore, using such a measure as a ’correct’ approximation for the consumers’ surplus would
lead to some errors.
However, as it will become clearer, it is possible to characterize the type of errors that can
be committed when relying on a proxy.
3.4.1 Objective functions: expected welfare and consumers’ surplus
Before we turn to evaluating the mentioned proxies, let us describe which would be the ideal
decisions if the objective functions expected social welfare and expected consumers’ surplus were
to be followed directly.
Irrespective of the observability of efforts, in the stand-alone case, there are four states of
nature implying three different realizations of the consumers’ surplus: both firms succeed in
reducing their costs, leading to CSj (βc, βc), no firm succeeds leading to CSj (c, c) or either
one firm succeeds while the other one fails, in which case we will have either CSj (βc, c) or
CSj (c, βc), respectively, where CSj (βc, c) = CSj (c, βc). Weighted with the corresponding
probability, we obtain the expected consumers’ surplus:
CSj (S) =
(
pj (S)
)2
CSj (βc, βc) +
(
1− pj (S))2CSj (c, c) + 2pj (S) (1− pj (S))CSj (βc, c) ,
where the superscript j stands for o or u, the observability or unobservability of the agents’
efforts.
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In addition to the expected consumers’ surplus, the expected social welfare also includes the
expected gross profits, as well as the agents’ disutility of exerting an effort. Taking this into
account, we can write for the expected social welfare in the pre-merger situation:
W j (S) = 2pj (S)
(
1− pj (S)) (π (βc, c) + CS (βc, c)) + (pj (S))2CS (βc, βc) +(
1− pj (S))2CS (c, c)− 2(1
2
(
pj (S)
)2)
.
If firms merge, there are only two states of nature, either the merged firm succeeds or it
does not, leading to the respective realizations of the consumers’ surplus, CSj (βc) and CSj (c),
respectively. Again, weighted with their probability, we obtain the expression of the expected
consumers’ surplus:
CSj (M) = pj (M)CSj (βc) +
(
1− pj (M))CSj (c) ,
where we use the superscript j as above.
As for the pre-merger case, additionally to the expected consumers’ surplus, the expected
social welfare includes the merged entity’s expected gross profit, and the agents’ disutility of
exerting an effort, leading to:
W j (M) = pj (M)
(
π (βc) + CSj (βc)
)
+
(
1− pj (M)) (π (c) + CSj (c))− 2(1
2
(
ej (M)
)2)
.
Figure 7 represents the impact of a merger on social welfare and consumer’s surplus if
efforts are observable and unobservable, respectively, and for high initial unit production costs,
c = 0.99. The CS − CS and W −W lines represent the combinations of β and ε for which a
competition authority, pursuing alternatively the consumers’ surplus or the welfare standard,
would be indifferent between the stand-alone situation and the merger. In addition to these two
lines, we again depict the lines of indifference between merging and staying alone for the firms,
labelled Π−Π.
In both worlds, the firms decide to stand-alone to the lower left of the Π − Π line and the
welfare (consumers’ surplus), if firms merge, is higher than otherwise to the lower right of the
W −W line (the CS − CS line). We see that a consumers’ surplus standard is stricter than a
welfare standard in both worlds, that is also when the agents that are responsible for reducing
unit production costs are able to capture an information rent.
However, the CS−CS andW−W lines are closer to each other when efforts are unobservable.
That means that adopting either standard would make less of a difference in a world where
agents are subject to moral hazard. On top of this, the Π − Π line also approaches the two
lines mentioned so that the area of a potential conflict, i.e. the area where privately preferred
mergers are undesired from either a welfare or a consumers’ surplus point of view, is reduced.
This is particularly striking for high initial unit production costs and not too low potential for
their reduction, i.e. for β < 0.8.
Furthermore, in the unobservable efforts case with high initial costs, the W −W line crosses
the Π − Π line. This means that there exist welfare increasing potential mergers which would
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Figure 3.7: The firms’ merger decision and its social welfare and consumers’ surplus impact
under no moral hazard (left) and under moral hazard (right) for c = 0.99
not be proposed by the merging parties. In this area, the expected welfare is increasing, and
both, expected net profits and expected consumers’ surplus, are falling. This means that there
has to be another component of the expected welfare that compensates: the social cost of the
effort exerted is reduced sensibly.
When the level of the initial cost is lower, the gap between the Π−Π, W −W and CS lines
is in general bigger than for higher initial costs. This is due to a large extent to the increased
profitability of a merger as compared to the stand-alone situation when costs are not initially
high. Opposite to the high initial costs case, i.e. when firms are more willing to go for a stand-
alone project − as this guarantees them to be the sole beneficiary of a high monopoly profit
should they succeed as the only one − lower initial costs make the perspective to merge be more
attractive. Figure 3.8 shows this.
3.4.2 Proxies for the society’s objective functions
Once the distinction between the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare has been made,
we can describe the consequences in the characterization of the type of errors a competition
authority may commit when relying on an efficiency defense on the basis of proxies.
As for the consumers’ surplus and for the social welfare, we can use the common superscript
j = o, u for each of the components of both the expected efficiency and prices in order to
account for the observable and the unobservable efforts cases. This is possible as the nature
of each component stays the same through these two environments: the only thing changing
is their respective level as each of them has been obtained solving for different optimization
problems.
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Figure 3.8: The firms’ merger decision and its social welfare and consumers’ surplus impact
under no moral hazard (left) and under moral hazard (right) for c = 0.79
Expected efficiency gains
Let us concentrate first on the composition of the elements that enter the expected efficiency
measure. In the stand-alone case, the expected efficiency takes the following form:
Ej(S) =
(
pj (S)
)2
+ 2pj (S)
(
1− pj (S)) ,
whereas in the merger case:
Ej (M) = pj (M) .
These expressions play the equivalent role of the measure of the overall efficiency on the
production side of the economy, respectively when two firms face a Bertrand competition on the
market, and when the two firms merge: they give the probability of producing the good with
the low production costs βc in the economy. In both these cases we will talk about ex-post
efficiency, as we are considering − when writing the expressions the way we are doing − that
the privately optimal induced probabilities of success have been replaced into the expressions of
the ex-ante measures of efficiency.
The differences between the post-merger efficiencies and the pre-merger ones, both, under
the no-moral hazard and the moral hazard assumptions, will determine, when positive, whether
a merger leads to expected efficiency gains. If the following inequality holds, we will talk about
efficiency gains due to a merger, either when moral hazard is not an issue, or when it is instead:
Ej(M)−Ej(S) > 0
The interest of the analysis is to combine the results of these inequalities, one for each of
the two regimes considered, alternatively with the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare. As
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argued in the previous section, in our analysis these two objective functions will be alternatively
taken as a standard by a competition authority when it has to judge upon a proposed merger.
In order to perform the necessary comparisons, we repeat the same type of analyses as the
ones we made when considering the merger decision of firms, or when we explained the rela-
tionships between the consumers’ surplus and the social welfare as possible objective functions
chosen by a competition authority. Thus, once more, in order to make the relevant graphical
comparisons, we will fix different values of the initial costs, and we will let the parameters β and
ε free to vary12.
Let us take the consumers’ surplus as the reference objective function first. Efficiency com-
parisons for this objective function can be described using figures 9 and 10, where the E−E line
depicts, in both, the curve where the difference between the pre and the post merger expected
efficiency is zero. Again, comparisons are made for the observable and the unobservable efforts
cases, and for two levels of the initial costs, a high and a moderate one. Given that when taking
lower levels of the initial costs, the Π − Π curve moves gradually to the left lower corner, and
the CS−CS as well as the E−E lines move to the right lower corner, restricting our attention
to only two levels of the initial costs is enough to describe the main results that can be obtained
when performing this type of comparisons. Note that for any value of the initial cost c, the
E −E line always stays above the CS − CS one.
Expected efficiency gains due to a merger only occur to the right of the E − E line, i.e.
both, in regions II and IV. However, while region II is not a problematic one as consumers’
surplus increases too, in region IV consumers’ surplus would decrease due to a permitted merger.
Therefore, if an efficiency defense of all the proposed mergers leading to an expected efficiency
gain was accepted then type I errors would be made for mergers falling in region IV: bad mergers
would be accepted. Notice that the occurrence of the type I error is reduced, when facing a
moral hazard behavior from the agents’ side: area IV shrinks and the E −E line gets closer to
the CS − CS line. The intuition for this result is that, under moral hazard, firms go together
more often "for the wrong" reason, i.e. for pure market power reasons (compare area (a) in
figures 5 and 6), and less often "for the right" reason, i.e. for the exploitation of synergies
between the agents’ efforts (compare area (b) in figures 5 and 6). This is reflected both, in the
expected efficiency and in the consumers’ surplus.
Notice also that requiring a significant efficiency gain due to a merger, may help reducing
the occurrence of type I error when the society does not face a moral hazard behavior from
the agents’ side. The relevant indifference curve would be to the right of the E − E line so
that area IV would shrink as a result. However, the same recommendation is not a valid one
anymore when facing a moral hazard behavior instead. The relevant indifference curve for the
application of this recommendation would lie to the lower right of the E − E line. Thus, using
this new indifference curve another type of error would arise: a type II error, i.e. some good
mergers would be refused instead. This is true at least when the level of the initial costs that
the economy faces is high (see figure 9).
We can now repeat the same type of analysis made for the consumers’ surplus, taking the
12Remember that the relevant comparisons will be made only in the range where ε [−1, 1[ .
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Figure 3.9: Efficiency gains: under consumers’ surplus objective function, for both, observable
(left) and unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.99.
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Figure 3.10: Efficiency gains: under consumers’ surplus objective function, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.79.
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Figure 3.11: Efficiency gains: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.99.
social welfare as the reference objective function a competition authority may care about. Doing
so, we obtain figures 11 and 12. As for the case where the consumers’ surplus is the objective
function chosen by the competition authority, we can characterize an area where type I errors
are made when accepting an efficiency defense based on an enhanced efficiency induced by a
merger. This area is labelled again as area IV, given that it has the same characteristics as
before.
It is easy to check that, if social welfare is taken as a standard, the recommendation of
having significant efficiency gains due to a merger may lead to type II errors both, in a world
with and without moral hazard. Figure 11 shows that, in particular, these errors would be made
systematically when the industry faces high initial costs: good mergers would be more often
rejected than if only enhanced efficiency due to a merger were required instead.
Furthermore, under the moral hazard assumption, for values of β below 0.8 the Π−Π, E−E
andW −W lines get closer to each other, up to the point that the E−E crosses theW −W line
and the latter one crosses the Π−Π line instead. This tells us two different things. First, that
whenever the potential for cost reduction is not very low, even asking for an enhanced efficiency
induced by a merger in order to approve it may be too demanding, in the sense that some
mergers that would have been desirable under the social welfare standard would be rejected.
These mergers are the ones falling in area V. Second, due to the crossing between theW−W and
the Π−Π lines, an area VI appears where there exist mergers that would be socially desirable
which are not even privately proposed. These two areas, V and VI, disappear for lower levels
of the initial costs as shown in figure 12, thus making the requirement of enhanced, or even
substantially enhanced, efficiency due to a merger be justified for lower levels of the initial costs.
To summarize:
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Figure 3.12: Efficiency gains: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.79.
Proposition 3.2 If a competition authority adheres to a (CS) standard and relies on expected
efficiency gains for judging proposed mergers:
(i) Under no MH, type I errors are systematically committed, i.e. bad mergers are accepted,
unless significant expected efficiency gains are required;
(ii) Under MH, type I errors are committed as well, but they occur less often than under the
no MH assumption; for high initial costs the requirement of significant expected efficiency
gains would lead to type II errors in addition, i.e. some good mergers would be rejected.
Proposition 3.3 If a competition authority adheres to a (W ) standard and relies on an expected
efficiency gains for judging proposed mergers:
(i) Under no MH, type I errors are systematically committed, i.e. bad mergers are accepted,
but they occur less often than when using a (CS) standard. For high initial costs, the
significant expected efficiency gains requirement would lead to type II errors in addition,
i.e. some good mergers would be rejected;
(ii) Under MH, type I errors are committed for smaller regions than under the (CS) standard,
but type II errors can be committed in addition unless the potential for cost savings is low,
i.e. β > 0.8. For high and moderate initial cost asking for substantial efficiency gains
would lead to refuse some good mergers, i.e. type II errors are committed in addition.
Corollary 3.1 Under MH, the expected efficiency proxy is better calibrated to the objective
functions than under no MH.
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Again, the intuition for the corollary is that, under moral hazard, firms go together more
often "for the wrong" reason, i.e. for pure market power reasons, and less often "for the right"
reason, i.e. for the exploitation of synergies between the agents’ efforts. This is reflected in the
expected efficiency as well as in the consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
Expected price reductions
We now move to the comparisons concerning possible price reductions due to a merger. In
order to do so, we characterize the expected price under the stand-alone and the merger cases
respectively, replacing the relevant optimal levels of the probabilities of success obtained under
each regime. Thus, the induced expected prices of a stand-alone situation are:
Ej [P (., .)] = 2pj(S)(1− pj(S))P (βc, c) + (pj(S))2 P (βc, βc) + (1− pj(S))2
where j = o, u accounts, as before, for both the observable and the unobservable efforts cases.
The induced expected prices by a merger are:
Ej [P (.)] = pj(M)P (βc) + (1− pj(M))P (c).
When the following is true, a merger induces expected price reductions, either under observ-
able or unobservable efforts:
Ej [P (., .)]−Ej [P (.)] > 0
As before, we want to determine the impact over alternatively the consumers’ surplus and the
social welfare of relying on reductions in expected prices when deciding upon proposed mergers.
We use here graphical representations in the same way as before to comment results of these
comparisons.
Figures 13 and 14 show the comparisons when consumers’ surplus is taken as a standard.
In both figures, the P − P line depicts the frontier between the mergers that do not lead to
expected price reductions − the ones to the left of this line − and the mergers that would lead
to reductions of the expected prices instead − the ones to the right of it.
For high levels of the initial costs, the P −P line intersects the CS−CS one both in a world
with and without moral hazard. The crossing results in the occurrence of two different areas,
areas IV and V. The requirement of a reduction in the expected prices induced by a merger would
provoke a type I error for mergers falling in area IV: bad mergers would be accepted, or a type
II error for mergers falling in area V: good mergers would be rejected instead. The reduction
of the expected price is too lax a requirement in certain cases, and a too strict one in others.
However, under the moral hazard assumption the occurrence of type I errors in particular is
sensibly reduced when compared to the one under the no moral hazard assumption. For lower
values of the initial costs, the P −P line always lies below the CS−CS line, implying that only
type II errors would eventually be made in these cases by requiring a reduction in the expected
price induced by a merger in order to approve it: all the bad mergers are refused, together with
some good ones.
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Figure 3.13: Expected Price: under consumers’ surplus objective function, both, observable
(left) and unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.99.
When we perform the parallel analysis using the social welfare as a standard we get figures
15 and 16. We can conclude that requiring a reduction in the expected price induced by a
merger always leads only to type I errors, as the P − P line always lies below the W −W line
no matter which is the initial level of costs considered, or whether or not we are facing a moral
hazard problem in the industry. The type I error occurs again in the area labelled V.
As has been pointed out in section 3.4.1, under moral hazard and high initial costs, we have
an area VI, given by the crossing between the W − W and the Π − Π lines, where welfare
enhancing mergers are not proposed by the parties.
To summarize:
Proposition 3.4 If a competition authority adheres to a (CS) standard and relies on reductions
in the expected prices for judging proposed mergers:
(i) Under no MH, type I and II errors are systematically made for high initial costs: for low β
some bad mergers are accepted and for higher β some good ones rejected. For lower initial
costs, only type II errors are made. The requirement is either too lax or too strict.
(ii) Under MH, type I errors are committed as well, but to a lower extent than under the no MH
assumption and only for high initial costs. In addition, type II errors are made regardless
of the level of the initial costs, i.e. the requirement is overall too strict.
Proposition 3.5 If a competition authority adheres to a (W ) standard and relies on reductions
in the expected prices for judging proposed mergers: under no MH and MH assumptions, type II
errors are systematically committed, i.e. some good mergers are rejected regardless of the level
of the initial costs.
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Figure 3.14: Expected Price: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.99.
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Figure 3.15: Expected Price: under consumers’ surplus objective function, both, observable
(left) and unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.79.
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Figure 3.16: Expected Price: under social welfare objective function, both, observable (left) and
unobservable (right) efforts, for c = 0.79.
Corollary 3.2 Under MH, the expected price proxy is better calibrated to the objective functions
than under no MH.
The same intuition applies as the one for the expected efficiencies: under moral hazard, firms
go together more often "for the wrong" reason, i.e. for pure market power reasons, and less often
"for the right" reason, i.e. for the exploitation of synergies between the agents’ efforts. This is
reflected in the expected prices as well as in the consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
3.4.3 Policy implications
Up to now, our analysis has focussed on the positive side of evaluating mergers using simple
proxies such as expected efficiency gains or reductions in the expected prices.
We have argued that a proxy leads to errors as it cannot perfectly substitute for the real
objective function. In this paper we have provided a characterization of the type of errors that
might be committed when using these proxies, under two different regimes, i.e. with and without
moral hazard. This characterization has been made in terms of parameters such as the potential
for innovation, β, the type of the joint project, ε, and the level of the initial costs of the industry,
c. Implicitly, we thereby also provided suggestions about which combination of these parameters
do not lead to commit systematically errors of either type I or II.
At this point, we would like to go back to the criticism related to the use of proxies, such as
expected efficiency gains and price reductions, as substitutes for either the consumers’ surplus
or the social welfare. If the use of these proxies helps giving some precise recommendation about
which mergers to accept and which ones to refuse, then they may be used whenever they may
allow to save on information to be collected and processed.
If a measure for these proxies could be constructed using the partial information that a
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competition authority may have access to, on the basis of the results obtained, we could conclude
which is the potential danger in adopting one proxy instead of another as a function of the
characteristics of the industry the merger is concerned with.
As an example, whenever the industry faces a moral hazard behavior from the agents’ side,
the potential for innovation is not too low, and the initial costs are high, then the expected effi-
ciency gains would be a good statistic for the ’real’ objective function pursued by a competition
authority when deciding whether a proposed merger should be rejected or not. In this particular
case, the collection of data to construct a precise measure for that proxy may result to be not
as essential to judge upon the likelihood for the merger to lead to an improvement from both
the social welfare and the consumers’ surplus point of views. We know that in this case both
consumers’ surplus and social welfare induced by a proposed merger would be enhanced.
Whenever the initial costs are lower, no matter whether we face moral hazard or not, expected
efficiency gains should be proved instead. In this case, the collection of data to construct an as
precise measure of the proxy as possible may be crucial in deciding upon the merger. This is
particularly true as long as the standard is the (CS). Furthermore, the lower the initial costs
the more substantial the expected efficiency gains should be.
These are only some general implications that are directly coming from the results we have
obtained in our analysis. Depending on the real objective of the competition authority and the
parameters characterizing the industry, one or another proxy, or different combinations of them,
could be alternatively preferred and constructed to adapt them and use them ’quanto basta’ in
order to fit real merger cases decisions.
3.5 Conclusions
The wave of horizontal mergers that has occurred in this last decade, has opened a debate about
the effects of mergers in their respective markets. On the one hand, worries have been voiced
about the potential increase in market power, concentration, therefore decreased degree of com-
petitiveness in these markets due to mergers. On the other hand, arguments in favor of mergers
have been put forward, stressing their potential virtues, as their ability to create efficiency gains,
coming from reduced production costs, transaction costs, or internal organization costs.
We have built a model where merger decisions and their potential efficiency gains are endo-
genized. The channel we propose and analyze has been formed by interactions of agents’ efforts
when they are devoted to a joint project within a merger as compared to when each agent has to
conduct the same project alone. We have shown this way that mergers happen either when the
potential for cost reduction is low, i.e. out of pure market power considerations, or when man-
agerial efforts are close substitutes, or alternatively slight duplicates, when ex-post synergies,
i.e. induced by implemented contracts, are present. Synergies are the results of both the inter-
action between these agents’ efforts and the implemented contracts that drive the profitability
of mergers, and determine the impact on consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
Results tell us that an efficiency defense based on potential efficiency gains due to a merger
is generally too lax a requirement − some bad mergers would be accepted − for the observable
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efforts case, and, for both informational assumptions, when the initial costs are not too high. In
these cases, requiring substantial efficiency gains may reduce this distortion. Results also show
that requiring the same for either the unobservable case when initial costs are high, or for a
larger range of costs when the standard used is the social welfare, may be too strict: some good
mergers would be refused. In any case when efforts are unobservable, this requirement is more
aligned to either type of standards.
We have also shown that the alternative requirement of comparing prices before and after
the merger, which would require to have additional information processed from the demand
side, turns out not to be necessary. The measure of the expected efficiency gains can be precise
enough when adjusted in the right way: using it ’quanto basta’.
Chapter 4
Control over joint development and
the incentives to innovate
4.1 Introduction
There are various ways in which a firm’s competitive environment affects the optimal managerial
incentives to exert an effort in the invention of new products, the reduction of production
costs, or the selling of a product. Several studies highlight that competition affects managerial
incentives positively. It offers a yardstick to the shareholders, as the firm’s performance can
be measured against close competitors. It enables relative performance evaluation which "may
be seen as a consequence of Holmström’s (1979, 1982) informativeness principle that stipulates
that in a principal-agent relationship all informative signals should be included in contracting"
(Celentani and Loveira, 2004). It offers insurance to risk averse managers by reducing the impact
of exogenous (demand or cost) shocks and thus increases incentives (Rey and Tirole, 1986). It
may improve incentives to the management in firms with poor governance structures to adopt
new technologies through the threat of bankruptcy (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1997).
This paper takes an alternative approach to show the impact of the competitive environment
— or more specifically, of a pro-competitive policy — on managerial incentives to develop new
products1, one coming directly from the separation of ownership and control inside the firms. In
our paper, we analyze a situation in which — without any policy intervention — the competitive
structure in which the invention of a new product is carried out, is not given exogenously but
emerges endogenously as a choice of both, the shareholders and their managers. Shareholders
give their managers optimal incentives to develop the new product — either in stand-alone or in
joint development with the other firm — and trade off the possibility to internalize a negative
externality and to enjoy synergies by means of joint development against the disadvantage of
being unable to attribute a success to a specific manager under joint development.
In stand-alone development, firms exercise a negative externality on their competitor: an
increase in the development effort of one firm, ceteris paribus, reduces the probability that the
1Although our example is that of a product development, our analysis is not limited to it. One may easily
think of alternative interpretations of the project, such as production cost reductions, process innovations or the
supply of retail services.
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other firm is successful alone and therefore the other firms expected profits. As the optimally
implemented development effort is increasing in the value of the potential innovation, this ex-
ternality increases in this value, too. This may induce joint development, within which the
externality is internalized: In joint development, the implemented effort levels (given through
the bonuses given to the management) are "coordinated". This, however, means a reduction of
the optimal bonuses, which may go against the interest of the management itself. If then the
management has superior information on how valuable a joint development of the product might
be, i.e. about the extent of the synergies that may be achieved, it may be costly to let them
reveal that information in those situations, in which the management would oppose a profit
increasing joint development. On the other hand, if the value of the potential innovation is low,
the effect of the externality is outweighed by the disadvantage of being unable to attribute a
success to a specific manager under joint development. However, the inability to attribute a
success to a specific manager is a source of rents to the managers. Again, if the management
has superior information on how valuable a joint development of the product might be, i.e.
about the extent of the synergies that may be achieved, it may be costly to let them reveal that
information in those situations, in which the management would prefer a profit decreasing joint
development.
Our results show that, under this type of asymmetric information, for a high value of the
innovation, the owners optimally reduce the incentives they give to their managers in stand-alone
development. As a consequence, we show that, for high value innovations, a pro-competitive
policy will also increase the incentives given to the management to exert an effort in the stand-
alone development as compared to laissez faire.
In this paper, we propose a simple model characterized by the following features. There is a
project for the development of a new product and there are two firms, which have the potential
to develop the product. These two firms face the decision of whether to conduct the project
each on a stand-alone basis, targeting a common market, or jointly, sharing the market later on.
The project(s) is (are) conducted by managers employed by the firms and protected by limited
liability2. In the stand-alone configuration, each of the firms employs one manager, whereas in
the joint situation, both managers are employed by the joint entity, which, that way, exploits
potential synergies coming from the collaboration of the managers. The managers’ efforts put
into the development of the product, which are assumed (throughout most of the paper) to be
not contractible, affect the probability of success of their respective project. Joint projects are
characterized by a degree of synergies coming from a reduction of duplication of the managers
efforts to develop the product. Before starting the project, the managers may receive a perfectly
informative signal on the extent of potential synergies in a joint project. We assume that this
signal is not observable by the owners. These can, however, by distorting the contract they
would offer under symmetric information, provide incentives to the managers to reveal their
information.
Our work is closely related to Fabrizi and Lippert (2005a) and (2005b). Fabrizi and Lippert
2The alternative interpretation is that the managers are infinitely risk averse and would not accept a contract
that pays a negative wage in any state of nature (see Tirole and Rey, 1986, for a similar interpretation).
111
(2005b) shows the impact of moral hazard on the organizational choice for conducting a research
project leading to an innovation of a fixed value. In Fabrizi and Lippert (2005b) joint research
is chosen for high values of the innovation and/or for high synergies. Furthermore, under moral
hazard, even thought the cost of implementing the same level of effort is higher, the joint
research, which shares these costs, is chosen less often than in the absence of moral hazard.
In Fabrizi and Lippert (2005a), a merger decision in the presence of a process innovation is
considered and implications of the presence of moral hazard for an adoption of an efficiency
defense are drawn. Contrary to both Fabrizi and Lippert (2005a) and (2005b) we abandon
here the assumption maintained in these papers of full information on the amount of achievable
synergies. In addition, in this paper, we differ in our approach on how to model synergies,
introducing a parameter taking values from no synergies to full elimination of overlap, which
allows us to disentangle the effects of each of our assumptions more easily.
In order to derive our results and the intuitions for them, we are proceeding in a step-wise
fashion, isolating the effect of each assumption. In section 3, we will assume that there is
symmetric information on the extent of the potential synergies between the owners of the firm
and the managers and that owners have full control over the decision whether to pursue the
development of the product in a stand-alone or in a joint organization. We will first derive the
optimal contracts for the stand-alone organization. Second, we will do the same for the joint
project organization under two different assumptions: (1) owners observe a separate statistic for
each manager employed and coordinate the incentives to give to them and (2) owners observe
only one joint statistic for the managers’ efforts. In the first of the joint situations, owners
observe whether each of the managers succeeded in their part of the project, whereas in the
second, only the success of the overall project is observed. For each of the joint organizations,
we allow the synergies to vary between the extremes of no synergies and full elimination of
the duplication of the managers’ efforts. In the case of no synergies, the change between the
stand-alone and the joint organizations comes under (1) and (2) from the coordination in giving
incentives to the managers and under (2) from the modified assumptions on the availability of
statistics for the managers’ efforts. For all these assumptions, we will show the configurations
chosen by the owners and their implication for the managers’ utility.
In section 4, we will lift the assumption that the owners have full control over the decision
whether to pursue the project in a stand-alone or in a joint organization. We assume that the
management retains real control over the organizational form by being better informed about
the synergies attainable in a joint project.
The paper ends with a summary of our findings and an outlook to further research.
4.2 Model setup
In this section, we describe the setup of the basic model. We describe the project, the payoffs
for the shareholders of the firms, as well as the payoffs of the managers carrying out the project.
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Project There is a project to develop a new product that targets a given market of value
π. Let there be two firms, indexed i = 1, 2, pursuing each this project. The shareholders of
the firms face the decision of whether to conduct the project each in a stand-alone fashion or
jointly. If, in a stand-alone project, only one of the firms succeeds, she will appropriate the
whole value of π attainable in the market. If on the other hand both firms succeed in developing
the product, we assume them to share the market3, appropriating each the value of π2 . In case
the firms decide to conduct the project jointly, we assume them to form a new entity to do
so. In case of success, this joint entity appropriates the value π. We assume an exogenously
determined sharing rule, according to which the payoffs (and the costs) of a joint project are
shared equally among the two firms. Thus, in case of success of the joint project, each firm gets
π
2 . In case of failure, both, a stand-alone and a joint project, pay off zero.
Probability of success The development of the new product is assumed to be carried out
(or supervised) by the management of the firms. In a stand-alone project, each firm i employs
one manager, also indexed i. With their effort ei, the managers affect the probability of success
of their respective project. This probability is assumed to be pSi = ei. Thus, the success of
one stand-alone project is assumed to be statistically independent of the success of the other
one. In a joint project, both managers of the two firms are working together. The probability
of success of the joint project is assumed to be a function of both managers’ efforts, e1 and
e2, and of a parameter s capturing the extent of synergies in a joint project. It is defined as
pJ = e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2. This probability function captures two aspects. First, if the two
managers conducting the joint project do that in a parallel fashion, it is enough if one of them
succeeds. Second, if s = 0, the success of the parts of each of the managers is independent of the
success of the other one. There is, therefore, the same "overlap" or duplication of their efforts
as in the stand-alone situation. An s ∈ (0, 1] signifies that, in a joint project, there is some
(exogenous) coordination between the two managers, alleviating (some of) the duplication of
their efforts. We call this the synergies coming from a joint project. The extent of the synergies
is assumed to be given exogenously. It cannot be affected by the managers or the owners of the
firms.
Managers Managers affect the probability of success of the project through their effort.
Throughout most of the paper, we will assume that these efforts are not observable and that it
is therefore not possible to write contracts contingent on them. Exerting the effort ei implies
a disutility for the manager that is equal to ci (ei) =
1
2e
2
i . For carrying out the project, the
managers receive a transfer ti from the entrepreneurs employing them. The managers’ utility is
additively separable between effort and money,
Ui = ti − 1
2
e2i .
Managers are assumed to be protected by limited liability, i.e. the transfers ti made by the
3 It can be shown that our results do not change qualitatively if we assume that a success of both firms destroys
value appropriable by the firms, i.e. if each of them receives only less than π2 .
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firms have to be non-negative4. As it is impossible to write contracts contingent on efforts,
under stand-alone development, these will be written on the observable and verifiable success of
the respective project. For joint development, we take two different assumptions: first, we will
assume that it is possible to observe and verify the success of each manager separately, i.e. there
is an independent statistic for the effort of each manager. Under this assumption, contracts will
be written on the success of the manager in his respective part of the joint project. Second,
we will assume that it is only possible to observe and verify the success of the project as a
whole, i.e. there is only one common statistic for both managers’ efforts. Under this alternative
assumption, contracts will be written on the success of the whole project. In a joint project, we
always impose equal contracts to both agents5.
In any configuration, we assume that the managers do not observe each other’s effort choice.
This implies that they cannot collude.
Shareholders Shareholders are assumed to be risk neutral and maximize their expected prof-
its.
4.3 The joining decision if shareholders have full control over it
In this section, we assume that both, the shareholders of the firm and the managers, have full
information on the synergies achievable if they develop the product jointly.
Assumption 4.1 s is observable and verifiable.
The shareholders decide to develop the product in a joint venture if the expected profit from
doing so exceeds the one they can get in a stand-alone development. In the following, we will
first derive the optimal contracts, both for observable and unobservable efforts, for the stand-
alone development and for the two assumptions on the statistics for the agents’ efforts under
joint development. We will then characterize the shareholders’ decision and their impact on the
utility of their managers. This will become the basis for the comparisons in the next section.
4.3.1 Stand-alone development
Observable efforts
If efforts are contractible, the owner of firm i (i, j = 1, 2, i = j) maximizes
max
ei
[
ei (1− ej)π + eiej π
2
− 1
2
e2i
]
.
4An alternative interpretation of this assumption is that the managers are infinitely risk averse, and that they
require that their transfer in the worst possible outcome (the only one they care about ex ante) be non-negative
(see Rey and Tirole, 1986, for a similar assumption).
5 It can be shown that giving equal contracts to both managers would emerge in equilibrium as the result of
the minimization of the cost of implementing a given probability of success.
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Resulting from these maximization problems, in the stand-alone equilibrium with observable
efforts, labelled with S, o, each owner i implements an effort level of
eS,oi =
2π
π + 2
,
leading to an expected profit of
EΠS,oi =
2π2
(π + 2)2
.
Unobservable efforts
In this subsection, the agents’ efforts are assumed to be not contractible. Contracts will, thus,
be written contingent on the observable and verifiable outcome of the project. In case of failure
of the project in firm i, manager i receives a base wage wS,ui , whereas in case of success, he
receives, in addition to the base wage wS,ui , the bonus b
S,u
i , where the superscript S, u stands for
stand-alone development with unobservable efforts. Manager i then chooses the level of effort
to exert such as to maximize his utility. His maximization program is
max
ei
[
wS,ui + eib
S,u
i −
1
2
e2i
]
,
which results in the incentive compatibility constraint
ei = b
S,u
i .
Manager i accepts the contract if his expected utility from doing so exceeds the one of his
outside option, which we normalize to zero. Furthermore, as the managers are protected by
limited liability so wS,ui has to be non-negative.
Firm i’s maximization problem under stand-alone development is
max
w
S,u
i ,b
S,u
i
[
ei (1− ej)π + eiej π
2
− eibS,ui − wS,ui
]
s.t. ei = b
S,u
i (IC)
wS,ui ≥ 0 (LL)
wS,ui + eib
S,u
i − 12e2i ≥ 0. (IR)
The solution to this problem gives
wS,ui = 0,
bS,ui = e
S,u
i =
2π
π + 4
,
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as well as the expected per entrepreneur profits, EΠS,ui , and expected utility of the managers,
EUS,ui ,
EΠS,ui =
(
2π
π + 4
)2
,
EUS,ui =
1
2
(
2π
π + 4
)2
.
4.3.2 Joint development
Next, we derive the optimal contracts if shareholders opt for joint development. We do so first
for the assumption of observable efforts, then under the premise that the shareholders observe
the success of each agent separately and finally supposing that the shareholders observe only
the success of the whole project.
Observable efforts
Under the observable efforts assumption, the joint maximizes
max
e1,e2
(e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2)π − 1
2
e21 −
1
2
e22.
Resulting from this maximization problem, the joint entity with observable efforts, labelled with
J, o, implements effort levels of
eJ,oi =
π
1 + (1− s)π .
The resulting expected profit of the joint entity is
EΠJ,o =
π2
1 + (1− s)π .
Proposition 4.1 If efforts and the extent of synergies are observable, ∀π, ∀s ∈ [0, 1], 12EΠJ,o ≥
EΠS,oi ; and e
J,o
i ≥ eS,oi iff s ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
.
Proof. 12EΠ
J,o ≥ EΠS,oi ⇔ 12 π
2
1+(1−s)π ≥ 2π
2
(π+2)2
⇔ π2 ≥ −4sπ, which is true ∀π, ∀s ∈ [0, 1].
eJ,oi ≥ eS,oi ⇔ π1+(1−s)π ≥ 2ππ+2 ⇔ s ≥ 12 . QED.
If efforts and the extent of synergies are observable, the firms choose joint over stand-alone
development for any profit and synergy level. Doing so, they implement higher effort levels than
the stand-alone firms if and only if s ≥ 126.
In stand-alone development, each firm does not take into account the decrease in the expected
profit of the other firm due to its own increase in the implemented effort. This effect does not
appear if these two firms form a joint entity. Therefore, even if s was close to 0, i.e. that
6The results use the optimal contracts calculated in this section without explicitly taking the constraints
pJ,os ∈ [0, 1] and pS,o ∈ [0, 1] into account. However, we do not need to restrict our comparison to π − s−
combinations for which eJ,osi =
π
(1−s)π+1
≤ 1, i.e. to π ≤ 1
s
, and eS,ui =
2π
π+2
≤ 1, i.e. π ≤ 2, as it is possible to
show that there are contracts that take into account the restrictions, for which the qualitative statements made
hold.
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there were (almost) no synergies, the firms would prefer joint development. They do so as going
for joint development allows them to "coordinate" on the levels of efforts to implement. For
low synergies, this "coordination" in the levels of efforts leads to lower implemented efforts.
Increasing the level of synergies makes an increase of the effort level more profitable, and as a
result, from a certain synergy level on, i.e. for s ≥ 12 , the implemented effort levels under joint
development is higher than under stand-alone development.
Unobservable efforts, owners observe the success of each agent separately
In this subsection, we assume that each of the agents is fulfilling a separable task and that, for
the success of the whole project, it is only necessary that one of them succeeds in his task. The
task, thus, corresponds simply to the development of the product. We assume — as in the stand-
alone development — that agent i succeeds in his task with probability pi = ei. This success is
observable and verifiable and contracts will, thus, be written contingent on it.
Manager i maximizes
max
ei
[
wJ,us + eib
J,us − 1
2
e2i
]
,
which results in the incentive compatibility constraint
ei = b
J,us.
The superscript J, us stands for joint development with unobservable efforts and separately
observable success of the managers. He accepts the contract again if it gives him an expected
utility of at least zero.
Given that we assumed that there is some duplication of the agents’ efforts, which is poten-
tially smaller than under independent, stand-alone development — this accounts for synergies —
the joint entity is successful with probability p = e1+ e2− (1− s) e1e2. It pays a bonus to agent
i with probability ei. Therefore, it maximizes
max
wJ,us,bJ,us
[
(e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2)π − e1bJ,us − e2bJ,us − 2wJ,us
]
s.t. ei = b
J,us (IC)
wJ,us ≥ 0 (LL)
wJ,us + eib
J,us − 12e2i ≥ 0. (IR)
The solution to this gives
wJ,us = 0,
bJ,us = eJ,usi =
π
(1− s)π + 2 ,
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as well as the expected profit of the joint entity, EΠJ,us, and the expected utility of each manager,
EUJ,usi ,
EΠJ,us =
π2
(1− s)π + 2 ,
EUJ,usi =
1
2
(
π
(1− s)π + 2
)2
.
Proposition 4.2 Under assumption 4.1, if the results of the managers’ tasks are independently
observable, ∀π, ∀s ∈ [0, 1], 12EΠJ,us ≥ EΠS,u; eJ,usi ≥ eS,ui iff s ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
; and EUJ,usi ≥ EUS,ui
iff s ∈ [12 , 1].
Proof. 12EΠ
J,us ≥ EΠS,u ⇔ 12 π
2
(1−s)π+2 ≥
(
2π
π+4
)2 ⇔ π2 ≥ −8sπ, which is true ∀π,
∀s ∈ [0, 1]. eJ,usi ≥ eS,ui ⇔ π(1−s)π+2 ≥ 2ππ+4 ⇔ s ≥ 12 . EUJ,usi ≥ EUS,ui ⇔ 12
(
π
(1−s)π+2
)2 ≥
1
2
(
2π
π+4
)2 ⇔ s ≥ 12 . QED.
The comparison of the expected profits reveals that shareholders prefer the joint development
for any π, even if there are no synergies, i.e. even if s = 0. This result is due to the possibility of
coordinating the managers’ implemented efforts. However, as long as the synergies are not high
enough, i.e. if s < 12 , the management’s utility decreases as this coordination in the managers’
implemented efforts means a reduction in their bonuses. The result parallels that for observable
efforts7.
Note that the extent of the externality on firm exercises on the other one — for a given effort
level of that other firm — does not depend on the introduction of the moral hazard. Furthermore,
the synergies are not cost side synergies, thus, there is no coordination of the incentive contracts,
but only on the implemented efforts. This explains the congruence of the results in this section
with the one before.
Unobservable efforts, owners only observe the success of the overall project
In this section, we again assume that each of the agents is fulfilling a task and that, for the success
of the whole project, it is only necessary that one of them succeeds in his task. Again, agent
i succeeds in his task with probability pi = ei. However, we assume now that this individual
success is not observable and verifiable and contracts can, thus, not be written contingent on
it. Instead, only the fact whether the product has been developed at all can be observed and
verified and contracts will be written contingent on this observation.
Manager i maximizes
max
ei
[
wJ,uc + (e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2) bJ,uc − 1
2
e2i
]
,
7The results use the optimal contracts calculated in this section without explicitly taking the constraints
pJ,us ∈ [0, 1] and pS,u ∈ [0, 1] into account. However, as with observable efforts, we do not need to restrict our
comparison to π − s− combinations for which eJ,usi =
π
(1−s)π+2
≤ 1, i.e. to π ≤ 2
s
, and eS,ui =
2π
π+4
≤ 1, i.e.
π ≤ 4, as it is again possible to show that there are contracts that take into account the restrictions, for which
the qualitative statements made hold.
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where J, uc stands for joint development, unobservable efforts, and the fact that shareholders
observe only a common statistic for the success of both managers. This results in the incentive
compatibility constraint
ei =
bJ,uc
(1− s) bJ,uc + 1 .
The firm maximizes
max
wJ,uc,bJ,uc
[
(e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2)
(
π − 2bJ,uc)− 2wJ,uc]
s.t. ei =
bJ,uc
(1−s)bJ,uc+1
(IC)
wJ,uc ≥ 0 (LL)
wJ,uc + (e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2) bJ,uc − 12e2i ≥ 0. (IR)
The first order condition to this maximization program with respect to bJ,uc is
∂ΠJ,uc
∂b
=
(
π − 2bJ,uc)( 2
1 + (1− s) bJ,uc −
4bJ,uc (1− s)
(1 + (1− s) bJ,uc)2 +
2
(
bJ,uc
)2
(1− s)2
(1 + (1− s) bJ,uc)3
)
−
2
(
2bJ,uc
1 + (1− s) bJ,uc − (1− s)
(
bJ,uc
)2
(1 + (1− s) bJ,uc)2
)
= 0,
and the optimal base wage and bonus resulting from the problem are wJ,uc = 0 and
bJ,uc = − 1
(1− s) +
φ
(1− s)2 3√18 −
3
√
2
3
φ
,
where
φ =
3
√
18 (1− s)3 + 9π (1− s)4 +
√
3 (1− s)3
√
112 + 108π (1− s) + 27π2 (1− s)2.
We renounce to report the algebraic expressions for the expected profits and the managers’
expected utility. Instead, we offer a graphical comparison with the stand-alone development.
In figure 4.1, the Π − Π− line corresponds to the π − s− combinations, for which the
expected profit of each firm from a stand-alone development equals the one it can have in a joint
development. Below the line, the expected profits from stand-alone development are higher than
those from joint development and vice versa. The U−U− line is the managers’ indifference curve
between these two organizational forms. For π − s− combinations below the line, they prefer
stand-alone development. The Pr−Pr− line corresponds to the π−s− combinations, for which
the probability of success under joint development equals the probability that the product is
successfully developed by at least one firm under stand-alone development. Above this line, the
probability of success of joint development is higher than the corresponding probability under
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Figure 4.1: Comparison stand-alone vs. joint development if only one statistic for both managers
is available
stand-alone development. Note also that the implemented efforts under (S, u) are always higher
than those under (J, uc)8.
From figure 4.1, we notice two areas of disagreement between the shareholders and the
managers. For relatively high values of π and intermediate synergies s, there are profit increasing
joint projects that are decreasing the utility of the managers and for intermediate to low π and
intermediate to high synergies, there are joint projects that increase the managers’ utility while
decreasing the profits of the shareholders.
Furthermore, it is possible to show that the effort levels implemented under stand-alone
development are always higher than under the joint configuration when only the overall success
is observable.
Proposition 4.3 Under assumption 4.1, if there is only one statistic for the efforts of both
agents in the joint venture,
1. there exist high π− high s combinations for which under joint development both, the own-
ers’ profit and the managers’ utility, are higher than under stand-alone development,
2. there exist low/intermediate π− low/intermediate s combinations for which under joint
development both, the owners’ profit and the managers’ utility, are lower than under stand-
alone development,
8As we assumed the synergies to be the reduction of overlap between the efforts of the agents, s = 0 corresponds
to no reduction and s = 1 to full reduction, we limit our comparison to s ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, this figure uses the
optimal contracts calculated in this section without taking feasibility constraints into account, i.e. there exists a
line, above which the probability of success pJ,uc =
(
2 b
J,uc
(1−s)bJ,uc+1
− (1− s)
(
bJ,uc
(1−s)bJ,uc+1
)2)
would exceed one.
Similarly, for π ≥ 4, the probability of success pS,u = eS,u = 2π
π+4
would exceed one. However, we do not need to
restrict our comparison to the area below these values as it is possible to show that there are contracts that take
into account the restrictions, for which the qualitative statements made in the graph hold.
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3. there exist π−s− combinations for intermediate synergies, for which profit enhancing joint
development would reduce the managers’ utility,
4. there exist π − s− combinations for high synergies, for which profit reducing joint devel-
opment would increase the managers’ utility,
5. the implemented effort levels under stand-alone development always exceed the ones under
joint development,
6. an increase in the implemented probability of success is sufficient for a profit and utility
increasing joint development.
Proof. Proposition 4.3 follows from comparing the values obtained in the sections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2, as well as from figure 4.1.
For high values of the innovation π, the efforts implemented in a stand-alone situation are
very high, such that the probability that both firms succeed in developing the product and
then have to compete/share the market is very high. Therefore, shareholders can gain from
coordinating the implemented efforts under joint development. This reduces the bonus to be
paid to the managers and, thus, makes them loose utility in a joint project, which enhances
profits over a stand-alone project. For low values of π, this component does not carry so much
weight and the reduced ability to attribute a success or a failure to one of the managers becomes
relatively more important. The informational rents in a joint project would be very high which,
therefore, makes managers better and shareholders worse off.
4.4 The joining decision if shareholders do not have full control
over it
Let us now assume that shareholders do not have full control over the decision whether to develop
the product alone or jointly. There are several reasons why this could be the case. One is that
shareholders are simply too dispersed to put such a decision on the agenda of the firm’s general
assembly. Another reason might be that there is asymmetric information on the synergies. If
managers know the amount of synergies and shareholders cannot observe these unless managers
reveal them, then there is scope for the management to extract rents from the shareholders. As
we will see, in this case, the shareholders will optimally "distort" the incentive contracts to be
given to the managers in a way that the managers will announce the synergies.
Therefore, the innovative activity in the firms with and without a joint venture will be
affected by the possibility to conduct the development of the product in an RJV. If there was a
policy, "ruling out" joint development, the contracts will not be "distorted" that way and we,
thus, might observe a more or a less innovative industry as compared to before the introduction
of the policy.
Assuming that managers have superior information on the extent of the synergies is a reason-
able assumption, as often "outside directors are [...] carefully chosen so as to be overcommitted.
Most outside directors in the largest US corporations are CEOs of other firms. Besides having
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a full workload in their own company, they may sit on a large number of boards. In such cir-
cumstances, they may come to board meetings (other than their own corporation’s) unprepared
and they may rely entirely on the information disclosed by the firm’s management" (Tirole,
2005). A consequence is that there is little real control of the shareholders over the activities of
the management, including the choice of whether to develop products together with potential
competitors or alone and whether this choice is indeed profit maximizing.
4.4.1 Assumptions
In order to capture the superior information of the management on the extent of synergies
achievable, we introduce asymmetric information on s in assumption 4.2.
Assumption 4.2 With probability pSignali ∈ ]0, 1[, before the start of the development project,
each manager receives independently from the other manager, a costless, perfectly informative,
hideable, but not falsifiable private signal about the value of s. With probability 1− pSignali , the
manager does not receive a signal. The occurrence of the signal is independent of s.
Assumption 4.3 Neither owners nor manager j observe whether manager i received a signal.
We assume the costlessness of the signal for simplicity, but also other scenarios can be thought
of. A consequence of assumption 4.2 is that the managers have the choice of whether to reveal or
hide the signal they received, if they received one. Given that the managers receive the signals
independently of each other, it is not possible to devise Maskin game type mechanisms, thanks
to which the owners could costlessly obtain the agent’s information.
With respect to the distribution of s and the occurrence of the signal, we assume that,
without further knowledge on the realization of s, each owner i prefers (S). Put differently:
Assumption 4.4 For all π, a signal showing a high s is sufficiently rare not to justify joint
development without revelation of a signal.
We will specify what this means in the following subsection on incentive constraints. Such
an assumption is justifyable as, in reality, joint projects are rarely implemented without having
received an "expertise" by the management (or/and external sources).
4.4.2 Incentive constraints
We now have two types of incentive constraints: effort incentive constraints and revelation
incentive constraints. The former are the usual incentive compatibility constraints, specifying
the utility maximizing effort level for each bonus. The latter ones are to ensure that the managers
reveal the signal if they received one and, thus, propose all joint developments that are profit
increasing over stand-alone development.
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Effort incentive constraints
There is effectively no change in the effort incentive constraint as compared to section 4.3. In
the stand-alone situation, agent i maximizes
max
ei
[
wS,upi + eib
S,up
i −
1
2
e2i
]
,
implying the incentive compatibility constraint
ei = b
S,up
i . (IC
e,S
i )
The p in the superscript (additional to the already introduced S, u) denotes the "private infor-
mation" of the managers on the extent of the synergies s.
If owners observe the success of each agent separately, under joint development, agent i ∈
{1, 2} maximizes
max
ei
[
wJ,usp + eib
J,usp − 1
2
e2i
]
,
implying
ei = b
J,usp. (ICe,J,si )
Again, the p in the superscript (additional to the already introduced J, us) denotes the
"private information" of the managers on the extent of the synergies s.
If owners only observe the success of the overall project, under joint development, agent
i ∈ {1, 2} maximizes
max
ei
[
wJ,ucp + (e1 + e2 − (1− s) e1e2) bJ,ucp − 1
2
e2i
]
,
implying
ei =
bJ,ucp
(1− s) bJ,ucp + 1 . (IC
e,J,c
i )
Again, the p in the superscript (additional to the already introduced J, uc) denotes the "pri-
vate information" of the managers on the extent of the synergies s. With a bonus bJ,ucp, the
shareholders implement therefore a probability of success of
pJ,ucp = 2
bJ,ucp
(1− s) bJ,ucp + 1 − (1− s)
(
bJ,ucp
(1− s) bJ,ucp + 1
)2
.
Revelation incentives
Owners observe the success of each agent separately Let us first assume that under
joint development, owners observe the success of each agent separately. Remember that, as the
shareholders face only forces favoring joint development, with symmetric information, joint de-
velopment was profit enhancing for all π−s− combinations. Therefore, the private information
of the managers does not have a value for the owners. Given that, the owners can simply distort
the incentives in the never preferred stand-alone development such that managers propose the
joint project. The owners choose the under symmetric information optimal contract for the joint
project and pay a zero transfer in any state of the world in the stand-alone project.
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Figure 4.2: The revelation equilibria with full information on s contracts
Owners only observe the success of the overall project Let us now assume that, under
joint development, owners only observe the success of the overall project. In order to derive
revelation incentive constraints, it is useful to exogenously fix the contracts to the level of the
full information on s case, i.e. to wS,u, bS,u, wJ,uc, and bJ,uc, and to see which equilibria with
respect to the managers choice to reveal an eventually received signal exist. Consider the owners
strategy to choose joint development if and only if at least one manager reveals a signal, for
which the expected profit of joint development is higher than that for stand-alone development.
Due to assumption 4.4, it is optimal for the owners to choose stand-alone development if not
signal is revealed. And if s was revealed, they can always implement the profit maximizing
organization.
Denote manager i’s decision to reveal with Ri and his decision to hide with Hi. In figure 4.2,
we characterize the (s, π)− combinations, for which there would be (Ri, Rj), (Ri,Hj), (Hi, Rj),
and (Hi,Hj) equilibria, respectively. Remember that the signal is hidable, but hard information.
It is therefore enough that one manager reveals it for the owners to have this information and
to choose their preferred configuration accordingly.
In areas I and IV , no matter whether any agent reveals the signal, the configuration chosen
by the owners will be (S). Therefore, no matter what manager j does and no matter whether
manager j received a signal, manager i is indifferent between revealing and hiding. This indif-
ference, and therefore the multiplicity of equilibria, can be (almost) costlessly avoided by paying
wS,u = ε, ε greater than but close to zero, in case a signal has been revealed and wS,u = 0
otherwise.
In areas II and III, if there is at least one manager revealing the signal, the owners will
choose the (J).
In area III, only (Hi,Hj) is an equilibrium in the revelation subgame. The reason is that
if manager j hides the signal or if he did not receive a signal, revelation by manager i would
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lead to a utility decreasing switch from (S) to (J). (Ri, Rj), (Ri,Hj), and (Hi, Rj) are not
an equilibrium, as although in case both managers received the signal, manager i would be
indifferent between hiding and revealing if manager j revealed, with probability 1 − pSignalj ,
manager j did not receive a signal and in this case, revealing would be utility decreasing for
manager i.
Lastly, in area II, only (Ri, Rj) is an equilibrium in the revelation subgame as, if manager j
reveals the signal, manager i would be indifferent between revealing and hiding, but if j did not
receive a signal, revealing would lead to a utility increasing switch from (S) to (J). (Hi,Hj),
(Ri,Hj), and (Hi, Rj) are not an equilibrium as revealing if the other manager hides would lead
to a utility increasing switch from (S) to (J).
It is now possible to specify more exactly how rare a signal stating a high s has to be (see
assumption 4.4). A deviation to implementing (J) using expected values over s to derive the
contracts has to be not profitable. In the most difficult case, this amounts to (J) being not
preferred if both agents choose to reveal in area I9. In this case, if the owners do not get
a signal revealed; this means that either no signal was obtained or at leat one signal was ob-
tained, which falls into area III. Assumption 4.4 then reads as
(
1− pSignal)2Es∈[0,1] [EΠJ,uci ]+(
1− (1− pSignal)2)Es∈[s˜,ŝ] [EΠJ,uci ] < EΠS,ui , where Es is the expectation operator over s,
where s˜ is the synergy level for which, under full information over s, the owners are indifferent
between (S) and (J) and where ŝ is the synergy level for which, under full information over s,
the managers are indifferent between (S) and (J), and EΠJ,uci is the share of firm i in the joint
profit.
Now that we have specified the revelation equilibria under the contracts derived for full
information over s, we can turn to conditions for which (Hi,Hj) equilibria disappear. Share-
holders would want the managers, if these received a signal, to reveal it. As we have seen, with
contracts wS,u, bS,u, wJ,uc, and bJ,uc, this is not always an equilibrium. For (s, π) ∈ III, there is
no equilibrium in which at least one manager reveals the signal. With the contracts offered, the
shareholders therefore also have to give the management an incentive always to reveal the signal
received, i.e. to propose a joint development if this is profitable. Managers reveal the signal if
their expected utility of doing so exceeds the one of hiding the signal.
In order to let agents reveal a signal if s and π are such that they fall into area III, they
have to be at least as well off as if stand-alone was implemented. Therefore, they have to get a
payment, additional to their bonus and base wage, of t ≥ EUS,upi (N) − EUJ,ucpi , where the N
stands for non-revelation. For each s, this utility difference is a function of the bonuses and the
base wages to be paid in stand-alone without revelation of the signal and in joint development.
The owners will, thus, pay an information rent to the first of managers to reveal the signal for
an (s, π) combination in an area similar to III as long as this is profitable. This transfer will
be paid as long as it is necessary, i.e. if
EUS,upi (N) > EU
J,ucp
i
9Remember that this is (almost) costlessly achievable by paying a wS,u = ε if agents reveal and wS,u = 0
otherwise.
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and as long as it is profitable, i.e. if
EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
)
> EΠS,upi (N) .
The firms are maximizing their profits over bS,upi (N), w
S,up
i (N), b
S,up
i (R), w
S,up
i (R), b
J,ucp,
wJ,ucp, and t, where R stands for revelation.
Denote s (π) the s for which EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
)
= EΠS,upi (N). This is the
lowest s for which the owners would be willing to pay a transfer to the managers for revealing
the signal in order to avoid a type III area. Denote s the s for which EUS,upi (N) = EU
J,ucp
i .
This is the highest s, for which an extra transfer for the revelation would have to be paid to the
agents in order to avoid a type III area.
The owners’ maximization problem
In the following, we assume that the owners construct the contracts such that the agents reveal if
they received the signal. The owners maximize their expected profits. These are, in case no sig-
nal has been received by either agent EΠS,upi (N). This happens with probability
(
1− pSignal)2.
In case at least one agent received a signal, which happens with probability
(
1− (1− pSignal)2),
the firms expected profit is
∫ s
0 EΠ
S,up
i (R) f (s) ds+
∫ s
s
(
EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
))
f (s) ds+∫ 1
s
EΠJ,ucpi f (s) ds, where f (s) is the marginal distribution function of the synergies, s. There-
fore, the firms’ expected profit is
EΠi =
(
1− pSignal
)2
EΠS,upi (N)+(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ s
0
EΠS,upi (R) f (s) ds+(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ s
s
(
EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
))
f (s) ds+(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ 1
s
EΠJ,ucpi f (s) ds.
The restrictions to be fulfilled are the limited liability constraint, the agents’ participation
constraint, and the effort incentive compatibility constraints. Furthermore, it should be an
equilibrium to reveal also if the signal is such that stand-alone is preferred, i.e.
EUS,upi (N) ≤ EUS,upi (R) .
The first order condition with respect to the bonus of agent i if he does not reveal a signal,
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bS,upi (N), can be written as (we show this in the appendix)(
1− bS,upj (N)
)
π + bS,upj (N)
π
2
− 2bS,upi (N)
+
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
 ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠS,upi (R)−EΠS,upi (N)
)
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
∫ s
s
∂EUS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
f (s) ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
= 0.
Under full information on s, the first order condition was
∂EΠS,ui
∂bS,ui
=
(
1− bS,uj
)
π + bS,uj
π
2
− 2bS,ui = 0.
Comparing it to that with private information on synergies, for any bS,upj
(
= bS,uj
)
, the optimal
value of bS,upi is lower than under full control of the shareholders, b
S,u
i . Thus, with a private
signal of the managers on s, the incentives to develop the new product in a stand-alone situation
are lower than under full control of the management for high values of the invention.
Proposition 4.4 If managers receive a private signal on achievable synergies in joint develop-
ment and π > π∗, the owners distort the optimal bonus to their agents such that bS,upi (N) < b
S,u
i ,
inducing a lower probability of an innovation in stand-alone development as compared to full in-
formation over the synergies. For π ≤ π∗, the offered bonus stays the same as under full info
over the synergies.
Proof. This follows directly from the discussion in this section.
A lower level of the bonus in stand-alone will be implemented, giving rise to a lower innovative
activity in stand-alone if no signal has been received. This comes from the fact that, in case
that a signal has been received, the principal can reduce the information rent to be paid to the
agent for revealing the signal by reducing the bonus that would be paid if no signal is revealed.
4.4.3 Policy Implications
The results obtained in this paper have implications for a pro-competitive policy with regard to
the development of new products, which would be preventing a joint development in order to
strengthen the competitive environment the firms sell their products in. As our analysis shows,
in addition to a possible ruling out of joint development, this type of policy may have an impact
on the incentives to innovate in stand-alone development. In other words, if joint development
is not an option, the best contracts the shareholders can offer are the ones from section 4.3.1,
i.e. the ones obtained for stand-alone development if the owners have full information over the
synergies.
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As a consequence, the introduction of these policies may reduce the innovative activity for
projects with π − s−values for which shareholders would choose voluntarily the organizational
form "prescribed" by the policy. Proposition 4.5 states exactly this.
Proposition 4.5 For π > π∗, a policy impeding joint development will increase incentives given
to managers to innovate in stand-alone development.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a channel through which a pro-competitive policy may have an impact
on managerial incentives to develop new products, one using directly the separation of ownership
and control inside the firms. If the managers conducting innovative projects also have private
information on the best organizational form in which to conduct these projects, the owners of
the firms would distort the incentives they give to their managers in each of the organizational
forms, depending on the value of the projects up or down, in a way that these managers reveal
their private information. If a policy prescribes stand-alone development, then there will be
no reason for them anymore to distort the incentives and the effect of the policy may also be
a change of the innovative activity in projects for which the "prescribed" organizational form
would have been chosen voluntarily. A (positive) side effect of such a policy would then be an
increase of innovative activity for projects with high value in stand-alone.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that, although our example is that of a product devel-
opment, our analysis is not limited to it. One may easily think of alternative interpretations
of the project, such as production cost reductions, process innovations (as considered in Fabrizi
and Lippert, 2005a) or the supply of retail services.
In future research, we will study the problem in an environment, in which the managers can
falsify the signal on s when they reveal it to the owners.
Appendix
D.1 Proposition 4.4
The firms’ expected profit is
EΠi =
(
1− pSignal
)2
EΠS,upi (N)+(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ s
0
EΠS,upi (R) f (s) ds+(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ s
s
(
EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
))
f (s) ds+(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ 1
s
EΠJ,ucpi f (s) ds.
The restrictions to be fulfilled are the limited liability constraint, the agents’ participation
constraint, and the effort incentive compatibility constraints. Furthermore, it should be an
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equilibrium to reveal also if the signal is such that stand-alone is preferred, i.e. EUS,upi (N) ≤
EUS,upi (R).
The first order condition with respect to the bonus of agent i if he does not reveal a signal,
bS,upi (N), is
∂EΠi
∂bS,upi (N)
=
(
1− pSignal
)2 ∂EΠS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
+
(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2) ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
EΠS,upi (R) f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s

+
(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)( ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
))
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s
)
−
(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2) ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
))
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s

−
(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2)∫ s
s
∂EUS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
f (s) ds
−
(
1−
(
1− pSignal
)2) ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
EΠJ,ucpi f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s
= 0.
We know that in s, EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
)
= EΠS,upi (N) and in s, EU
S,up
i (N) =
EUJ,ucpi . Substituting and dividing by
(
1− pSignal)2, this condition can be written as
(
1− bS,upj
)
π + bS,upj
π
2
− 2bS,upi
+
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
 ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠS,upi (R)−EΠS,upi (N)
)
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s

−
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
∫ s
s
∂EUS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
f (s) ds = 0. (A1)
We want to show that the implemented bonuses in stand-alone without revelation are lower
with private information on s than with full information on s. For this, we will compare the
first order conditions with respect to this bonus in both situations and we will see that the one
under private information on s will be equal to the one under full information, augmented by a
negative term. This lets us conclude that the reaction function of each owner for a given bonus
level of the other owner is smaller under private information than under full information on s,
which means also a lower equilibrium level of these bonuses in stand-alone.
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For this, we will show that(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
 ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠS,upi (R)−EΠS,upi (N)
)
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s

−
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
∫ s
s
∂EUS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
f (s) ds < 0. (A2)
We have
(
1−(1−pSignal)
2
)
(1−pSignal)
2 > 0, which follows from the fact that p
Signal ∈ ]0, 1[. The threshold
s was defined as
s =
{
s : EΠJ,ucpi −
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUJ,ucpi
)
= EΠS,upi (N)
}
.
Taking the total differential, and keeping in mind that only EΠS,upi (N) and EU
S,up
i (N) depend
on bS,upi , and only EΠ
J,ucp
i (s) and EU
J,ucp
i (s) depend on s, we get
0 =
∂
(
EΠJ,ucpi (s) +EU
J,ucp
i (s)
)
∂s
ds−
∂
(
EΠS,upi (N) +EU
S,up
i (N)
)
∂bS,upi (N)
dbS,upi (N) ,
which leads to
ds
dbS,upi (N)
=
∂(EΠS,upi (N)+EU
S,up
i (N))
∂b
S,up
i (N)
∂(EΠJ,ucpi (s)+EU
J,ucp
i (s))
∂s
.
As
∂(EΠS,upi (N)+EU
S,up
i (N))
∂b
S,up
i (N)
> 0 (due to the unobservability of efforts) and
∂(EΠJ,ucpi (s)+EU
J,ucp
i (s))
∂s
>
0, we get
ds
dbS,upi (N)
=
∂(EΠS,upi (N)+EU
S,up
i (N))
∂b
S,up
i (N)
∂(EΠJ,ucpi (s)+EU
J,ucp
i (s))
∂s
> 0.
Revelation of s requires that
(
EUS,upi (N)−EUS,upi (R)
)∣∣∣
s=s
≤ 0, which implies that(
EΠS,upi (R)−EΠS,upi (N)
)
f (s)
∣∣∣
s=s
≤ 0. We therefore get
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
 ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠS,upi (R)−EΠS,upi (N)
)
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s
 < 0.
As
∂EU
S,up
i (N)
∂b
S,up
i (N)
> 0, we have that
∫ s
s
∂EU
S,up
i (N)
∂b
S,up
i (N)
f (s) ds > 0, which then implies that
−
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
∫ s
s
∂EUS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
f (s) ds < 0.
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This shows that(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
 ∂s
∂bS,upi (N)
(
EΠS,upi (R)−EΠS,upi (N)
)
f (s)
∣∣∣∣∣
s=s

−
(
1− (1− pSignal)2)
(1− pSignal)2
∫ s
s
∂EUS,upi (N)
∂bS,upi (N)
f (s) ds < 0.
We know that for full information on s, the first order condition was(
1− bS,uj
)
π + bS,uj
π
2
− 2bS,ui = 0. (A3)
Keeping the bonus of firm j fixed to bS,uj , letting both equations A1 and A3 hold amounts
to bS,upi
(
bS,uj
)
< bS,ui
(
bS,uj
)
. Q.E.D.
General Conclusion
Achieving cooperation among economic agents who are interacting for (partially) common goals
may be desirable, both, from an individual and/or from a social point of view. There are
attempts to create this cooperation, for example in R&D, using various policy measures starting
from subsidies for joint R&D going to the creation of technological parks by public authorities.
This dissertation deals with the phenomenon of cooperation, shedding light on it from two
distinct perspectives of Industrial Organization.
Part I of this thesis studies cooperation and collusion in networks of cooperative/collusive
agreements. There are several main insights. First, pooling payoff asymmetries in infinitely
repeated prisoners dilemmas in a multilateral punishment mechanism may systain cooperation
where without this possibility it would not be sustainable: it avoids an end-network effect. Sec-
ond, unforgiving multilateral punishments inhibit the use in-network information transmission
and may thereby hamper cooperation. Third, the ability to cooperate within a bilateral mech-
anism may inhibit the existence of a larger network of cooperative agreements. Finally, social
capital is defined and a game theoretical reason for Coleman’s argument that closure of social
networks allows for more cooperation is given.
Part II of this thesis studies the impact of agency problems on the formation and organization
of joint R&D.
In the first chapter of this part of the thesis, a product innovation project is considered.
There are two main insights from this chapter. First, it is shown that entrepreneurs choose to
carry out the research in a joint project if this is of high value and/or if there are high synergies
between the research units from a joint conducting of the project. Second, in the presence
of moral hazard the threshold value a potential innovation has to have in order to have the
entrepreneurs choose a joint project, is higher than if the research is carried out by the owners
themselves. Similarly, the synergies from conducting a joint project of a given value have to be
higher with moral hazard than without in order to let the entrepreneurs choose to carry out the
research project jointly.
In the second chapter of this part of the thesis, a process innovation project is considered,
which may be executed by each of two competing firms separately or by both of them together in
a merger. There are two main insights from this chapter. First, it is shown that agent managed
firms merge more often out of pure market power considerations and less often in order to use
synergies as compared to owner-manager (or family-run) firms. Second, it is shown that, due to
the systematically different equilibrium organizations, a competition authority incurs fewer type
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I and type II errors if it accepts an efficiency defense based on lower expected unit production
costs from agent-managed firms than if it accepts this defense from owner-managed firms.
Finally, in the third chapter of this part of the thesis, again, a product innovation project is
considered, which can be carried out by two entrepreneurs separately or by both in a research
joint venture. As in the chapters before, the research project is carried out by agents exerting an
unobservable effort. Contrary to the chapters before, in this chapter, these agents have superior
information on the optimal organizational form in which to carry out the project. There are
again two main insights from this chapter. First, it is shown that, in this case, the owners of the
firms optimally distort the incentives of their agents to exert an effort in stand-alone development
in order to induce them to reveal their private information on the optimal organizational form.
And second, as a consequence, it is shown that a policy promoting competitive research may
— as a byproduct — also affect (to be specific: increase) the probability of an invention under
stand-alone development.
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